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Abstract
This thesis investigates the conceptual relationship between laws of nature and
free will. In order to clarify the discussion, I begin by distinguishing several questions
with respect to the nature of a law: i) do the laws of nature cover everything
that happens? ii) are they deterministic? iii) can there be exceptions to universal
and deterministic laws? iv) do the laws of nature govern everything in the world?
In order to answer these questions I look at three widely endorsed accounts of
laws: "Humean" regularity accounts, laws as relations among universals, and the
dispositional essentialist account. I argue that there is nothing in the very nature of
a law - in any of the accounts surveyed - that implies a positive answer to questions
(i) and (ii). I show that this has important consequences for the free will problem.
I then turn to the compatibility of free will and determinism. I focus on the
Humean view and the dispositional essentialist account of laws. And the bulk of this
discussion concerns the consequence argument, especially the question of whether
the laws of nature are "up to us". I show that, on the dispositional conception of
laws, there is no sense in which the laws of nature are up to us, contrary to the
Humean view. However, this does not mean that there is no room for free will on
the dispositional account. I argue that free will requires the laws of nature to be
limited in scope, rather than being indeterministic. I conclude by showing that this
allows one to resist the claim that indeterminism rules out free will.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Free will is, we all know, a huge question to which over millennia an enormous
amount of intense thought has been dedicated, involving of course debate over the
very formulation of the problem. The general topic to be discussed here is the
conceptual relation between laws of nature and free will. This chapter is divided
into two parts. First, I set forth the problem of free will and determinism. Second,
I give an outline of the following chapters1.
1.1 The problem of free will and determinism ini-
tially characterised
I have made a choice while typing these words. I have decided - perhaps from
a diverse cluster of possible courses of action - to write this introduction. And I
believe that this was up to me, that I had control over this decision. There are
two main ideas here (Fischer 1999: 98). Free will, at least according to a certain
traditional view, requires both (i) genuine alternative possibilities and (ii) control2.
A nice way to picture this is to think of our future as a garden of forking paths.
1Parts of this chapter are based on a joint paper with Nancy Cartwright.
2Following John Fischer, I will use the term "control" because, as he says, "it highlights the fact
that mere chance occurrences do not secure the satisfaction of the relevant requirement" (Fischer
1999: 99).
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Many paths are genuinely available to us, and we can "select which path will be the
path into the future" (Fischer 1999: 99).
Common sense suggests that there is free will. It is not totally clear, however,
whether the very notion of free will is coherent. One worry comes from the thesis
of determinism. If determinism is true, then it seems that there cannot be genuine
alternative possibilities. On the other hand, philosophers worry that if determinism
is not true, then our actions are "indeterministic" or "random", so that they cannot
be under our control. It seems as though (i) and (ii) are in conflict. In order to have
a better grasp of this, let us start by considering the notion of determinism. Since
there are several theses that may be properly called "determinism", I shall start by
distinguishing them.
First, one may reasonably assume that the principle of bivalence holds for all
propositions, that is, that every proposition is either true or false. Now consider the
proposition that I will have a beer tomorrow night. Either this proposition is true,
or it is false. If it is true, then I will have a beer tomorrow night. If it is not true,
then I will not have a beer tomorrow night. In any case, it seems that it is not up
to me whether I will have a beer tomorrow night, since there is a true proposition
describing what I am going to do in the future. This is what some philosophers
call "determinism", or "logical determinism" (Jordan 1963; Lukasiewicz 1970). The
problem of logical determinism is that of understanding how agents can have free
will if there are true propositions about their future actions.
Second, the term "determinism" may be used to refer to the view according to
which God knows every true proposition, including those about our future actions.
In this sense, this view may be more accurately called "theological determinism".
And it is called "determinism" because it may be the case that God’s omniscience
is incompatible with free will (Fischer & Tognazzini 2013). This is the problem
of theological determinism and free will, that is, the problem of whether God’s
omniscience is compatible with free will.
Naturally, one may use the term "determinism" in a way that is neither "logical
determinism" nor "theological determinism". It is the conception of determinism
often called "nomological determinism" or "causal determinism". Very roughly,
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nomological determinism is the thesis according to which the past and the laws of
nature determine the future. Nomological determinism is also connected with free
will, since it is arguably a threat to the view that there are genuine alternative
possibilities. But it differs from the views mentioned above because it is deeply
related to the concept of laws of nature and our comprehension of the physical
sciences. It is this conception of determinism I shall be concerned with in this
thesis. The main question I shall address here is: What is the relation between laws
and free will?
Clarifying the problem. In order to answer these questions, I must explain what
is the problem of free will and nomological determinism (henceforth just "determin-
ism"). One of the ways to put forward a philosophical problem is in terms of a set
of propositions all of which seem true (or for all of which we seem to have good
reasons), but which are jointly inconsistent. We can sum up the problem of free will
and determinism as follows:
1. Either determinism is true or not.
2. If determinism is true, then there is no free will.
3. If determinism is not true, then there is no free will either.
4. There is free will.
Propositions (2) and (3) are the controversial ones, but there are influential ar-
guments in the literature for them. That is, as I will explain below, the consequence
argument is an argument for (2), while the Mind argument and the luck argument
are arguments for (3). If the consequence argument is cogent, then determinism
rules out genuine alternative possibilities. On the other, if the Mind and the luck
arguments are cogent, then the truth of indeterminism rules out control. So, if these
arguments are cogent, there are good reasons for accepting (2) and (3). And there
are also good reasons for propositions (1) and (4). (1) is an instance of a logical
truth. With respect to (4), it seems no one can deny it, at least "until they started
doing some philosophy" (Vihvelin 2015: 395).
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Now the problem should be clear. For suppose determinism is true. If this is the
case, given proposition (2), it follows that there is no free will. Now suppose that
determinism is not true. If this is the case, given proposition (3), it follows that there
is no free will. Therefore, in any case, there is no free will, which is the contradictory
of proposition (4). So, as we can see, theses (1) to (3) entail the contradictory of (4).
This is how the philosophical problem of free will and determinism may be initially
presented.
As Kadri Vihvelin (2015) points out, the fact that we have free will seems unde-
niable until someone starts doing philosophy. Naturally, the philosophical problem
may be presented as a dilemma against (4). Either determinism is true or not. If
determinism is true, then there is no free will. If determinism is not true, then there
is no free will either. Thus, there is no free will.
All of this requires a more precise characterisation. I have not sufficiently ex-
plained what I mean by "determinism", nor have I explicitly presented the arguments
for (2) and (3). On top of that, there are some important questions with respect to
the notion of determinism that need to be distinguished. I shall explain the dilemma
in a bit more detail in the following sections, as well as the arguments for (2) and
(3).
1.1.1 Either determinism is true or not
Determinism, as I mentioned before, is deeply related to the concept of laws of
nature. But it is not my aim to provide an original account of the sort of thing a
law of nature is. Rather, I shall look at some widely endorsed accounts in chapter
2 in order to discuss their connection with free will. There is, however, a way of
cashing out the notion of "determinism" that one may take as independent of any
particular philosophical account of lawhood. Call it "the standard view". It may
be presented as follows (van Inwagen 1983: 65; Vihvelin 2013):
Determinism is the thesis that for every instant of time t, there is a proposition
that expresses the state of the world at that instant, and if P and Q are any
propositions that express the state of the world at some instants, then the
conjunction of P together with the laws of nature entails Q.
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This definition allows us to elucidate the intuitive idea about nomological deter-
minism, namely, that the past and the laws determine the future. If P expresses the
state of the world at t and Q expresses the state of the world at some time t′ later
than t, then one part of the world’s history (namely, the past) together with the
laws determine another part of that history (namely, the future). This definition
has also the consequence that the future and the laws determine the past, for P may
be a proposition that expresses the state of the world at an instant t later than the
one expressed by Q.
This is a legitimate way of cashing out the notion of determinism. But there are
two theses in this formulation that need to be properly distinguished.
Extent and permissiveness
Vihvelin does a nice job pointing out that the standard sense of determinism, roughly
stated, is the conjunction of the following two claims: (i) that the laws hold every-
where and everywhen, covering all aspects of what happens3; (ii) "that the laws
state sufficient, as opposed to merely necessary or probabilistic, conditions" (Vi-
hvelin 2013: 3). Following work with Nancy Cartwright, I shall keep the following
two questions separate from one another:
• Extent. Is everything that happens covered by the laws of nature? For in-
stance, there may be happenings, or kinds of happenings, or whole domains
about which L - the complete set of correct laws - is silent.
• Permissiveness. When L speaks about the outcomes that are to occur, what
kind of latitude does it admit? For instance, does it always select a single
happening? Does it always lay down at least a probability, or can L admit a
set of different outcomes, remaining silent about their probabilities4?
3Actually, Vihvelin formulates (i) like this: "(i) that we are no exception to the laws that govern
everything else in the universe". I avoided this formulation because the word "govern" is a bit
misleading, even though Vihvelin herself is aware of this.
4Cartwright and I propose treating the laws that say "anything goes" in some circumstance as
not covering that circumstance and thus limited in extent.
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To explain these questions I must first say something about laws. We may very
broadly think of laws as saying something about the occurrence or features of some
kinds of events given other facts about those events or others. I shall call events of
the former kind, the "domain of the law", those of the latter, the "input". The free
will discussion focuses on laws where the input for any event described by P in the
law’s domain is in P ’s past. I will designate an input for P that is allowed under
law L and that occurs at t0 by Pt0(L, P ).
There are two guiding ideas I rely on throughout in considering extent and per-
missiveness. The idea for extent is simple. There may be situations where the laws
are silent; they simply do not cover those situations. This is an issue that is or-
thogonal to questions about whether laws are permissive when they do speak. For
instance, L may be deterministic in the sense that for each Pt0(L, P ), L admits one
and only one P to occur, yet limited in extent because some real situations are not
Pt0(L, P )-type situations for any admissible Pt0(L, P ), i.e. some situations may not
fall into any of the categories for the additional facts that bring L to bear.
With respect to extent, a little simple housekeeping is necessary since some of
the discussion in both the philosophy of science and the free will literature as well
as in the related metaphysics literature is confusing (at least to Cartwright and me)
because it does not make clear the formulations at stake to begin with, especially
with respect to the quantifiers and what they range over. Consider the claim G’:
"Politeness requires giving an expensive gift to one’s teacher/mentor", that I suppose
is true in some cultures influenced by Confucianism. Shall we say it is limited in
extent, or shall we rather consider G: "In cultures A,B,C, politeness requires giving
an expensive gift to one’s teacher/mentor", which is, I suppose, true everywhere
and in that sense not limited in extent? Similarly Cartwright (1983, 1989, 2009,
2010) has suggested that what we think of as the usual laws of physics L′ may well
be limited in extent in a very specific way: They may be unable to represent all
the possible causes of the effects they represent; their truth may then be restricted
to just those cases where only causes they can represent are at work. Thus, it
should more perspicaciously be formulated something like this. L: "So long as all
of the causes of the consequences represented in L′ are features represented in the
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antecedents of L′, then L′". One could think of formulating the issue in terms of
domain restrictions: Are these restrictions included in the laws themselves or not?
The problem is that it can be difficult to formulate criteria for what counts as a
restriction on the domain of a law versus what counts as a feature that it genuinely
covers. This is why I formulate the issue as follows: Are there things that happen
that the complete and correct set of laws does not cover?
As to permissiveness, Cartwright has long urged that some events may just
happen - by hap - without even any probabilities assigned by nature. An ear-ring
back is stuck in some debris in the crack between the floorboards. Someone tries to
lift it with a magnet. The magnet pulls upward on the metal object with a fixed
strength and gravity pulls it down with a fixed strength. These activities are both
properly treated as sources of forces, where by "properly" she means that there is a
general way to ascribe forces for both. There is a magnet and there is a rule in physics
for what forces magnets exert; and there is a large mass – the earth – and there is
a rule for what force a mass exerts. There is also debris that inhibits the motion of
the ear-ring back. Maybe there is another description of this particular debris for
which there is a proper rule in physics that assigns a force. But certainly not under
the description "debris". And maybe there is no other such description. We may
grant that some causes of motion are forces in the proper sense of that concept but
that does not imply that all are. To assume there must be because the debris can
affect the motion of the ear-ring back is to make a massive metaphysical assumption
beyond the empirical evidence, Cartwright (2000, 2010) argues (cf. Cartwright &
Pemberton 2013).
If one leaves the issue open, then a new possibility arises. There is a rule for what
force is exerted when the magnet and the earth act together in this arrangement,
and on this rule only one resultant force is allowed. But what about the motion
of the ear-ring back? Is there a rule that says what one motion will happen in
this arrangement when the resultant force of the earth and the magnet acts on the
ear-ring back simultaneously with the inhibiting power of the debris, or if not a rule
dictating one single outcome, is there a rule that dictates a set of outcomes with a
probability measure over them?
1.1. The problem of free will and determinism initially characterised 8
It seems we have insufficient reason to assume there is, Cartwright has argued, so
that assumption should not be forced by our account of what laws are; the account
should leave the question open. Yet surely there is some kind of rule since we have
what do seem well-warranted beliefs that the ear-ring back will not fly away at near
the speed of light. This is very underexplored territory. Cartwright and I have
labelled this permissiveness : When L applies, given a relevant input Pt0(L, P ), L
might admit only one outcome, in which case L is not permissive. On the other
hand, L may be permissive in the sense that L admits a set that includes more than
one outcome, and in the latter case, L may or may not provide a probability over
that set5.
What we want then is a definition of "deterministic" that is sensitive to these
aspects. A definition in which - for instance - laws may be deterministic and yet
limited in extent6. Now, there are different ways to characterise "deterministic"
(see, for example, Müller and Placek 2015). Here, I shall discuss what they call the
"mapping-based approach", which springs from Richard Montague’s (1974) seman-
tic characterisation of deterministic theories. I follow, in particular, John Earman’s
work (1986), which strips away "much of the formal apparatus employed by Mon-
tague" (Roberts 2006: 199) in characterising determinism in terms of physically
possible worlds. That is, the strategy is to define "deterministic" by quantifying
over all the possible worlds allowed by the set of laws.
Let L to stand for "L is the correct set of laws". Here is how "deterministic" is
defined:
Definition 1.1.1. Laws L are deterministic if, and only if, for any P that L covers
and any Pt0(L, P ) that is an input to L for P and any logically possible worlds w,
w
′ in which L, if w and w′ agree on Pt0(L, P ), they agree on whether P obtains.
5Clearly this supposes some already given way to individuate outcomes.
6Another motivation for keeping the questions about extent and permissiveness separate from
one another is that the standard view is at odds with some recent accounts of laws. Two of
them are Jonathan Cohen and Craig Callender’s (2009) "Better Best Systems Account" and Barry
Loewer’s view (2007). I show in the appendix that the laws of nature may not hold everywhere
and everywhen, and yet there is a sense in which one might say that they are deterministic.
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This definition allows us to keep the questions about extent and permissive-
ness separate from one another. According to the standard view, the claim that
determinism is true boils down to saying that laws have universal extent and are
deterministic.
Perhaps one might question the relevance of such a distinction because in the
relevant sense of "laws" - such as David Lewis’ best system account (1973, 1994)
or David Armstrong’s necessitarian view (1983, 1997) - they are universal in extent.
However, I shall argue in chapter 2 that this is not the case even for the mainstream
accounts: the claim that laws are universal in extent is just an add-on to these
accounts of laws.
This has some consequences for my formulation of the compatibility problem of
free will and deterministic laws. For strictly speaking the problem with respect to
the laws of nature and free will is not about free will and deterministic laws, at least
not according to the definition I employ. If it turns out that laws are limited in
extent and do not apply to actional-events, then they do not seem to be a threat to
free will. The claim that laws are a threat to free will depends on the assumption
that they are universal in extent, or at least that they cover actional-events. In this
sense, the first proposition of the dilemma should be more explicitly formulated as
follows: either laws are deterministic and universal, or not. So in a nutshell, the
problem is about whether deterministic laws together with the claim that laws are
not limited in extent (and thus cover actional-events) is a threat to free will.
Furthermore, distinguishing these questions opens the possibility of differentiat-
ing at least two views with respect to the compatibility of free will and indeterminism
- where indeterminism is the denial of determinism. For example, it is usually ar-
gued that if determinism is incompatible with free will, then if there is free will, the
laws of nature have to be indeterministic. (I suspect that this is so because a good
part of this discussion seems to presuppose that the laws of nature cover, or perhaps
govern, everything in the world). Nevertheless, if we distinguish the questions about
extent and permissiveness, then if free will and determinism are incompatible and
there is free will, what follows is that either laws are indeterministic or they are
limited in extent. Someone may be an incompatibilist in the sense that deterministic
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and universal laws are incompatible with free will, but deny that free will requires
laws to be indeterministic. I will articulate such a view in chapter 5.
1.1.2 If determinism is true, there is no free will
There are many arguments for the incompatibility of free will and deterministic laws
insofar as determinism is the claim that laws are universal in extent and determin-
istic7. I will characterise incompatibilism as the thesis that, necessarily, if laws are
deterministic and universal in extent, there is no free will. Let compatibilism be
the denial of incompatibilism; that is, it is possible for laws to be deterministic,
universal in extent, and nevertheless there is free will. Among the arguments for
incompatibilism there is no doubt that the consequence argument - defended most
famously by Peter van Inwagen (1983) and Carl Ginet (1983) - is the most influen-
tial one. As Neil Levy and Michael McKenna write "the consequence argument is
very powerful. It has been credited with breaking the compatibilist hegemony over
the free will debate" (Levy & McKenna 2009: 97). The informal formulation of the
argument runs as follows:
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequence of laws of nature
and events in the remote past. But it’s not up to us what went on before we
were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore,
the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.
(van Inwagen 1983: 16)
There are many attempts to fill in the details of this enthymeme, and I will discuss
some of them in the following chapters8. The main idea is simple. Let us assume
that our acts are covered by the correct set of laws. Now consider the following
question:
• Reliability. Does what L (plus some relevant Pt0(L, P )) says is to happen
always happen? For instance, can there be exceptions to L and yet L still be
the correct and complete set of laws?
7See Vihvelin (2013: chapter 5) for a nice survey of the traditional arguments for incompatibil-
ism. Here I shall be mainly concerned with the consequence argument.
8In particular, van Inwagen’s first and third formal arguments, and Alicia Finch and Ted
Warfield’s (1998) formulation.
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Suppose P is a proposition such as the one expressed by the sentence "I raise my
hand". Given that L - the correct set of laws covers P , if L and L is deterministic,
then laws are reliable: what L says to happen always happen. This can be formulated
in a more precise way as follows:
D: If L is deterministic, □((L ∧ Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) follows.
To see why, suppose that L is deterministic and Pt0(L, P ) is an initial condition
for P with respect to L and P . Let W stand for the collection of all possible
worlds. Consider an arbitrary world w in W where Pt0(L, P ) and L. Because L is
deterministic, if P obtains in any world where L and Pt0(L, P ) obtain, it holds in
all worlds where Pt0(L, P ) and L obtain, including w. P obtains in our (the actual)
world where L and Pt0(L, P ) obtain. So P obtains in w and thus (Pt0(L, P )∧L) ⊃ P
in w. Since w is any arbitrary possible world, □((L ∧ P0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) follows.
Now, the idea of the consequence argument is that neither the fact that L holds
nor the fact that Pt0(L, P ) holds are up to us. Both Ginet and van Inwagen have
introduced a modal sentential operator in order to cash that out. The operator is
"N", and (according to van Inwagen’s formulation) Nφ stands for "φ and no one
has or ever had any choice about whether φ". Furthermore, "N" is supposed to
satisfy the following inference rules:
(α) □φ ⊢ Nφ
(β) Nφ, N(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢ Nψ
Here is the consequence argument for incompatibilism. If the the laws of nature
are deterministic and universal, they cover P (say, that I raise my hand).
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1 □((L ∧ Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) def 1.1.1
2 □(L ⊃ (Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P )) modal logic, 1
3 N(L ⊃ (Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P )) α, 2
4 NL premise
5 NPt0(L, P ) premise
6 N(Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P ) β, 3, 4
7 NP β, 5, 6
The consequence argument is an argument for the view that if laws are determin-
istic and universal in extent, then no one is able to do otherwise9. Remember that,
according to the traditional view, free will requires genuine alternative possibilities.
So, if the consequence argument is cogent, there cannot be genuine alternative pos-
sibilities, so that determinism is incompatible with free will10. And if this is the
case, the laws of nature cannot be both deterministic and universal if we believe
some agents have free will.
1.1.3 If determinism is not true, there is no free will
Suppose incompatibilism is true. If that is the case, is there any room for free will?
Call "libertarianism" the view that incompatibilism is true and there is free will. If
libertarianism is right, then indeterminism (which is the denial of determinism) is a
necessary condition for free will. However, it is worth pointing out that even liber-
tarians do not take for granted that indeterminism per se guarantees the existence
9Well, at least this is what I will show by defining "N" in order to demonstrate the validity
of the argument. And I guess that this definition (roughly) boils down to "no one is able to do
otherwise".
10This formulation, however, faces lots of problems. First, there is the problem of whether (β) is
a valid inference rule. Second, since incompatibilism is the thesis that, necessarily, if determinism
is true (in the sense that laws are deterministic and universal in extent), then there is no free will,
the argument cannot rely on premises that are merely actually true, such as premises 4 and 5
(Warfield 2000). In any case, however, I believe that there is some formulation of the argument
which is immune to these critiques, as I shall argue in chapters 3, 5 and 6.
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of free will. For instance, if a long time ago some particles in a far, far away galaxy
were undetermined and everything else was determined, there would not be such a
thing as free will (assuming, of course, that determinism and free will are incompat-
ible). In other words, if the laws for non-agents are permissive, but impermissive
as long as agents are involved, then there is no free will (simply because there are
no genuine alternative possibilities). What is important for those holding that our
having free will requires indeterminism is that either the laws of nature do not cover
our actions, or if they cover our actions, they are indeterministic.
However, the term "indeterminism" seems to have something to do with luck
and randomness; and luck and randomness do seem incompatible with free will
because they seem incompatible with control. And if this is the case, then free
will is incompatible with indeterminism after all. The Mind and luck arguments
are attempts to turn this intuition about indeterminism and free will into precise
rigorous arguments.
The Mind argument
The Mind argument has received this name because van Inwagen noticed that it
has appeared very often in the philosophy journal Mind11. Here, I will focus on van
Inwagen’s version of the argument (in particular the third strand) and its subsequent
discussion (Finch & Warfield 1998; Nelkin 2001; Graham 2014; Shabo 2013). It is
controversial, however, whether the very formulation of the argument is not muddled
(Graham 2010). I will follow the standard way of putting forward the argument
anyway, leaving the question of whether this discussion is confused to chapter 7.
In An Essay on Free will van Inwagen sums up the argument as follows: "a
free act is an act one has a choice about; but no one has any choice about that
which is undetermined" (van Inwagen 1983: 142). But why exactly no one has any
choice about that which is undetermined? He defends this claim by asking us to
imagine a mechanism the salient features of which are a red light, a green light, and
11It appeared for example in Hobart (1934), Nowell-Smith (1948, 1957), Smart (1961), Ayer
(1954), among others.
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a button. If someone presses the button, the mechanism will result in one of the
lights flashing, but it is undetermined which. Following Christopher Franklin (2011:
225), I will assume that by "undetermined" van Inwagen means that the laws are
indeterministic with respect to the light to which the light will flash. "Now suppose
that you must press the button on this mechanism. Have you any choice about
which of the lights will flash? It seems obvious that you have no choice about this"
(van Inwagen 1983: 142).
Now consider the following scenario. Suppose that Mary is undecided about
whether or not she should take a break from writing her PhD thesis. If laws are
permissive with respect to this, she may decide to take a break and procrastinate a
little bit, or she may decide to stay in her office working for a few hours more, etc.
Suppose she thinks the matter over carefully and decides to keep on writing. Why
did she do this? In order to finish her work, go back home early and chat with her
friends.
In that scenario there is an explanation as to why Mary decided to stay in the
office working; the explanation reveals Mary’s reasons for performing that action.
But what makes such an explanation true? According to causalism, for instance,
there must be a causal connection between the explanans (say, the agent’s desires,
beliefs, etc.) and the explanandum (the agent’s action). That is, the agent’s reasons
(Mary’s desire to go back home early and chat with her friends) need to cause the
action (the decision to stay in the office). Suppose the following is right, that Mary’s
reasons caused her action. Now, let P stand for the proposition expressed by the
sentence "Mary decides to stay in the office" and let DB stand for the relevant
desires and beliefs that do the causing12.
The cogency of the consequence argument implies that there are no genuine
alternative possibilities. But suppose that, in order to allow genuine alternative
possibilities, we require laws to be indeterministic with respect to our actions. Let
12The argument can be formulated without presupposing causalism. But since in the original
formulation van Inwagen (1983: 145) adopts a Davidsonian account sketched in "Actions, Reasons
and Causes" (Davidson 1963), and since Davidson himself defended causalism in that paper, I
think this formulation is fine for the present purposes.
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us say, for example, that the laws of nature are indeterministic with respect to P
being followed by DB, so that it is undetermined whether P is followed by DB.
Here is a version of the argument (Finch & Warfield 1998):
1. N(DB ⊃ P )
2. NDB
Thus,
3. NP (from 1, 2, and (β))
Now consider premise 1. Mary seems to have no choice about whether P follows
DB in the same way that no one has any choice about whether the device will flash,
say, a green light (for the laws of nature are indeterministic with respect to this).
And it is also assumed that premise 2 is plausible13. If one is an incompatibilist
because she is convinced that the consequence argument (as presented before) is
cogent, then one will have trouble with the Mind argument. For if the consequence
argument is cogent, rule (β) is valid, and in that case the Mind argument is valid as
well. In fact, the purpose of bringing this formulation of the Mind argument into the
discussion is that it relies on the assumption that "having no-choice about" transfers
across material conditionals. As I shall argue in chapter 7, however, this discussion
is not very clear and at least this formulation of the argument is not compelling.
The luck argument
The luck argument has recently received a lot of attention in the literature on free
will. There is no single argument that is "the luck argument". There are rather a
great many arguments about the connection between luck and free will. Franklin
13As Franklin says, this assumption is harmless because Mary "could only have had a choice
about DB [...] if [s]he performed some earlier action which itself would have been brought about
by yet earlier mental states. We could then raise the same questions about this earlier action and
these earlier mental states. Someone might again insist that the agent had a choice about these
still earlier metal states. But this cannot go on forever and we will eventually discover [Mary’s]
‘initial’ mental states for which [s]he had no choice" (Franklin 2011: footnote 35).
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(2011) identifies several formulations, and here I will be concerned with Alfred Mele’s
(2006) explanatory formulation.
In his original formulation, Mele conceives a scenario in which a goddess, Diana,
creates "agents in an indeterministic universe which whenever they freely perform
an action of deciding to a, they could have freely performed some alternative action"
(Mele 2006: 8). Notwithstanding,
She worries that her design does not accommodate this. Her worry, more
specifically, is that if the difference between the actual world, in which one of
her agents judges it best to A straightaway and then, at t, decides accordingly,
and any possible world with the same past up to t and the same laws of
nature in which he makes an alternative decision while the judgment persists
is just a matter of luck, then he does not freely make that decision in that
possible world, W. Diana suspects that his making that alternative decision
rather than deciding in accordance with his best judgment— that is, that
difference between W and the actual world—is just a matter of bad luck or,
more precisely, of worse luck in W for the agent than in the actual world.
After all, because the worlds do not diverge before the agent decides, there is
no difference in them to account for the difference in decisions (Mele 2006: 8).
This what I will refer to as "the luck argument", which is supposed to be a
problem for the compatibility of the denial of determinism and free will.
1.1.4 There is free will
So far I have motivated the most controversial assumptions of the problem (although
I have not presented the arguments in complete detail yet). The claim that there is
free will should be the least controversial one. One reason for believing in free will
is that one may think it is connected to moral responsibility. If there is no free will,
on many standard understandings, there is no moral responsibility. And because
there is moral responsibility it follows there is free will.
Now, I do not know how to give a consensual characterisation of "free will",
let alone a widely accepted definition of this term. Here, I will stick with the
characterisation I started at the beginning. Fischer calls it "alternative-possibilities
control":
The intuitive picture behind the alternative-possibilities control requirement is
that moral responsibility requires that the agent select one from among various
genuinely open paths the world might take. There are two important ideas
1.1. The problem of free will and determinism initially characterised 17
here. One is that there must be various paths genuinely available to the agent
(at least at some times suitably related to the time of the behaviour under con-
sideration). The second idea is that the agent (and not some outside force or
mere chance) selects which path will be the path into the future. It seems to me
that both ideas are important components of the traditional conception of the
sort of control associated with moral responsibility - alternative-possibilities
control. (Fischer 1999: 99)
I have avoided to use the term "moral responsibility" because there is a side of
the debate I am not considering. If this intuitive picture is correct, we have the
following:
Alternative possibilities: If no one is ever able to do otherwise, then there is no
free will.
Moral responsibility If there is no free will, no one is morally responsible.
This is hugely contentious. If the conditionals presented above are true, one can
infer the following:
PAP: If no one is ever able to do otherwise, then no one is morally responsible.
The assumptions are in line with what Carolina Sartorio14 calls "the traditional
view of freedom" (Sartorio forthcoming). In "Alternate Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility" Harry Frankfurt (1969, 2003) has decisively influenced the debate
by arguing against (PAP). Vihvelin compares the impact of Frankfurt’s argument
to Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples to knowledge as justified true belief (Vihvelin
2013: 93). The scenarios Frankfurt appealed to have been called "Frankfurt-style
examples". The difference, however, is that it is still controversial whether Frankfurt
provided a successful refutation of (PAP).
As I said, I am not considering this side of the debate. Precisely for this reason
I am considering the discussion concerning the "consequence argument", and not
the "direct argument"15. If it turns out Frankfurt is right, then my formulation of
14See Sartorio’s paper (forthcoming) on Frankfurt-style counterexamples for a nice survey.
15The direct argument, to use Levy and McKenna’s expression (2009), is the "cousin" of the
consequence argument. While the consequence argument relies on transfer principles with respect
to "no-choice about", the direct argument works with the notion of no-responsibility for.
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the consequence argument will not expose the incompatibility of determinism and
moral responsibility, but just the incompatibility of determinism and free will, where
"free will" - as I understand it - requires both genuine alternative possibilities and
control. So, although the thesis is about laws of nature and free will, it is not about
laws of nature and moral responsibility16.
1.2 An outline
I have specified the general problem to be discussed throughout the thesis. But
I have said too little about what laws are. In chapter 2 I look at some widely
endorsed philosophical accounts of laws of nature: "Humean" regularity accounts,
laws as relations among universals, and disposition/powers account. Chapter 2
has two purposes: to distinguish several important questions in formulating the
problem of free will and to discuss how the term "deterministic laws" should be
defined relative to the philosophical accounts discussed. My claim will be that
"Humeans" and dispositional essentialist advocates should adopt different definitions
of "deterministic laws". I motivate the definitions by discussing Scott Sehon’s (2011)
objection to the claim that deterministic laws are reliable.
The purpose of presenting both the consequence and Mind arguments in this
chapter was to highlight the role "N" and rule (β) play in the debate, since the
16In the Stanford Encyclopedia’s entry for arguments for incompatibilism, Vihvelin distinguishes
questions about free will from questions about moral responsibility. According to her, "Someone
might believe that we have free will and that free will is compatible with determinism while also
believing, for other reasons, that no one is ever morally responsible. And someone might believe
that we don’t have free will (because of determinism or something else) while also believing,
against conventional wisdom, that we are nevertheless morally responsible. What one believes
about determinism and moral responsibility will depend, in large part, on what one believes about
various matters within the scope of ethics rather than metaphysics. Among other things, it will
depend on what one takes moral responsibility to be (P. Strawson 1962; G. Strawson 1986, 1994;
Watson 2004). For these reasons it is important not to conflate the question of the compatibility
of free will and determinism with the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with
determinism." (Vihvelin 2017)
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formulations of the arguments depend on this inference rule: N(φ ⊃ ψ), Nφ ⊢ Nψ.
In chapter 3 I present the back and forth of the discussion concerning the validity
of rule (β). I will discuss the main counterexamples against (β), as well as Crisp
and Warfield’s solution (2000) to these counterexamples. I put forward an argument
from analogy to show that Crisp and Warfield’s strategy is implausible. After that,
I give two interpretations of "having no choice about whether a proposition is true"
and prove that some "no-choice about" transfer rules (such as β) hold on the Lewis-
Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals. One interesting result is that, according to
one of the definitions, (β) is valid on Stalnaker’s semantics but not on Lewis’. After
defining "deterministic laws" and finding some interpretation of "no-choice about"
in which the inference rules hold, I go on to discuss the conceptual relationship
between universal and deterministic laws and free will according to two accounts
of laws described in Chapter 2, namely, the Humean view and Alexander Bird’s
dispositional view. The reason is that I take the Humean position on laws to be the
best way to motivate compatibilism, and the dispositionalist conception of laws to
be the best way to motivate incompatibilism.
In Chapter 4 I argue that at least some Humean compatibilist view motivates the
rejection of premise 2 in the dilemma against free will. I discuss David Lewis’ Local
Miracle Compatibilism (LMC). Helen Beebee has interestingly argued that LMC is
an untenable view because it depends on a quite problematic distinction. However, I
will argue the distinction makes sense if the principle that a freely performed action
requires a contrastive explanation (an explanation of why the agent performed a
rather than not-a) is true.
In chapter 5 I argue that the dispositional essentialist account of laws and in-
compatibilism go hand in hand. I show that the dispositional account of laws entails
the necessary truth of the premise that the laws of nature are not up to anyone.
Nevertheless, my formulation of the consequence argument depends on the Lewis-
Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals, which seems incompatible with dispositional
essentialism. I respond to this problem by appealing to Toby Handfield’s solution
(2001, 2004) according to which dispositional essentialists may appeal to the concept
of a space-invading property instance. After that, I introduce the theory of agent
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causation and draw some parallels between space-invasion and agent causation. And
if agent causation can be conceived as space-invasion, then laws - according to the
dispositional view - will have to be limited in extent rather than indeterministic if
they are consistent with free will.
If the arguments in chapter 5 are sound, then incompatibilists should take dis-
positional essentialism seriously. But there is another premise in the consequence
argument that requires justification, namely, the premise that no one can change the
past. In chapter 6 I argue that the main counterexample to this premise - presented
by Joseph Campbell (2007, 2008, 2010) - fails.
Finally, if the dispositional account of laws is correct and the premise that no one
can change the past is true, free will is incompatible with laws being deterministic
and universal in extent. The challenge then is to reply to the Mind argument. I
argue that the standard formulation of the Mind argument fails. After that, I briefly
consider the implications of the view articulated in chapter 5 with respect to the luck
argument. I will argue that there is a gap in the argument, and that presupposes
that the laws are both universal and indeterministic.
The purpose of bringing the Humean account of laws and the dispositional view
of laws into play was to point out that different philosophical views with respect to
laws have different implications for the question of whether determinism and free
will are compatible. But if my overall argument is sound, at least one proposition of
the dilemma against free will is unjustified. I do not claim, however, that I have a
solution to the troubling problem of free will. A solution to the problem - I suggest
- depends on explaining what is to have the degree of control necessary for free will,
which is something I will not consider in detail here. In any case, I hope at least
to clarify that there is nothing in the very nature of a law - in any of the accounts
I survey - that implies that there are no genuine alternative possibilities. The only
difference is that the Humean view is compatible with alternative possibilities even
if determinism is true, while the dispositional essentialist view requires determinism
not to be true. However, showing that laws are consistent with various paths avail-
able to the agent does not show that the agent has control, that is, that "the agent
(and not some outside force or mere chance) selects which path will be the path into
1.2. An outline 21
the future" (Fischer 1999: 99). The solution to this problem - I suggest - does not
depend on the question of whether determinism is true. It depends on what control
consists in.
Chapter 2
Are laws of nature consistent with
contingency?
In the previous chapter I introduced three questions concerning the nature of laws,
namely, questions about extent, permissiveness and reliability. Cartwright and I
have labelled the possibility of laws being permissive, limited in extent or unreliable
as sources of contingency about what happens in the world1. My claim is that
the questions matter because the very formulation of the free will problem relies
on them; for instance, incompatibilism has bite as long as laws do not allow for
contingency in the aforementioned senses. So, the general question to be dealt with
in this chapter is that of whether laws are consistent with contingency. That is, does
the existence of laws imply that things could not happen other than the way they
do consistent with the laws staying the same?
The answer to the question of whether laws allow for contingency depends on
what the laws of nature actually are, but it also depends on what they are like. This
latter is my concern here. Different philosophical views give different accounts of
the sort of thing a law of nature is. I shall look at three that are widely endorsed:
"Humean" regularity accounts, laws as relations among universals, and the disposi-
1Parts of this chapter have been published as "Determinism, Laws of Nature and the Conse-
quence Argument" (2016), and some other parts will be published as "Are laws of nature consistent
with contingency?", which is a joint paper with Nancy Cartwright. The bulk of subsubsection
"Laws as relations among universals: Extent and Permissiveness" was carried out by Cartwright.
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tional essentialist account. The question is, given an account of what laws are, what
follows about how much contingency, and of what kinds, laws allow?
Naturally, whether contingency is possible given the laws of nature depends not
only on what kinds of things laws of nature are but also on what contingency consists
in. I will introduce two more questions in addition to those I talked about in the
previous chapter. Here are the questions to keep sorted from one another.
• Extent. Is everything that happens covered by L? For instance, there may be
happenings, or kinds of happenings, or whole domains about which L is silent.
• Permissiveness. When L speaks about the outcomes that are to occur, what
kind of latitude does it admit? For instance, does it always select a single
happening? Does it always lay down at least a probability, or can L admit a
set of different outcomes, remaining silent about their probabilities?
• Reliability. Does what L (plus some relevant Pt0(L, P )) says is to happen
always happen? For instance, can there be exceptions to L and yet L still be
the correct and complete set of laws?
• Potency. Do the things that L speaks about happen on account of L? Or, for
instance, merely in accord with L?
• Free will. If P is an action of a person, is ∼P consistent with Pt0(L, P ) and L
being the correct and complete set of laws?
The last question - as one might expect - hovers in the background. One might
take laws to be a threat to free will because it is assumed that they are deterministic.
However, this should be reformulated as follows. Suppose that laws do not allow for
contingency in the sense that (i) there are no happenings about which laws are silent,
(ii) they are impermissive for agents and (iii) what they say to happen (with some
relevant input) always happens. If (i), (ii) and (iii) hold water and the consequence
argument is sound, then laws do not allow for contingency in the free will sense.
Without these assumptions, though, it is hard to see how incompatibilism has bite.
All these assumptions, however, can be envisaged as add-ons of the accounts I look
at, or so I shall argue.
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I will not always have much to say about every question with respect to each
view of laws I survey but rather focus on what might not be altogether obvious or on
where interesting differences lie. I will not focus too much on potency - though I list
it for completeness and to make clear that it is a separate issue from the others. It
is generally supposed – though not without objections – that universals and powers
accounts allow for potency, as well as accounts that involve "necessary" regularities,
whereas "Humean" regularity accounts do not.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.1 I look at the best system
account of laws (BSA for short), and, in particular, David Lewis’ BSA. (In the
appendix, I highlight some of the problems with it and examine two recent attempts
to overcome it). Sections 2.2 and 2.3 concern - respectively - David Armstrong’s
account and the dispostionalist view of laws. The investigation here suggests that
the dispositionalist conception of laws may rule out contingency but it need not.
Conversely, the other accounts may admit contingency but they need not. In all
three cases, I shall argue, the root idea of what laws are does not settle the issue of
whether they allow contingency. Advocates of the different accounts may argue for
one view or another on the issue, but (at least as I understand the accounts) this
will be an add-on rather than a consequence of the basic view about what laws are.
2.1 The "Humean" regularity account
The central motivating idea behind what I shall call the "Humean" regularity ac-
count of laws is not about laws but about the make-up of the world. The facts
that constitute the world involve only qualities, quantities, and relations that are
occurent, where "occurent" means different things to different philosophers who call
themselves "Humeans". What they all have in common is that they want to exclude
any kind of modal features. There are no causings, no necessitatings, no doings, no
making-things-happen-ings.
In answer to the question "What is it to be a law of nature?" the naive "Humean"
account states that laws are regular associations among occurent features. But this
is thought to be problematic. There are true accidental regularities that are not
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laws, it is supposed. To use Hans Reichenbach’s memorable example (1947: 368),
"All gold spheres are less than a mile in diameter" is a genuine regular association,
but this does not seem to be a law. So, it is commonly assumed, a satisfactory
"Humean" view of laws should distinguish laws from accidental regularities. This is
what David Lewis’s best system account (BSA) sets out to do (Lewis 1973). Since
the BSA is very well developed and widely adopted, I shall focus on this version
of the "Humean" regularity account. However, the main arguments I put forward
should go through for any acceptable "Humean" account of lawhood.
In Counterfactuals (Lewis 1973: 73) and "Humean Supervenience Debugged"
(1994: 478), Lewis takes as a starting point a short note written by Frank Ramsey
in 19282. Here is how to formulate Lewis’ view. Consider a true deductive system
in which the general claims that represent laws of nature appear as a set of true
sentences that is deductively closed and whose non-logical vocabulary contains only
predicates that express perfectly natural properties3. The laws of nature will belong
to all the axiom systems with a best combination of simplicity and strength4 (and
fit).
We can think of a true deductive system as a set of true sentences T that is
deductively closed. To say that T is deductively closed is to say that every sentence
that can be deduced from T is itself a member of T . The sentences that are logical
consequences of T are its theorems. And there are many ways in which systems can
be axiomatised. Some systems are stronger than others, in the sense that they have
more information content. Some true deductive systems can be axiomatised simpler
than others, in the sense that they have fewer axioms. We can have, for example, a
2Lewis’s restatement of Ramsey’s passage asserts that "a contingent generalisation is a law of
nature if and only if it appears as a theorem (or axiom) in each of the true deductive systems that
achieves a best combination of simplicity and strength" (Lewis 1973: 73).
3I have introduced the term "perfectly natural properties" in the formulation of Lewis’ BSA
because it is needed in order to solve a trivialisation problem (presented in the appendix of this
chapter), but it is important to note that the term was not present in Lewis’ original formulation.
4This looks like a use/mention confusion but it is almost certainly harmless. I shall try to avoid
confusing the two but occasionally for ease of expression I will follow Lewis in talking in the formal
mode when the claim is really one in the material mode.
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very strong system that is the conjunction of all true sentences. But the complexity
of such a system would not make it useful. On the other hand, we can have a less
complex and simple system, only with some mathematical and logical truths. But
this system would not allow us to deduce important regularities about the world.
The laws of nature will belong to all the systems with a best combination of these
virtues, simplicity and strength.
Notice two important features of this view. First, laws supervene on the par-
ticular matters of fact. This is so because laws merely summarise facts. So, as
to potency, laws do not "govern" the world, they are just special regularities that
encompass a good many other regularities. The particular matters of fact deter-
mine the laws of nature in the sense that if the laws of nature are different, that
is because the facts are different. Because of this, the BSA preserves the alleged
intuition that the laws of nature are metaphysically contingent, at least so long as
it is metaphysically contingent what the facts are.
Given this brief description we can look at how the BSA deals with questions of
whether L is compatible with contingencies.
2.1.1 Extent
Does L cover everything that happens? And what does it mean to say that L
covers everything? Following Earman, one might formulate the question as follows:
Do laws have an unrestricted range in space and time? (Earman 1978: 174). As
Earman points out, to deny that laws have an unrestricted range in space and time
boils down to saying that there is "a region of space-time R0 such that, as far as L is
concerned, ‘anything goes’ in R0." (Earman 1978: 174)
5. More precisely, where M
denotes the set of all models of the putative law sentences, this may be formulated
as the question of whether claims representing the complete and correct set of laws
5I use this formulation because someone may be familiar with it. But - as Cartwright says -
there is no reason to assume that nature thinks in terms of space-time regions rather than, as in
her view, in terms of what features obtain. For instance, her rendering of boundaries on the range
of a theory T is roughly this: Those instances of effect E that T covers are the instances for which
some or all of the causes of E fall under concepts available in T .
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L satisfies the following condition, where A ∣ B stands for B is restricted to A and
≈ stands for model isomorphism:
(U) There is no non-empty, proper sub-region R0 of space-time such that for any
M ∈M, there is an M ′ ∈M where M ′ ⊧ L and M ′ ∣ R0 ≈M ∣ R0
This condition states that L is valid on a model that is not restricted to some
spatio-temporal region, that is, L is "universal". Given the BSA there is at least
some motivation for thinking that the laws of nature should be "universal". If the
range of the axioms (or theorems) of the best deductive systems were limited to
some spatio-temporal region, then one would expect more axioms to summarise
the whole history of the world. That is, one would need more axioms to cover all
spatio-temporal regions. But if the range of the axioms is not limited, then one
can naturally expect fewer axioms to summarise all the particular matters of fact.
Furthermore, this will not reduce the system’s informativeness, since the axioms
now are not restricted to some spatio-temporal region.
Earman is right in pointing out that the BSA explains why we might expect the
laws of nature to be universal. However, he is also right in calling our attention
to the fact that there is no a priori guarantee that the laws of nature according to
the BSA will satisfy (U) (Earman 1978: 180). In fact, consider a scenario in which
our world is quite unruly and chaotic outside a given range. If this is so, adding
piecemeal information about what happens there to any set of axioms may increase
informativeness at too great a cost to simplicity. So the laws may be limited in
extent.
2.1.2 Permissiveness
Within its domain, under the BSA, does the correct L (plus relevant initial or bound-
ary conditions) always single out a unique outcome? In order to answer this question
one needs to bear in mind the main motivation behind Humeanism about laws. The
world is void of modalities – no causings, no necessitatings, no probabilifyings; the
world is nothing but a mosaic of occurent events. Laws summarise what happens in
this mosaic, rather than "governing" what the particular matters of fact are.
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If L is deterministic, given Pt0(L, P ), L admits only one outcome. But there
is nothing in the Humean motivation that makes determinism natural. The best
summary may be provided by purely probabilistic laws or by laws that constrain
outcomes to a given set but do not choose among them nor lay a probability over
them. As Beebee points out (Beebee 2000: 575) whether the world is best axioma-
tised under deterministic laws depends on how regular the world is. The world can be
modality free and still irregular enough to be summarised best by non-deterministic
laws.
2.1.3 Reliability
So as not to muddle together issues of extent, permissiveness, and reliability, let us
consider the most difficult case for contingency in the reliability sense: where the
laws have universal extent and are deterministic, allowing only one output for any
relevant input. It looks at first sight as if in this case on the BSA, they must be
reliable. There can be no exceptions to the correct laws. I think, however, that there
is still some wiggle room and will offer a way that might be thought sympathetic
to the "Humean" viewpoint that might allow for exceptions, one of which is due to
Lewis himself.
Once again, and for the sake of this discussion, I propose to adapt Earman’s
definition of determinism in terms of possible worlds to define deterministic laws
because it makes for a ready connection to the Lewis wiggle. This definition is just
the same as the one I gave in chapter 2, but it is worth rehearsing it. Let L stand
for "L is the correct set of laws", then define "Humean-deterministic" thus:
Definition 2.1.1. Laws L are Humean-deterministic if and only if for any P that
L covers and any input Pt0(L, P ) to L for P and any logically possible worlds w, w′
in which L, if w and w′ agree on Pt0(L, P ) they agree on whether P obtains
Furthermore, it is worth mentioning once more that if laws are Humean-deterministic,
we have the following:
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D : If L is deterministic, □((L ∧ Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) follows6.
The upshot then is that laws are reliable if L is deterministic. However, Sehon
(2011) has interestingly argued that a definition of deterministic laws that allows us
to deduce □((L∧Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) is highly problematic. And the Humean definition
of laws - at least the way I presented - definitely has this consequence.
Sehon argues that, even if the correct laws are deterministic, it should be logically
possible that there is, for example, an interventionist God (IG) that could, say,
miraculously change water into wine (Sehon 2011: 31). As Sehon says, "necessarily,
if an IG exists, then it is possible that the same initial state of affairs obtains, along
with the same laws of nature, and yet P is false" (Sehon 2011: 31) – i.e it is possible
that Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L ∧ ∼P . His reasoning can be spelled out as follows (using IG to
stand for "There is an interventionist God"):
1 □(IG ⊃◇(Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L ∧ ∼P )) Premise
2 ◇IG Premise
3 ◇(Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L ∧ ∼P ) S4, 1, 2
4 ∼ □ ((Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L) ⊃ P ) Modal Logic, 3
Notice that Sehon’s main point does not depend on the premise that an inter-
ventionist God is logically possible. One might try to cast Sehon’s objection merely
as a call for a domain restriction: L holds everywhere that there is no interventionist
God (L holds if ∼IG). There are two problems with such a solution, however.
First, as Sehon emphasises, even if that goes through, one might argue that
determinism is incompatible, say, with the logical possibility of an interventionist
demon, in the sense that, necessarily, if an interventionist demon exists, then it is
possible that Pt0(L, P )∧L∧∼IG∧∼P . And this would also be, according to him,
an implausible consequence.
Second, "Humeans" might not like the call for domain restriction because there
is no way that the domain restriction could be brought into the antecedents in
the laws of nature since laws are supposed to involve only occurent features, and
6Please see chapter 1 for a demonstration of D.
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God’s intervening does not seem a good candidate for an occurent feature on any
"Humean" account of "occurent" I am entertaining here7.
So, Sehon’s main worry is not about the logical possibility of an interventionist
God, nor about the logical possibility of a demon in particular. It is about the logical
possibility of the laws of nature being violated. Thus, Sehon urges, exceptions to
what L (and Pt0(L, P )) say should happen should be possible even if determinism
is true, precisely because it must be logically possible to violate the laws. And if the
BSA does not accommodate that, there must be something wrong with the BSA as
an account of laws.
In what follows, I will show how a Lewisian might reply to this argument, showing
that the BSA may be consistent with assuming that the correct laws are determin-
istic and yet can be violated, at least in a sense. The task then is to show that these
two propositions are consistent:
P : The correct laws L are deterministic.
Q: It is possible to violate (the correct laws) L.
The first strategy is to hedge on P , using Lewis’s own notion of soft determinism,
which is supposed to allow a sense in which agents are able to do things such that,
if they were to do them, what L says happens would not happen (Lewis 1981: 114).
Let us assume the truth of P and thus of D, so that some statement about the
distant past, Pt0(L, P ), and L logically imply, for instance, P : "Agent a did not
raise her hand". What if a had raised her hand? There are three options:
1. If a had raised her hand, contradictions would have been true.
2. If a had raised her hand, Pt0(L, P ) would be false.
3. If a had raised her hand, L would be false.
Someone like Lewis will naturally reject option 1. Even if the agent had raised
her hand, contradictions would not have been true. Lewis also denies 2. Even if
7A domain restriction in this case seems to make law claims tautological, which they should
not be for the Humean: "As are regularly associated with Bs except when they are not".
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the agent had raised her hand, the past would still be the same, so Pt0(L, P ) would
still be true (Lewis 1979). Thus, if we want to say that the correct set of laws L is
deterministic and sometimes we are able to act otherwise, the only option remaining
consistent with Lewis’s viewpoint is 3. Thus, given Pt0(L, P ) and D, ∼P implies L
is false. Yet, we are supposed to be arguing that L are the correct laws. How is that
possible? Following Lewis the clue is: correct in what worlds?
To see how this works we need to draw a distinction between two senses in which
one can violate a law:
Weak sense: An agent is able to do something such that, if she were to do it, a
law would be violated.
Wondrous sense: An agent is able to do something such that, if she were to do
it, a law would be violated and this law would be of the actual world.
For example, in the weak sense, if the agent were to have raised her hand (i.e.
I assume she did not raise her hand in the actual world), contrary to what L says,
then L would have been violated before the hand raising. To use Lewis’s phrase,
a "divergence miracle" would have happened before that, that is, there would be
a violation of the laws of nature that hold at our actual world, and this violation
would not be caused by a’s action8. Note that to say that there is a violation of the
laws of nature in the weak sense is not to say that the violated laws are the laws of
the same world where they are violated. The term "miracle" is used to express a
relation between different possible worlds. As Lewis says, "a miracle at w1, relative
to w0, is a violation at w1 of the laws of w0, which are at best the almost-laws of
w1" (Lewis 1979: 469). So with a divergent miracle in our actual world, whose laws
are the "almost" laws of a nearest world where L is not violated, we can violate the
correct laws of that nearby world. Or vice versa. Now, if by "violating a law" we
mean the weak sense where what we violate is an "almost law", not a real law, of
our world, then it seems agents may be able to violate laws that are deterministic.
8This, however, is contentious. Lewis’ compatibilist view will be discussed in much more detail
in chapter 4.
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But what if by "violating the laws of nature" Sehon means what I call the
"wondrous sense"? The wondrous sense is the one in which the laws that are violated
in the actual world are the laws of the actual world. This seems to be what Sehon
has in mind when he says that, if IG, then it is possible that we have the same laws,
the same past, and yet P is false. Nonetheless, if by "violating a law" Sehon means
the wondrous sense, then someone like Lewis will deny that it is logically possible to
violate a law in the wondrous sense. This is so because, as Lewis says, "any genuine
law is at least an absolutely unbroken regularity" (Lewis 1981: 114). Given the
BSA, it is clear why we cannot violate laws in the wondrous sense. Suppose it is a
law that no object moves faster than light. If someone were to throw an object that
moves faster than light, then that law would not be true. Since Lewis’s "Humean"
laws are true regularities, if it is a fact that a certain stone moves faster than light,
then it cannot be a true regularity that no objects travel faster than light9.
2.1.4 Potency and Free Will
Do the things that L speaks about happen on account of L? Or, for instance, merely
in accord with L? Perhaps this is the least problematic question to answer according
9Cartwright has suggested that "Humeans" might however, consistent with the commitment
that there are only the occurent facts of which laws are summaries, take a more instrumentalist
line. The best summaries may not be required to be true, especially if this brings about a big gain
in simplicity. They could admit of exceptions but be right most of the time. Or they could be
wrong most all the time yet still very nearly right most, even all, the time. This is like William
Wimsatt’s view (1992) that laws could be templates that fit widely but in many cases not exactly.
Whether admitting false claims as the correct laws is a good idea on the "Humean" view depends
on what the world is really like. Cartwright (1983) has argued that high level laws in physics often
get fitted to the real details of real situations only by adding ad hoc corrections. That could be
because we have just missed out on the factors that support those corrections and that bring the
situation genuinely under the laws. But it could be that that is just what the world is like. There
is no single uniform pattern but only a template which fits widely but not exactly. If the latter is
the case, the BSA can be maintained while allowing contingency in the reliability sense, so long as
the demand is given up that the best summary of the facts be true. (Here it is easy to make things
look simpler than they are by blurring use/mention distinctions. If laws are "false" but "nearly
true", then the laws will not be facts but rather only very similar to facts.)
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to the BSA. Clearly, the things that L speaks about happen merely in accord with
L. This means that the BSA is a non-governing conception of laws.
Beebee (2000) has argued that a consequence of such a conception of laws is that
determinism is not a threat to our ability to do otherwise. Again, assume for the
sake of the argument that laws are universal in extent, impermissive for agents and
reliable. If the consequence argument is sound, no one is able to do otherwise.
I think those who are moved by this argument for incompatibilism are implic-
itly adopting an anti-Humean conception of laws of nature - and in particular,
a conception of laws according to which laws are not just generalizations about
what has happened and will happen, but rather govern what will happen. It
is this thought which prompts one to think that the laws of nature place a
constraint on our actions that is in some way incompatible with freedom: a
constraint which forces us in some metaphysical, not-purely-logical sense to
act in the way we do (Beebee 2000: 579).
I believe Beebee is right in saying that those who accept the cogency of the
consequence argument are implicitly assuming an anti-Humean conception of laws10.
If - roughly speaking - Humean laws are just the best way to summarise all past,
present and future facts, it is hard to see how they could be a threat to free will,
even if they turn out to be deterministic and universal. In fact, suppose this is the
case. Humeans who follow Lewis will agree that we are able to break the laws in
the weak sense, that is, we are able to do something such that, if we were to do it, a
law would be violated because a "divergence miracle" would have happened before
that. As we will see in chapter 4, this will allow us to show how Humeans may reply
to the premise of the consequence argument that no one has or ever had any choice
about whether L is true.
However, in order to show that, I would like to give some plausible interpretation
of "N", which is something I will do only in chapter 3. Furthermore, although
Humeans agree on the weak sense, there is a disagreement about whether "divergence
10However, I am not sure that incompatibilists need to accept a governing view of laws. In
chapter 5 I show that the premise that the laws of nature are not "up to us" is necessarily true if
the dispositionalist account is correct. And one can follow Heather Demarest in combining anti-
Humean properties with Humean laws into a Potency-Best System Account of Laws (Demarest
2017).
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miracles" can be actional-events or caused by some actional-events. Lewis thinks
they cannot, whereas Beebee thinks they can. It seems to me that both views are
coherent, and which one is right will depend on what control is. I shall argue in
chapter 4 that if the lack of contrastive explanation (that is, if there is no explanation
of why an agent performed a rather than something else) indicates lack of control,
then free actions cannot be divergence miracles.
2.2 Laws as relations among universals
Fred Dretske (1977), Michael Tooley (1987), and David Armstrong (1983) devel-
oped a rival approach to the BSA. In what follows this presentation will focus on
Armstrong’s view. Laws of nature, according to Armstrong, are necessary relations
among first-order universals. That is, on Armstrong’s view, a law is a second-order
relation between first-order universals. Suppose that all F’s are G’s and that the
laws of nature ensure this. F-ness and G-ness are taken to be first-order universals.
Armstrong states that a second-order contingent relation holds between these two
universals. He labels this relation as "nomic necessitation" and he uses "N" to refer
to it - (not to be confused with the "N" in the consequence and Mind arguments
though!). Armstrong symbolises the relation of necessitation between F and G as
"N(F,G)". He also claims that the holding of N entails the corresponding generali-
sation. So, the second order-relation N between the first order universals F and G,
"N(F,G)", entails "All F’s are G’s".
On the traditional Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske view it seems that laws are reli-
able - what they say goes, goes11. At least this is the case under the assumption at
the core of the view that the relations that obtain between universals make true the
corresponding relations between instantiations of those universals in the real world;
what happens in the empirical world depends on and must be in accord with what
relations hold among universals. This also ensures that laws are powerful - things
11It is important to note, however, that Armstrong claims that laws can be "oaken" in the sense
that the entailment of N(F,G) to "all Fs are Gs" does hold for all deterministic laws. Oaken laws
contrast with "iron" laws where this entailment holds, and the paragraph above concerns iron laws.
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happen because they say so. So potency is assured as well.
Beebee has interestingly pointed out that the disagreement between the Humean
view and the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong view with respect to potency results in
different ways to understand the notion of determinism. One way to understand
determinism is in terms of the past and laws determining the future.
For the Humean, the laws and the current facts determine the future facts
in a purely logical way: you can deduce future facts from current facts plus
the laws. And this is just because laws are, in part, facts about the future.
(Beebee 2000: 578)
For the Humean view, we do not have laws if we rule out future facts, for we need
all the facts, including future ones, in order to have those statements that will best
summarise them all. This is why I have defined "Humean-deterministic" in that way,
quantifying over logically possible worlds. Notwithstanding, things are different for
Armstrong’s account. While for the Humean laws are in part dependent on future
facts, for Armstrong it is just the other way round. As Beebee points out, "the
laws ‘make’ the future facts be the way they will be: the laws are the ontological
ground of the future facts" (Beebee 2000: 578). As a result Armstrong has a much
more substantial conception of what determinism is than the Humean. The main
difference is that, for Armstrong, laws of nature "make" the future events, rather
than being also part of them:
Imagine Armstrong writing down everything that’s true of the universe up
to this moment. One of the things that will appear in his list will be the
obtaining of N between various pairs of universals. And it’s in the nature of N
that its obtaining entails that those universals will carry on occurring together.
“N(F,G)” expresses a relation that is already with us, so the future really is
determined by some current feature of the universe. For the Humean, on the
other hand, a complete list of everything that’s true of the universe up to now
entails nothing whatever about the future, since if future facts by definition
are banned from the list, then so are laws of nature. (Beebee 2000: 578-9)
Remember that, as Beebee said, Armstrong takes the laws of nature to be the
ontological ground of future facts. If the literature on ground has any bite, to say
that A grounds B does not seem to be equivalent to saying that A entails B. For
example, we may say that the proposition expressed by "snow is white" entails the
proposition expressed by "either p or not-p" such that it is logically necessary that
if snow is white, then either p or not-p. But this is merely because it is logically
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necessary that either p or not-p. We would not say that the fact that either p or
not-p is grounded on the fact that snow is white. When we say that a certain fact
grounds another there seems to be something more than entailment, that is, the
facts seem to be connected through something else, namely, ground. This suggests
that an Armstrongian conception of determinism may not be seen as tantamount to
the Humean one.
How should one understand the statement that the laws of nature ground future
facts? One suggestion might be the following (see Fine 2012: 39, although Fine
himself is not committed to it): the fact that A grounds the fact that B if and
only if the fact that B obtains in virtue of the fact that A and it is a metaphysical
necessity that if A then B.
Now, let us briefly go back to D, that is:
D: if L and L is deterministic, then □((L ∧ Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) follows.
If laws however are Humean-deterministic, then the box of □((L∧Pt0(L, P )) ⊃
P ) should be read as logical necessity. On Armstrong’s account, on the other hand,
since laws of nature ground future facts, it is more natural to read the box as
metaphysical necessity. This - I suggest - gives a straightforward reply to Sehon’s
objection. For
(M) □M((L ∧ Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P )
and
(L) ∼ □L ((L ∧ Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P )
are not explicitly contradictory. This is so because we are dealing with two
different sorts of modality. Suppose that we define "epistemic necessity" as follows:
φ is epistemically necessary for a subject s if and only if ∼φ is ruled out by what
s knows. And suppose that given everything Jamie knows, it is necessary that the
Brazilian economy will hit a recession in the coming months. Let P stand for the
proposition that the Brazilian economy will hit a recession in the coming months.
Clearly, P is not logically necessary, since it is neither an axiom of any system, nor
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it is derivable from a system through its rules. Let □E stand for epistemic necessity,
and consider the following set:
(S){□EP,∼ □L P}
Set (S) is not explicitly inconsistent, for □EP and ∼ □L P are not explicitly
contradictory. Similarly, it could be argued that the set consisting of (M) and (L)
is not inconsistent either. If Sehon’s worry is that determinism should be consistent
with the logical possibility of laws being violated, then (M) will do the job as long
as (M) is consistent with (L).
But the problem, one might say, still remains. Even if we are going to read the
box as metaphysical necessity, how are we to understand metaphysical necessity? If
metaphysical necessity is just logical necessity, then even if what I suggested above
is appropriate, determinism is still incompatible with an IG being logically possible.
So it may be that the Armstrongian conception of determinism is incompatible with
an IG being logically possible. This is fair enough. But if it is really the case, it
is hard to see what is the difference between Armstrong’s view and the Humean
view of determinism. After all, if metaphysical necessity is just logical necessity,
Armstrong’s understanding of □((L∧Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) would just be something like
"the fact that P obtains in virtue of Pt0(L, P ) and L and it is a logical necessity
that if Pt0(L, P ) and L then P". The only difference then would be the expression
"in virtue of". But as Fine points out, "we may call an in-virtue claim a statement
of ontological or metaphysical ground when the conditional holds of metaphysical
necessity" (Fine 2012: 38). If we insist that metaphysical and logical necessities are
equivalent, I do not see how their conceptions of determinism may be different. And
Beebee - I think - has given a good motivation for thinking that they are different.
In any case, I am not going any further on this issue. All I wanted to show is
that it is not so implausible to read the box as metaphysical necessity if one is keen
on assuming Armstrong’s account of laws. If one agrees with Armstrong about the
nature of laws and is also willing to separate metaphysical necessity from logical
necessity, this is a good answer to Sehon’s challenge.
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Laws as relations among universals: Extent and Permissiveness
Let us consider the questions about extent and permissiveness now. On extent, the
issue seems open as well. Individual advocates may argue that laws govern all that
happens. But that seems to be an add-on to the two assumptions that seem central
to the account that, first, laws are relations between universals, and second, any
instances of universals that figure in the laws must reflect in the appropriate way
the relations among those universals. These do not by themselves imply that every
feature that occurs in the world instances a universal that has such relations to
others and hence the two do not seem to imply that everything that happens is in
the purview of laws of nature. Even if one supposes that it makes no sense to think
of features that do not fall under universals, there is still the issue of whether the
associated universals all participate in the kinds of relations to one another that
make for laws of nature.
Permissiveness may also be more open on the laws-as-relations-among-universals
view than it seems at first sight. For there may be more relations among universals
than just the one – labelled "N" – that is the truth-maker for the necessitation
aspect of law claims. Some universals may be taller or more beautiful than others,
which may be irrelevant to what happens in the world when these universals are
instantiated. Even among world-guiding relations, necessitation may not be all
there is. After all, the view presumably does not want to rule out that a probabilistic
theory like quantum mechanics can be correct.
One way to allow for this is to keep only N and then suppose that the universal
represented by the quantum state is N-related to a universal that we represent by a
probability measure. Instantiation of this last seems troublesome though; moreover
probability itself, as Bas van Fraassen (1980) argues, may best be seen as a modal
notion. So, in keeping with the view that modalities reflect facts about universals
and their relations, another idea for how to handle probabilistic laws is to assume
there is another kind of modality beyond that responsible for necessity: "proba-
bilifies", with various ways to develop this idea further. Key though is that if the
universal corresponding to A probabilifies the universal corresponding to quantity Q
in accord with Prob (Q = q), then instances of A will be associated with instances
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of values of Q in a pattern reflecting Prob (Q = q).
This leads readily to admitting permissiveness of the kind we see in Cartwright’s
account of laws (cf. Cartwright & Pemberton 2013). Once more world-guiding
relations are admitted than N, there seems no good reason to suppose that an even
weaker modal notion than "probabilifies" may obtain, one that constrains the values
Q may take when A is instantiated to a given set but which dictates no particular
pattern to them. One or another in the set must be instantiated but which on any
occasion is mere hap, with not even a nice probability-looking pattern to emerge in
the long run.
This may, at first sight, seem counter to the universals account of laws. After
all, wasn’t the point to find some location for necessity? Cartwright and I think not.
The point is to find a location for modality. Universals are introduced in order to
enable laws to do a number of jobs. They are supposed to support counterfactuals,
to explain why things happen in the orderly way they do, to justify our inductive
practice. All this may require modality, but other modalities than necessity can
do the jobs required. How is it on this view that the laws of nature explain that
All Fs are Gs and justify our inductive practice of predicting that the next F we
encounter will be G on the basis of past observations that Fs are Gs? It is because
the universal associated with F is N-related to that associated with G. But it is
not the N-ness of the relation that matters; it is rather the two-fold fact that this
relation holds between the universals, and whatever world-guiding relations occur
must be reflected in the behaviour of their instances in the empirical world. Other
kinds of patterns in the world could then be equally explained and supported by
other relations between universals, for instance "F probabilifies Q=q to degree p",
where the p values for Qs satisfy the probability calculus; or "F φ-necessitates Q",
which is reflected in the fact that Fs are always followed by some value or other of
Q in φ.
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2.3 Dispositions, a la Alexander Bird
So far I have mainly focused on Lewis’s and Armstrong’s accounts (though I cover
some new best system accounts of laws in the appendix). Although Lewis and
Armstrong can both be seen as figureheads for rival camps concerning the laws of
nature, Bird (2005, 2007) interestingly notes that the accounts have two theses in
common: they both take (i) laws of nature to be metaphysically contingent, and they
both take (ii) fundamental properties to be categorical. Dispositional essentialism
(DE) has emerged as an account of laws that explicitly rejects these two assumptions.
First, according to DE, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, for reasons that
we will see soon (though I shall have very little to say about what is supposed
to be meant by "metaphysically necessary"). Second, DE takes at least some –
maybe all – fundamental, natural properties to be essentially dispositional. I will
briefly discuss in this section Bird’s version of DE for a concrete illustration. Similar
results with respect to contingency hold for many other versions, making appropriate
adjustments.
First, Bird adopts the conditional analysis of dispositions (CA). Where D is a
dispositional property, S(D) is a stimulus property appropriate to it and M(D) is
its manifestation property, (CA) may be symbolised as follows:
(CA) Dx↔ (S(D)xM(D)x)
As Bird points out, (CA) does not merely provide an analysis of the concept D;
instead, it characterises the nature of the property D. Thus, as Bird says, (CA) is
metaphysically necessary:
(CA□) □M(Dx↔ (S(D)xM(D)x))
Second, DE endorses the view that at least some fundamental properties are es-
sentially dispositional. To say that a property P is essentially dispositional is to say
that, necessarily – in the metaphysical sense – to instantiate P is to possess a dis-
position D(P ) to yield the appropriate manifestation in response to an appropriate
stimulus:
(DEp) □M (Px→ D(P )x)
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Here is how to explain "the truth of a generalisation on the basis of the disposi-
tional essence of a property" (Bird 2007: 46):
1 □M(Px→ (SxMx))
2 Px→ (SxMx))
3 Px ∧ Sx
4 Px ∧E, 3
5 Sx ∧E, 3
6 SxMx ⇒E, 2, 4
7 Mx E, 5, 6
8 (Px ∧ Sx)→Mx ⇒I, 3–7
9 ∀x((Px ∧ Sx)→Mx) ∀I, 8
10 □M(∀x((Px ∧ Sx)→Mx)) □I, 1, 2–9
Hence, a universal generalisation follows from CA□ and DEp. Furthermore, since
both CA□ and DEp are metaphysically necessary, this generalisation is metaphysi-
cally necessary as well. It looks then as if any laws underwritten by dispositional
properties will be totally reliable, and on Bird’s view it seems that these are all the
laws there.
The problem with this, though, is that (CA) is often false, Bird notes, because
of the existence of finkish dispositions and antidotes12. However, he argues, rather
than being a disadvantage for dispositionalism, this is one of its virtues, since the
falsity of (CA) allows the dispositionalist to account for ceteris paribus laws. We
12“An object’s disposition is finkish when the object loses the disposition after the occurrence
of the stimulus but before the manifestation can occur and in such a way that consequently that
manifestation does not occur” (Bird 2007: 25). See also Martin (1994) and Lewis (1997). Bird
also points out that one cannot eliminate all counterexamples to (CA) by excluding finks (Bird,
2007: 27). “Let object x possess disposition D(S,M). At a time t it receives stimulus S and so in
the normal course of things, at some later time t′, x manifests M ” (Bird 2007: 27). An antidote
or mask to D(S,M) is something that “has the effect of breaking the causal chain leading to M,
so that M does not in fact occur” (Bird 2007: 27) when applied before t’. The counterexamples to
(CA) will be presented in chapter 5.
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can just replace the left-to-right implication of (CA) by
(V*) ∀x(finks and antidotes to D are absent → ((Dx ∧ Sx)→Mx)).
This is how the dispositionalist can account for ceteris paribus laws – supposing
that in all correct ceteris paribus laws, the conditions that are referred to in the ce-
teris paribus clause genuinely are either finks or antidotes to the disposition referred
to. Conditioning on the absence of finks and antidotes gets built right into the laws
themselves. Reliability, it seems is thus restored, at least for ceteris paribus laws
where all that is missing to render the ceteris paribus clause explicit is reference to
finks or antidotes. Moreover, Bird also argues that there is a fundamental level of
laws where no finks occur and where antidotes are very unlikely (Bird 2007: 63). In
that case, as above, reliability is assured by (CA), as already noted.
What then about permissiveness? It seems that when they speak – which seems
to be whenever a dispositional property obtains and there are no finks or antidotes
to it – DE laws allow only one outcome, the manifestation associated with that
disposition. So DE laws seem impermissive. On the other hand, there seems to be
nothing in the basic motivations for this account that implies that the manifestation
must be limited to a single choice rather than a set of choices, with or without a
probability over them. So impermissivenes might be an add-on for DE laws, just as
it is for laws when taken as relations among universals or on the BSA.
Extent too seems to fare just the same as in the other two accounts so far
surveyed, except perhaps limitations on extent are to be expected here, at least so
far as the basics I have presented go. The issue is whether everything that happens
is a manifestation of (some combination of) essentialist dispositions. Two ways they
may not be are immediately evident. First, if not all fundamental properties are
DE properties then DE laws that supervene on DE properties and their associated
dispositions will not cover them13. Second, DE laws derived above are, as remarked,
13Some proponents of DE might, however, hold a mixed view according to which some funda-
mental properties are essentially dispositional and others are categorical, and so a DE law could
connect a disposition with a categorical property. As a result, extent may be retained since laws
will not supervene only on DE properties. Thanks to Walter Ott and Lydia Patton for pointing
2.3. Dispositions, a la Alexander Bird 43
ceteris paribus laws, which cover only situations where no finks and antidotes obtain.
What happens when these do? Or – more to the point, will finks and antidotes
always be constituted by essentialist dispositional properties so that what happens
when they obtain is then covered by the universal generalisation that supervenes on
the dispositions associated to those? If not, then DE laws will not cover everything
that happens. So DE laws may well be limited in extent.
Recall, however, that Bird maintains that there is a level of fundamental dispo-
sitional properties that are not subject to finks and are seldom - if ever - subject
to antidotes. Does this imply that the correct set of laws covers all that happens?
Supposing we substitute "never" for "seldom", the answer is "yes", if a kind of total
reductionism holds in which everything ultimately is covered by laws deriving from
fundamental dispositional properties. But this kind of reductionism does not seem
to follow from the basic motivating ideas of a DE account of laws. As with many of
the other assumptions I have discussed, it is just an add-on.
The real issue for extent then depends on two things. First, are all properties,
including those that feature in finks and antidotes, essentially dispositional? And
second, are all complexes of properties – like: "P(D) and the properties that charac-
terise antidote A to P(D) and fink F to P(D)" – themselves essentially dispositional
properties and hence properties that give rise to laws that can cover every case?
Even if the answer is "yes", that does not seem to be a central part of the DE
view. It seems to be just add-on. (In chapter 5 I will introduce Handfield’s idea
that dispositional essentialism is compatible with space-invasion. And if laws have
a space-invader clause, they will be limited in extent). Naturally, one might insist
that DE laws are, by their nature, universal in extent, but it does not seem to be
totally clear why this should be the case.
What about reliability? Again let us look at what seems to be the hardest case
– where the laws are deterministic, which is where much of the current philosophy
of religion and metaphysics literature focuses. As we saw before, if the correct laws
L are deterministic, then □((Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L) ⊃ P ).
this out.
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This is true also for Bird’s account. But the main difference between Bird’s
view and the BSA is how they reply to Sehon’s objection. If Sehon is right, then
determinism should be compatible with "IG" being logically possible. However,
it should be noted that, in Sehon’s argument, he reads boxes and diamonds as
logical necessity and possibility. Thus, his reasoning is only relevant if the box of
□(Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L ⊃ P ) is read as logical necessity. It will be clearer if we present
his reasoning again. Let □L and ◇L respectively stand for logical necessity and
possibility.
1 □L(IG ⊃◇L(Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L ∧ ∼P )) Premise
2 ◇LIG Premise
3 ◇L(Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L ∧ ∼P ) S4, 1, 2
4 ∼ □L ((Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L) ⊃ P ) def., 3
As we can see, 4 implies the contradictory of □((Pt0(L, P )∧L) ⊃ P ) if the box
is read as logical necessity.
Now, if we take the initial or boundary conditions that feed into laws to be facts
about the past, which is one typical choice for them, then let us remember what
Beebee says about the issue of logical necessity for "Humean’ views":
For the Humean, the laws and the current facts determine the future facts in
a purely logical way [my emphasis]: you can deduce future facts from current
facts plus the laws. And this is just because laws are, in part, facts about the
future’ (Beebee 2000: 578).
According to a view motivated by Humeanism about laws, it should follow from
determinism that □L((Pt0(L, P )∧L) ⊃ P ), as indeed it does under the definition I
adopted before. That is, according to the BSA on Lewis’ formulation, determinism
is incompatible with "IG" being logically possible as possibility is characterised by
Sehon.
On the other hand, if DE is correct, then the same strategy I used for Armstrong
may work here. At a first glance, it seems that determinism could be compatible
with "IG" being logically possible even as characterised by Sehon. This is so because
the dispositionalist needs only one genuine notion of necessity that applies to issues
about what happens in the world, which is metaphysical necessity (Bird 2007: 48).
And metaphysical necessity is not logical necessity (Bird thinks that logical necessity
2.3. Dispositions, a la Alexander Bird 45
is not even a genuine sort of necessity). As a result, the box of □((Pt0(L, P )∧L) ⊃
P ) stands for metaphysical necessity. Now it is clear that
(L) □L((Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L) ⊃ P )
and
(M) □M((Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L) ⊃ P )
are not explicitly contradictory. Someone might argue that (L) and (M) are
implicitly contradictory. If logical possibility entails metaphysical possibility, then
one gets the contradictory of (M); and then (L) and (M) are implicitly contradic-
tory. Nevertheless, the dispositionalist has no motivation for accepting the premise
that logical possibility entails metaphysical possibility. As Scott Shalkowski writes,
essentialist claims "usually involve logical possibilities that are not metaphysical
possibilities (Shalkowski 2004: 61). It is logically possible that water is not H2O,
but this is not metaphysically possible. One might object that we should expect a
clear explanation of what metaphysical necessity is, since Bird’s account relies on
it. This might be correct, but it is something that goes beyond the purposes of
this discussion. And just because we need a better understanding of metaphysical
necessity it does not mean that this reply to Sehon is implausible.
How though could DE reject the "logically necessary" reading of the box since I
argued that that reading follows from the definition of determinism I adopt, which
is not an unconventional one? It seems the trick would be to revise the definition of
determinism so that it does not involve logical necessity either but only metaphysical
necessity, thus:
Definition 2.3.1. Laws L are DE-deterministic if and only if for any P that L
covers and any P0(L, P ) and any metaphysically possible worlds w, w′ in which L,
if w and w′ agree on P0(L, P ) they agree on whether P obtains
This may indeed be a reasonable move for the DE advocate to make given the
view that the only modalities that should play a role in these discussions about
nature and its laws and possibilities are metaphysical ones.
The second point concerns the question of free will. Lewis’ view gives motivation
for rejecting one of the premises of the consequence argument, namely, the premise
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that the laws of nature are not up to anyone. On the other hand, it seems that
those sympathetic to DE should accept this premise because they should, it seems,
accept not only rule (α) but the rule (α′):
(α′) □Mφ ⊢ Nφ
Given that according to DE □ML, it follows that NL. Then again, before we
consider the implications of DE for the problem of free will and determinism we
need to have an appropriate interpretation of "N". I will come back to this point
in chapter 5.
2.4 Final remarks
I hope to have clarified that even if laws govern and in some sense "make things
happen", there is nothing in the very nature of law in any of the senses surveyed
that implies that things could not happen other than the way they do consistent
with the laws staying the same, nor even that probabilities need be fixed. Laws
may be universal in extent and yet totally impermissive, and one may – or may not
– have good independent arguments for these add-ons; but in all senses of "laws"
surveyed that is just what these are: add-ons.
One surprise of this chapter is that there are a number of different forms of "con-
tingency" that are worth distinguishing and, contrary to what one might expect,
contingency is no more readily admissible, for example, in Cartwright’s capacities
account than on those that take laws as strong unifying regularities (BSA), as re-
lations among universals, or as facts about dispositions of the Alexander Bird style
(or as the metaphysically necessary facts about regularities that follow from these).
All these equally can, but need not, allow laws to be both permissive and limited in
extent.
The upshot is that the formulation of the problem of free will and determinism
relies on add-ons about laws. However, I still need to discuss the following questions:
(i) does the Humean view of laws allow for contingency in the free will sense? (ii)
does the dispositionalist conception of laws allow for free will? In the next chapters
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I shall argue that it is plausible to think so. There are two main ways to get
rid of the dilemma presented in chapter 1: committing oneself to compatibilism
or libertarianism. I shall sketch a view in chapter 5 that adopts a dispositionalist
account of laws. On the other hand, it seems to me that adopting Humean laws is
the most natural view for compatibilists. The first question to be discussed then
is the one of whether determinism/indeterminism is compatible with free will. But
before we can go any further on these issues, there is still the question of whether
(β) is valid. In formulating the traditional problem I pointed out that two influential
arguments for the incompatibility of determinism/indeterminism and free will relies
on the validity of this rule. Even if we suppose that laws are universal in extent and
deterministic, incompatibilism relies on another controversial assumption, namely,
that rule (β) is valid. This is what I will discuss in the next chapter.
Chapter 3
The no-choice transfer rules and the
Lewis-Stalnaker semantics
In chapter 1 I indicated that the problem of free will and determinism may also be
presented as an argument against libertarianism (the view that incompatibilism is
true and there is free will), one that rests on the view that both determinism and
indeterminism are incompatible with free will1 (cf. also Finch & Warfield 1998).
While the consequence argument is often regarded as a source of justification for
the incompatibility of free will and determinism, the Mind argument is supposed to
justify the view that indeterminism also rules out the existence of free will. Both
arguments however depend on a no-choice transfer principle. The idea is that "no-
choice about" transfers across material conditionals: if no one has any choice about
whether P is true and whether P materially implies Q, then no one has any choice
about whether Q is true. That is, both arguments as presented in chapter 1 depend
on the premise that rule (β) holds.
The aim of this chapter is to give some interpretation of "no-choice about"
in which some no-choice transfer rule turns out to be valid, and so in which the
1However, the discussion in chapter 2 opens new possibilities. For example, if deterministic
and universal laws are incompatible with free will, then if there is free will, either laws are not
universal or not deterministic. One possibility is to say that what free will really requires is laws
being limited in extent, rather than indeterministic for agents. I shall sketch such a view in chapter
5. In any case, I will assume that "indeterminism" here means "determinism is not true".
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consequence argument and the Mind argument turn out to be valid. This will
allow us to focus on the plausibility of the premises of the arguments rather than
their validity. And the discussion will reveal itself much clearer when discussing
the plausibility of the premises given these interpretations, especially in chapters 5
and 6. Because the discussion has focused on (β) in the context of the consequence
argument, I will be mainly concerned in discussing the importance of (β)’s validity
for the consequence argument.
In this chapter I discuss the back and forth of the discussion on (β) by rehearsing
the main counterexamples to it. But since there is a huge discussion on the problem
of free will and determinism related to (β) it will be unreasonable to consider all
the objections to it. My strategy then is to focus on what I take to be the most
interesting objections to (β) in a somewhat chronological order. The chapter is
structured as follows. Section 3.1 gives a brief outline of the background of the
discussion concerning (β) and the consequence argument. After that, I put forward
two revealing counterexamples to it: namely, the counterexamples presented by
David Widerker (1987) and McKay and Johnson (1996). Sections 3.5 and 3.6 deal
with an incompatibilist strategy to get rid of the counterexamples, namely, Crisp
and Warfield’s desiderata to avoid the counterexamples to (β). After showing the
problems with that strategy, I go on to prove that some (β)-like transfer rules hold
on the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals.
3.1 The context of the discussion on rule (β)
The consequence argument has been recognised to break the compatibilist hege-
mony over the problem of free will and determinism (Levy and McKenna 2009).
Since Ginet (1983) and van Inwagen (1983) advanced the modal version of the con-
sequence argument, most compatibilists replies were directed to what was considered
its weakest point: rule (β). Let us take a look at the argument again.
If determinism is true, then our acts are the consequence of laws of nature
and events in the remote past. But it’s not up to us what went on before we
were born, and neither is it up to us what the laws of nature are. Therefore,
the consequences of these things (including our present acts) are not up to us.
(van Inwagen 1983: 16)
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Here is the modal formulation:
(α) □φ ⊢ Nφ
(β) Nφ, N(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢ Nψ
1 □((L ∧ Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) def 1.1.1
2 □(L ⊃ (Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P )) modal logic, 1
3 N(L ⊃ (Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P )) α, 2
4 NL premise
5 NPt0(L, P ) premise
6 N(Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P ) β, 3, 4
7 NP β, 5, 6
Van Inwagen himself recognised that the weakest point of the modal version is
rule (β) when he wrote that "the validity of (β) is [. . . ] the most difficult of the
premises of the Third Argument to defend" (van Inwagen 1983: 96).
However, despite being the weakest point of the argument, (β) is not obviously
invalid. It is not easy to think of direct counterexamples to it. As Vihvelin interest-
ingly notes (Vihvelin 2013: 159), (β) makes the difference between the consequence
argument and a typical modal fallacy such as the fatalist fallacy. For example, sup-
pose that the proposition expressed by the sentence "I raise my hand" is true. Here
is a typical modal fallacy:
1. □(I raise my hand ⊃ I raise my hand)
2. I raise my hand
Thus,
3. □ I raise my hand
If the conclusion is true, then I necessarily raise my hand, and so I cannot do
otherwise. Fortunately, the argument above is clearly invalid, for step 3 does not
follow from steps 1 and 2. It would be valid if "necessarily I raise my hand" were
one of its premises, but in this case we would already be assuming a thesis called
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"fatalism", the thesis according to which we are not able to do anything other than
we in fact do. Rule (β) seems to be, instead, more similar to the following valid
inference:
1. □(φ ⊃ ψ)
2. □φ
Thus,
3. □ψ
Nevertheless, the necessity expressed by "N" is neither logical nor metaphysical
necessity. So, obviously, the validity of the argument-schema above does not show
the validity of (β). But because they look similar it hints why it is difficult to present
a direct counterexample to it. Here is an example given by van Inwagen that seems
to show that (β) is intuitively valid (van Inwagen 1983: 98):
1. N(The sun explodes in the year 2100)
2. N(The sun explodes in the year 2100 ⊃ All life on earth ends in the year 2100)
Hence,
3. N(All life on earth ends in the year 2100).
The example above is prima facie persuasive in showing (β)’s validity. Van
Inwagen further noticed that the pre-theoretical appeal of this inference rule is inde-
pendent of incompatibilism. Even if incompatibilism were false, it is hard to see how
agents would have a choice about the propositions expressed by "the sun explodes
in the year 2100" and "if the sun explodes in the year 2100, then all life on earth
ends in the year 2100". And so it does seem to follow that no one has any choice
about whether all life on earth ends in the year 2100.
One of the ways to rebut the argument is in terms of the conditional analysis
of abilities, and this is one of the objections van Inwagen considers in his original
paper (cf. also Gallois 1977; Narveson 1977; Foley 1979; Slote 1982; Flint 1987).
For example, suppose someone holds the following conditional analysis of abilities2:
2I am following the literature in understanding the conditional as a subjunctive one.
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(the simple conditional analysis of ability): agent s could have done action-
type a if, and only if, if s had chosen to do a, s would have done a.
One could argue that the conditional analysis is compatible with determinism;
and if this is so, then even if the premises of the consequence argument are true,
its conclusion will be false, so that the argument has to be invalid. Suppose, for
example, that Mary has the ability to do a PhD thesis. If the conditional analysis
is correct, then if Mary had chosen to do a PhD thesis, she would have done it.
However, if we suppose that laws are deterministic and that they cover the actual
event that Mary does not do a PhD, this will only entail that Mary does not do
a PhD. It will not entail that "if Mary had chosen to finish her PhD thesis, she
would have done it" is false, and thus it will not entail that she does not have the
ability to do a PhD. Thus, even if the premises of the consequence argument are
true, its conclusion is false. And if the argument is invalid, rule (β) must be invalid
(assuming, of course, that rule (α) is undisputable).
Much has been said about the conditional analysis of abilities (Moore 1912;
Austin 1956; Berofsky 2003; Lehrer 1968; and van Inwagen 1983). Here, I will
present only a very simple counterexample to that simple analysis (simple indeed,
but false, as Lewis would say). The point I want to stress is that an agent performing
an action is not sufficient for that agent having the ability to perform it. Anthony
Kenny (1975) has already made this point: "A hopeless darts player may, once in
a lifetime, hit the bull, but be unable to repeat the performance because he does
not have the ability to hit the bull" (Kenny 1975: 136). Let us assume Kenny is
right. Let us also suppose that this hopeless darts player in fact chooses to hit the
bull and let us suppose he succeeds in so doing, even though he does not have the
ability to do that. According to the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals
(that I shall introduce very soon!), if any propositions P and Q are true, so is the
counterfactual if P were the case, Q would be the case. Now, if it is true that the
darts player chooses to hit the bull and if he in fact hits the bull, it is also true that
if he had chosen to hit the bull, he would have done it. If the conditional analysis
is right, then it follows that the hopeless darts player has the ability to hit the bull,
contradicting our initial supposition.
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Now, I am not sure whether this counterexample decisively refutes the simple
analysis. But it is not obvious that it fails either. Naturally, there are some more
sophisticated conditional analyses that avoid the counterexamples3. Given the prob-
lems with the simple analysis it seems unreasonable to conclude that it is persuasive
in showing (β)’s invalidity. On top of that, there is a problem with such a strategy
to argue against (β). For arguing against (β) by presupposing that determinism
is compatible with the ability to do otherwise is problematic. After all, incompat-
ibilists will not accept the premise that determinism and free will are compatible.
Taking this into account, incompatibilists expect that the counterexamples to (β)
should not presuppose compatibilism, for the plausibility of the rule seems not to
depend on incompatibilism. This actually was the challenge issued by van Inwagen:
show that (β) is invalid without presupposing compatibilism. It turned out that
even opponents of the consequence argument, such as McKay and Johnson (1996:
113), accepted it. Following Crisp and Warfield (2000: 175) I will refer to this
condition as the First Desideratum.
FIRST DESIDERATUM: Proposed counterexamples to (β) must not presup-
pose compatibilism.
From now on I will consider counterexamples that presumably satisfy that desider-
atum.
3.2 Widerker’s counterexample to (β)
In chapter 1 I followed van Inwagen in saying that "Nφ" stands for "φ and no one
has or ever had any choice about whether φ". But I recognise that this might not be
entirely clear. Here is another way to understand it. I will use the sentential operator
form presented by Ginet (1983: 391). The English expression of this operator form
is this: "P and it was not in agent’s s power at time t to make it not the case that
3Some recent attempts include Michael Fara (2008) and Vihvelin (2004), also known as the new
dispositionalism. But I shall not discuss them in the thesis, since the demonstration that (β) holds
will go through without making substantial assumptions about abilities.
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P". Inserting universal quantification on the variables s (the agent-variable) and t
(the time-variable), we get the following sentential operator: "P and, for any s and
any t, it was not in s’s power to make it not the case that P ’. This is how I shall
understand Nφ in this section4.
Here is the first counterexample (Widerker 1987: 38):
Suppose that by destroying a bit of radium r before t9, Sam prevents the
emission of a subatomic particle by r at t9. Suppose further that this is the
only way by which Sam can make sure that r will not emit radiation at t9.
Finally suppose that Sam is the only sentient being that exists or ever existed.
Let ’R’ and ’S’ stand for
R: A bit of radium r emits at t9 a subatomic particle.
S: Sam destroys r before t9.
Now consider the following instance of rule (β):
1. N∼R
2. N(∼R ⊃ S)
4 This is pretty much what van Inwagen meant by his operator. Although it might not be
obviously clear what he meant by "having a choice about whether P is true", I think we should
interpret his construal of this operator as equivalent to Ginet’s one. There is a long passage in An
Essay on Free Will which strongly supports this interpretation:
[W]e shall do well to state the free-will thesis as a thesis about agents and propositions.
I propose to do this by devising a way to describe our powers to act – and, by acting,
to modify the world – as powers over the truth-values of propositions’. Consider the
propositions [. . . ]
(a) 27 x 15 = 405;
(b) Magnets attract iron;
(c) Mary Queen of Scots was put to death in 1587;
(d) I have never read The Teachings of Don Juan;
(e) No one has ever read all of Hume ‘s Enquiry aloud;
(f) The cup on my desk has never been broken.
[T]he truth of (a)-(c) is something it is not and never has been within my power to
change [my emphasis], though the truth of (d)-(f) is something that is within my
power, or once was within my power, to change; (a)-(c) are true and I do not have,
and never have had, any choice about this [my emphasis] (van Inwagen 1983: 66)..
So, it seems that van Inwagen is in fact assuming that "P and no one has, or ever had, any
choice about whether P" is equivalent to Ginet’s construal of NP . I will eventually use both of
them assuming they are equivalent.
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3. NS
According to Widerker, this is an instance of rule (β) in which the premises
seem true and the conclusion false. I will examine this example more carefully.
Premise one says that "∼R and, for any s and any t, it was not in s’s power to
make it the case that R". This premise is true if and only if both conjuncts are
true. The first conjunct is true because, in the example, r does not emit a particle
at t9. But why is the second conjunct true? Why is not the case that Sam has
the power to make it the case that r emits at t9 a subatomic particle? Although
Widerker does not give any reason in support of the second conjunct, there is an
instructive passage where he says that (β) is not truth-preserving "in situations
involving the occurrence of uncaused, random events, or events associated with free
human actions" (Widerker 1987: 38). So, I guess his idea in this case is that R is
a proposition about the occurrence of a random event, and no one can ensure that
such an event will happen. Though I take the second conjunct to be true, it is worth
investigating it in a bit more detail.
First of all, it is important to note that Widerker gives a slightly different reading
of "NP". In his view,NP can be read as "P and it’s not within s’s power at t to bring
it about [my emphasis] that P" (Widerker 1987: 38). It is not entirely clear whether
Widerker’s formulation boils down to the one given by Ginet or van Inwagen. But
he indicates that there are two ways in which we can understand his construal. The
first and most obvious one is this:
Definition 3.2.1. It is within s’s power at t to bring it about that P if, and only
if, it is within s’s power to cause the event that P describes.
Now we can see why premise one is true if we assume this definition. While
it is not completely clear what "random" means when applied to single events, I
assume that Widerker takes "random event" and "uncaused event" as synonyms
in his paper. If the proposition expressed by "a bit of radium r does not emit a
subatomic particle at t9" describes an uncaused event, then Sam cannot cause it to
happen. Thus, assuming (def. 3.2.1), it is not within Sam’s power to bring it about
that ∼P .
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Premise two states that "(∼R ⊃ S) and, for any s and any t, it was not in s’s
power to bring it about that ∼R and ∼S". The first conjunct is true because, in
the example, Sam in fact destroys r before t9, so that S is true and consequently
the material conditional ∼R ⊃ S is also true. The second conjunct is true, to use
Widerker’s understanding of N if, and only if, Sam cannot cause the events that ∼R
and ∼S say to occur. Suppose, however, that Sam can cause these events to happen.
Suppose he does not destroy r before t9, causing the event that ∼S describes. If
this is the case, he cannot ensure that r will not emit a subatomic particle at t9,
for, according to the example, the only way by which Sam can make sure that r will
not emit a subatomic particle at t9 is by destroying it before t9. So, if Sam does not
destroy r before t9, he cannot cause the event that ∼R describes, contradicting our
assumption that Sam can cause the events to happen. Thus, assuming (3.2.1), it is
not within Sam’s power to bring it about that ∼R.
Although the premises are true, the conclusion is nevertheless false. It is up to
Sam whether he destroys r before t9. If the premises are true and the conclusion is
false, (β) is not valid and accordingly the consequence argument is not valid.
The interpretation given by (3.2.1) may not be very compelling to some philoso-
phers, however. For it assumes, contrary to many philosophical accounts of causation
(especially the so-called "Humean" accounts), that causal relata are not only partic-
ular events; in the present case, the relation is conceived to be between a particular
event (particle decay) and an agent (Sam). Even so, this is a point that would
lead us to a different question altogether. Furthermore, if (3.2.1) is not compelling,
there is another way in which we can understand "to bring it about that" without
assuming agent causation. Consider this:
Definition 3.2.2. It is within s’s power at t to bring it about that P if and only if
there is an act-type a such that
(i) it is within s’s power at t to perform a, and
(ii) if s were to perform a, then it would be the case that ∼P .
Premise one is true assuming (3.2.2). In the example, there is nothing Sam can
do such that, if he did it, r would emit a subatomic particle at t9. Even if Sam had
3.3. Responding to the counterexample: strengthening rule (β) 57
not destroyed r before t9, we are not entitled to conclude that r would have emitted
a subatomic particle at t9. The conclusion is false because, had Sam not destroyed
r before t9, it would have been the case that ∼S.
Now consider premise two. Sam is able not to destroy r before t9. And we are
supposing that this is the only way by which r does not emit a subatomic particle
at t9. So, if Sam were not to destroy r before t9, ∼S would be true, but R would
also be true, and so the material conditional ∼R ⊃ S would be vacuously true.
The conclusion, however, is false. Sam is able not to destroy r before t9. And if
he were to do that, S would be false. Thus, rule (β) is invalid.
To sum up, the counterexample presented by Widerker seems to show that (β)
is invalid5. Additionally, it seems not to violate the first desideratum, since the
counterexample does not seem to presuppose the truth of compatibilism.
3.3 Responding to the counterexample: strength-
ening rule (β)
Does the counterexample really show that (β) is invalid? Philosophers such as
Crisp and Warfield (2000: 175) and Timothy O’Connor (1993a: 209) think that
the counterexample is successful. They think it really shows that (β), at least as
formulated by Ginet and van Inwagen, is invalid. Interestingly, Widerker did not
only present a counterexample to the original rule, as he offered an inference rule
which is immune to his original counterexample, namely,
(β-2) Nφ,□(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢ Nψ
However, a suggestion made by McKay and Johnson (1996) may show that
the counterexample is not a serious threat to the proponents of the consequence
argument after all, although it may definitely refute rule (β). In this section, I will
put forward an argument to show that a very simple revision of rule (β) will enable
us to sidestep the counterexample.
5See O’Connor (1993a) for an attempt to repair rule (β). I shall not discuss O’Connor’s revised
rule because I believe it fails to rule out McKay and Johnson’s counterexample.
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The first point that I want to make is that Widerker’s example works only on
the assumption that laws are unreliable. I will show that, if determinism is true
(in the sense that laws are deterministic, universal in extent and reliable), then the
example is not successful if the first desideratum has bite. Let us take a look at the
counterexample one more time:
1. N∼R
2. N(∼R ⊃ S)
3. ∼NS
All someone needs to do is to use that inference rule presented by Widerker
himself, namely, (β-2).
Suppose that determinism is true. If determinism is true, then the past and the
laws of nature determine a unique future. In the formulation of determinism used
earlier, if laws are reliable, deterministic and universal, then they cover S. Thus,
Pt0(L, S) and L strictly imply the sentence "Sam destroys r before t9".
1. □((Pt0(L, S) ∧ L) ⊃ S)
We are still not discussing the question of whether the premises of the conse-
quence argument are true. The concern here is about whether the conclusion of the
argument follows from its premises. Now, if the premises are plausible, so is the
following:
2. N(Pt0(L, S) ∧ L)
(Notice that I am not saying that 2 follows from the premises of the consequence
argument, but rather that if there is no reason to reject them, there is no reason to
reject 2 either).
From (1) and (2), using (β)-2, we can infer
C. NS
If the argument above is sound, it shows that Widerker’s example is successful
only if it assumes that laws are not deterministic, universal and reliable, that is,
only if determinism in the standard sense is not true.
3.3. Responding to the counterexample: strengthening rule (β) 59
Surely there is no problem in rejecting determinism to show (β)’s invalidity. After
all, the question of whether (β) is valid should be independent of our considerations
about determinism. However, the problem of arguing against (β) by assuming the
denial of determinism is that the consequence argument has determinism as an
assumption in the proof. And as we have seen, if determinism is true and the
first desideratum is a plausible one, then Widerker did not present a successful
counterexample to (β). For, as McKay and Johnson suggested, all we need to do in
order to sidestep his counterexample is to make the following claim. Rather than
saying that NS follows from N(∼R ⊃ S) and N∼R, we can just say that it follows
from these premises plus the assumption of determinism. Consider the following
argument:
1. □((Pt0(L, S) ∧ L) ⊃ S)
2. N∼R
3. N(∼R ⊃ S)
Hence,
4. NS
The above argument is not susceptible to Widerker’s counterexample, for if the
conclusion is false, premise (1) is false. Since the consequence argument is a condi-
tional proof that assumes the truth of determinism, we can strengthen rule (β), as
McKay and Johnson suggested. Let us call this rule "delta".
(Delta) Determinism is true, N(φ ⊃ ψ), Nφ ⊢ Nψ
In this new rule, determinism was added to the left of the turnstile. Now, if
Widerker’s example presupposes the denial of determinism, then it certainly does
not show that rule delta is invalid, simply because determinism would be false, and
then we would not have a case in which the premises of delta are true and its conclu-
sion false. Because the consequence argument assumes determinism, it is unaffected
by Widerker’s counterexample if the first desideratum is a plausible one. All we
need to do is to add determinism in the justification of steps (6) and (7) in the
modal formulation.
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Hence, the idea is that there can be no "indeterministic" counterexamples to rule
delta. Although Widerker’s example seems to satisfy the first desideratum, it does
not satisfy another one. Following this idea, Crisp and Warfield proposed a second
desideratum that counterexamples to (β) must satisfy in order to be persuasive
(Crisp & Warfield 2000: 180):
SECOND DESIDERATUM: Proposed counterexamples to (β) must not presup-
pose the truth of indeterminism.
As they say, "any such example that does presuppose indeterminism allows in-
compatibilists to sidestep the example by employing Principle Delta in the Conse-
quence Argument" (Crisp & Warfield 2000: 180). If there is an effective counterex-
ample to (β), according to them, then it must satisfy both desiderata. McKay and
Johnson, however, believe the counterexample they gave satisfies both desiderata.
I will consider McKay and Johnson’s counterexample to (β) now, and then I will
return to discuss the plausibility of the desiderata given by Crisp and Warfield.
3.4 McKay and Johnson’s counterexample
For starters, McKay and Johnson did not give a direct counterexample to (β).
Instead, they argued that agglomeration is invalid, and that rules (α) and (β) allow
us to generate agglomeration. The rule of agglomeration is this:
(Agglomeration) Nφ,Nψ ⊢ N(φ ∧ ψ)
Now consider a fair coin and suppose that the coin is not tossed, but that someone
could have tossed it. Let P abbreviate "The coin does not land heads" and let Q
abbreviate "The coin does not land tails". At a first glance the premises seem true
because P and Q are true and no one has the power to make it the case that not-
P, as well as the power to make it the case that not-Q. For instance, consider an
ordinary agent just like me. I do not have the power to make a fair coin land heads.
Nor do I have the power to make it land tails. Still, I do have the power to make a
fair coin land heads or tails.
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Given this, it is true that "N(the coin does not land heads)". There is nothing
that anyone can do such that, by doing it, it would render the proposition expressed
by the sentence "the coin does not land heads" false. The conclusion "N(the coin
does not land heads and the coin does not land on tails)" seems false, though. If
someone had tossed the coin, then it would have landed heads or tails, and so the
proposition expressed by the sentence "the coin does land tails and the coin does not
land heads" would be false. Thus, the counterexample shows that agglomeration is
invalid, at least if we assume definition 3.2.2.
McKay and Johnson’s reasoning against the validity of (β) is spelled out as
follows:
1 NP premise
2 NQ premise
3 □(P ⊃ (Q ⊃ (P ∧Q))) Logical truth
4 N(P ⊃ (Q ⊃ (P ∧Q))) α, 3
5 N(Q ⊃ (P ∧Q)) β, 1, 4
6 N(P ∧Q) β, 2, 5
As we already saw, the premises are true. Rule (α) is valid. But the conclusion is
false. Therefore, in the reasoning above, what allowed us getting a false conclusion
from true premises was precisely rule (β). Therefore, (β) is invalid.
Van Inwagen (2000) himself recognised the invalidity of rule (β) when he wrote
that "since the validity of [(β)] entails the validity of agglomeration, the existence
of a counterexample to agglomeration entails the existence of counterexamples to
[(β)]" (van Inwagen 2000: 19 note 6). Curiously, however, he does not think that
McKay and Johnson’s counterexample to agglomeration is a counterexample to (β).
Perhaps this is a too restrictive way to understand what a counterexample is. In
any case, we may present a counterexample to (β) based on McKay and Johnson’s
case. Let "T" abbreviate "the coin is tossed" (Vihvelin 2013).
1. N(P ⊃ ∼T )
2. NP
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Thus,
3. N∼T
Premise one says that "(P ⊃ ∼T ) and, for any s and any t, it was not in s’s power to
make it the case that P ∧T". The first conjunct is true because, in the example, the
coin is not tossed, so that the consequent ∼T is true and consequently the material
conditional is also true. The second conjunct is also true. In order to have the
power to make it not the case that the material conditional P ⊃ ∼T holds, someone
must be able to perform an action type a (for example, tossing a coin) such that,
if someone were to perform a, it would be the case that P ∧ T . Yet, we cannot
conclude that the coin would land heads, and so we cannot conclude that P would
still be true. Premise 2 is true as we saw in the example to show the invalidity
of agglomeration. But the conclusion is false. If someone were to toss the coin, it
would be false that ∼T . Thus, rule (β) is invalid.
According to McKay and Johnson, a distinctive characteristic of their argument
against (β) is that it shows not only that (β) is invalid but that rule delta is invalid
as well, so that the counterexample cannot be sidestepped by using rule delta. They
think that particle decay is an indeterministic process, whereas coin flip is not.
However, Crisp and Warfield have argued that the coin flip example does not satisfy
both desiderata.
3.5 Crisp and Warfield’s defence of (β)
In order to present Crisp and Warfield’s response to McKay & Johnson, we need to
see again the desiderata we have been considering so far:
FIRST DESIDERATUM: Proposed counterexamples to rule (β) must not presup-
pose compatibilism.
SECOND DESIDERATUM: Proposed counterexamples to (β) must not presup-
pose the truth of indeterminism.
McKay and Johnson’s example starts with the assumption that there is a fair
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coin and that no one has tossed this coin, but could have tossed it. Here is how
Crisp and Warfield reply to it.
Either determinism is true or not. Suppose that determinism is true. According
to the example, someone has the power to make a fair coin land heads or tails, that
is, someone has the power to make it not the case that the coin does not land heads
and does not land tails. If this is the case, then someone has the ability to make it
not the case that some proposition is false even on the assumption of determinism.
This (roughly) boils down to compatibilism. Since this violates the first desideratum,
Crisp and Warfield argue, the counterexample is not successful. Now suppose that
determinism is not true. If determinism is not true, then indeterminism is true,
which violates the second desideratum. Since this violates one of the desiderata, the
counterexample is not successful. Therefore, McKay and Johnson’s counterexample
is not successful.
Clearly, Crisp and Warfield’s argument against McKay and Johnson depends on
the plausibility of the two desiderata presented above. The question one should
naturally ask is this: what are the reasons for accepting these two desiderata?
First, let us see the justification for the first desideratum. Crisp and Warfield’s
defence of it is given in a footnote where they cite van Inwagen. This is what
they say: "see van Inwagen (1983) pp. 102-3 for a discussion of this important
desideratum. It is worth noting that van Inwagen’s critics accept this adequacy
condition on counterexamples to Principle Beta" (Crisp and Warfield 2000: 175).
This defence has two parts. One of them is certainly not decisive; after all, just
because some opponents of the consequence argument accept the first desideratum,
it does not follow that this desideratum is a plausible one. But if they are arguing
against McKay and Johnson and they accept this desideratum, well... The other
part of the defence is the same as the one presented by van Inwagen in the passage
they mentioned:
[I]t would be nice to see a counter-example to (β) that did not presuppose the
compatibility of free will and determinism. After all, the examples I gave in
support of (β) did not presuppose the incompatibility of free will and deter-
minism. I should think that if there are any counter-examples to (β), then
some of them, at least, could be shown to be such independently of the ques-
tion whether free will and determinism are compatible. (Van Inwagen 1983:
102)
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Since the discussion about (β)’s validity is a discussion in the context of the
problem of free will and determinism, any counterexample to this rule that presup-
poses compatibilism will beg the question, or so it seems. With respect to the second
desideratum they say that "any such example that does presuppose indeterminism
allows incompatibilists to sidestep the example by employing Principle Delta in the
Consequence Argument" (Crisp & Warfield 2000: 180).
Are the reasons above good ones to accept the desiderata? I do not think so. I
will give an argument from analogy to show that this sort of strategy is unacceptable,
and then present a reason as to why the first desideratum is implausible.
3.6 Against Crisp and Warfield
If Crisp and Warfield are correct, they did not only show that McKay and Johnson’s
counterexample is unsuccessful. They showed that all possible counterexamples to
(β) in the context of the consequence argument are unsuccessful. The reason is very
simple. Assuming the second desideratum, one cannot present a counterexample
that presupposes the truth of indeterminism. In order to show that (β) is invalid,
all we have left is to present a possible situation in which determinism is true, NP
and N(P ⊃ Q) is true, and NQ is false. Here is the problem: it is impossible to do
this without violating the first desideratum. If NQ is false, then there is someone
who has a choice about whether some proposition is true (or that there is someone
who can make it not the case that Q). But if determinism is true, one will be
presupposing compatibilism6. To see why this strategy is problematic, let us take a
6Erik Carlson (2003) has argued that Crisp and Warfield’s strategy constitutes a false dilemma.
Remember what van Inwagen says in defence of rule (β): "if there are any counter-examples to
beta then some of them, at least, could [my emphases] be shown to be such independently of
the question whether free will and determinism are compatible" (van Inwagen 1983: 102). The
idea here is to revise the desiderata. Taking the first desideratum into account, it is not that
proposed counterexamples to (β) must not presuppose compatibilism, but rather that they could
be proposed without presupposing compatibilism. And the same goes for the second desideratum.
A counterexample to (β) must be such that it could occur even if determinism were to hold, not
that the counterexample actually occurs and determinism holds (cf. Carlson 2003). However, I
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look at this inference rule:
(C) : □((Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L) ⊃ P ), P ⊢◇∼P
Suppose that we are using rule (C) to argue for compatibilism, and suppose we
add the following desideratum:
DESIDERATUM*: Proposed counterexamples to (C) must not presuppose the
falsity of compatibilism.
As we can see, if we accept the desideratum above, it is impossible to present a
successful counterexample to rule (C). Suppose one gives a counterexample to (C)
showing that the premises are true and the conclusion is false. The proponents of
rule (C) could reply to it by saying that this counterexample is not effective because
it presupposes the falsity of compatibilism. If the conclusion is false, then it follows
that □P and so that NP , which just means that no one has or ever had free will.
And if no one has or ever had free will where determinism holds, compatibilism
is false. Clearly, every counterexample to rule (C) will presuppose the falsity of
compatibilism; it will presuppose that determinism and the free will thesis (in this
case, that someone has a choice about whether some proposition is true) cannot
both be true.
My point is that Crisp and Warfield’s strategy is implausible for the same reason
that the strategy employed above is implausible. Rule (C) is bizarre and cannot be
defended by appealing to desideratum*. If a counterexample to rule (C) presupposes
the truth of incompatibilism (or the falsity of compatibilism), then if Crisp and
Warfield are right in denying the counterexamples to (β) then one will also be right
in denying the counterexamples to (C). Sure this cannot be right.
If the argument from analogy is correct, it shows only that Crisp and Warfield’s
strategy is implausible, but it does not give a diagnosis of what is wrong with their
strategy. Here is what is wrong, in my view, with their strategy.
The problem seems to be with the term "presuppose", which is ambiguous7.
am not completely sure whether Carlson identifies the real problem with that strategy. For that
reason I shall take a different route.
7Sean Choi (2006) has made the same point.
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How does McKay and Johnson’s (and also Widerker’s) counterexample presuppose
that compatibilism is true? The counterexample is not anything like the following
argument: compatibilism is true, the premises of the consequence argument are true
and rule (α) is valid, so it has to be the case that rule (β) is invalid. In other words,
it does not seem to be anything like the first strategy based on the simple conditional
analysis of abilities. So, they cannot understand "presupposing" in the sense that
the truth of compatibilism is a sufficient condition of (β)’s invalidity.
On the other hand, suppose that they understand "presuppose" in its "ordinary"
sense, that is, that compatibilism is a necessary condition of the counterexample.
More precisely, say that P presupposes Q if and only if P entails Q. (I take this
distinction from Oliver Wiertz’s comments on Plantinga’s book Warranted Christian
Belief (2015)). In that sense, it does make sense to say that the counterexample
presupposes compatibilism, for if it is successful, then compatibilism follows. Let us
reformulate the desideratum in an explicit way:
DESIDERATUM: Counterexamples to rule delta must not entail compatibilism.
But why is this desideratum plausible? Understood in that way, Crisp and
Warfield are asking for the impossible: namely, a counterexample to rule delta
which does not entail compatibilism. So, it is not surprising that both desiderata
will not be fulfilled. That is the same reason why desideratum* is an implausible
one; after all it requires something that is impossible to do. If there are no good
reasons to accept this desideratum, then this strategy to defend the consequence
argument fails.
To sum up, both counterexamples presented have shown that there is at least
some problem with the original formulation of the argument. And Crisp andWarfield’s
strategy seems too implausible. But this is enough for the background of the dis-
cussion. What I shall do now is to find an alternative way to interpret "N", or to
put forward a different formulation of the consequence argument that rests on an
inference rule that avoids McKay and Johnson’s counterexample.
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3.7 Rule (β) and the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for
counterfactuals
The overall aim of this section is to evaluate the question of whether (β) is a valid
inference rule on the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals. I will consider
this, first, by discussing McKay and Johnson’s counterexample on Lewis’ semantics
for counterfactuals. I show that the counterexample is successful in showing the
invalidity of rule (β) on Lewis’ semantics. After that, I propose to define "no-choice
about" in terms of the might-counterfactual in order to prove that a new (β)-like
inference rule holds on Lewis’ semantics. While the original inference rule is invalid
on Lewis’ theory, it is actually valid on Stalnaker’s. I show that agglomeration and
the original (β) rule are in fact valid on Stalnaker’s theory and give an explanation
as to why this is the case. (I also show how this allows one to reply to Alex Blum’s
claim about the paradoxical result of McKay and Johnson’s counterexample).
3.7.1 The counterfactual sufficiency interpretation
In "Van Inwagen’s Consequence Argument" Michael Huemer (2000) discusses sev-
eral interpretations of "no-choice about" by arguing that a successful interpretation
should satisfy the following desiderata:
a) the premises of the consequence argument are true
b) the claim that "φ and no one has or ever had any choice about whether φ" is
incompatible with agents having free will
c) the argument is valid.
Since the context of this discussion concerns the consequence argument, I will
follow Huemer’s suggestion that we need to satisfy those desiderata.
I start with what Huemer calls "the sufficiency interpretation". Remember that
to say that someone has a choice about whether P is true is to say that although
P is true, someone can make it not the case that P . This can be understood as
follows (Huemer 2000: 529): although P is true, someone can do something that
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is sufficient for ∼P 8. The following interpretation of “N” boils down to Huemer’s
counterfactual sufficiency interpretation (Huemer 2000: 529-30) and also Widerker’s
interpretation. Let x range over agents and α range over all past, present and future
action-types (cf. also Pruss 2013). Now define "Nφ" thus:
Definition 3.7.1. Nφ if and only if φ∧∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α)∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)]
I have not defined Can(x, α) nor. Of course defining "can" is a real challenge,
but as we shall see the proofs I will present work given just some fairly uncontro-
versial assumptions about it; and the proofs go through on Lewis’ theory regardless
of how we define it. With respect to, as the title of this chapter suggests, I shall
assume the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals. In other words, I shall
start by saying something about the meaning of counterfactuals that amounts to
the common aspects of Lewis and Stalnaker approaches:
(LS) φ ψ is true in a world w if and only if ψ is true in all the worlds in which
φ is true that are closest to w.
I also adopt the standard terminology in saying that an φ-world is just a world
in which φ is true. In this sense to say that φ ψ is true in w is to say that ψ is
true in all the φ-worlds closest to w.
3.7.2 Lewis’ theory and the might-counterfactual
This is the standard response to the problem. Lewis’ theory allows us to see that
McKay and Johnson’s counterexample is indeed successful in demonstrating that (β)
does not hold. In order to get Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals we need to examine
his definition of the "might-counterfactual", that is, "if φ were the case, ψ might be
the case". Let ◇→ stand for if... might.... Now define ◇→ thus:
(Lewis’ might counterfactual): φ◇→ ψ if and only if ∼(φ ∼ψ)
8Van Inwagen has suggested (1983, 2004) that by "sufficiency" he meant logical sufficiency. But
this is problematic for many reasons (cf. Huemer 2000: 529-30).
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Remember that McKay and Johnson’s counterexample starts with the assump-
tion that no one tossed the coin. Let P stand for the proposition expressed by
"the coin does not land heads" and Q for "the coin does not land tails". What the
counterexample needs to show is that NP , NQ and ∼N(P ∧ Q). Given definition
3.7.1, what needs to be shown is this:
1. P ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼P )]
2. Q ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼Q)]
3. ∼(P ∧Q) ∨ ∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(P ∧Q))]
So, the first conjuncts of (1) and (2) are true, since no one tossed the coin it
did not land heads and it did not land tails. Consider the second conjunct of (1)
and (2). Is there a way to show that they are true? Suppose they are false. If they
are false, there must be an action that an agent can perform such that, if the agent
were to perform it, the coin would land tails (or heads in case of premise 2). In
other words, to show that they are false, we need to show that at least one of the
following counterfactuals is true:
Cf1: If someone were to toss the coin, it would land tails.
Cf2: If someone were to toss the coin, it would land heads.
Notwithstanding, neither Cf1 nor Cf2 are true on Lewis’s theory. Since I think
Jean-Paul Vessel explained it in a sufficiently clear way in his paper "Counterfactuals
for consequentialists" (2003), the following will be a mere exposition of Vessel’s
explanation.
The first point Vessel raises for thinking that neither Cf1 nor Cf2 are true is
that their antecedents are very unspecified. All we need to do in order to satisfy the
antecedents is that someone tosses the coin. But there are many ways in which one
can do that. Consider Sam’s ability to do it.
[...] Sam is capable of flipping a coin in any number of ways. Variations in
these influencing factors can be used to generate a plethora of different fully
specified ways in which the antecedents of our two counterfactuals might be
satisfied. And this implies that there are a vast number of different possible
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worlds - at least one for each fully specified way that Sam might flip a coin
- in which Sam flips the demon’s coin. In one possible world, Sam flips it in
direction d1, with velocity v1, spin action s1, and so on. In another, Sam flips
it in direction d2, with velocity v2, spin action s2,... In another... (Vessel 2003:
107).
But as Vessel maintains, the fact that the antecedent is extremely unspecified is
not the only factor contributing to his denial of the Cf1 and Cf2 pair.
There are plenty of examples of pairs of counterfactuals with identical under-
specified antecedents and incompatible consequents such that one of the pair
is, in fact, true.
Consider the following counterfactuals:
Cf5: If I were to carry my daughter Samantha towards her crib, I would
drop her along the way.
Cf6: If I were to carry my daughter Samantha towards her crib, I wouldn’t
drop her along the way.
Cf5 and Cf6 are underspecified in much the same ways that Cf1 and Cf2
are: there is a multitude of different fully specified ways in which I can carry
Samantha to her crib. But, intuitively, Cf6 seems true. Samantha is our third
baby – and I’ve never dropped a kid. I have the ability to guarantee that
whatever fully specified ways satisfy the antecedents in the closest antecedent
worlds are ways that will ensure the truth of the consequent of Cf6 (Vessel
2003: 108-9).
The ability that Vessel has to guarantee the truth of the consequent of Cf6 contrasts
with one’s inability to ensure the truth of the consequent of either Cf1 or Cf2. So
the difference is this: Sam not only lacks the ability to perform a particular fully
specified way of satisfying the antecedent of Cf1 and Cf2, he also lacks the ability to
guarantee that a fully specified way of satisfying the antecedent of Cf1 and Cf2 will
lead to his desired result. Because no one has the ability to ensure that by tossing
a coin it will produce the desired result, "there don’t appear to be any factors that
would influence the similarity relation to grant any special priority (or ‘closeness’)
to heads-worlds over tails-worlds" (Vessel 2003: 109):
How a Lewis-style theory for subjunctive conditionals evaluates the Cf1-Cf2
pair now becomes clear. In order for either counterfactual to be true, either
all of the closest antecedent worlds under consideration must be heads-worlds
or all of them must be tails-worlds. But the fact of the matter is that some
such worlds are heads-worlds; others are tails-worlds. Thus, Lewis’s account
entails that neither of the counterfactuals is true (Vessel 2003: 110).
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If this is right, then the scenario presented by McKay and Johnson is a situation
in which the premises of agglomeration are true: after all, no one has the ability
to do something such that, if one were to do it, the coin would land tails (heads).
The conclusion of this instance of agglomeration, however, is false. Consider the
following conditional:
Cf3: If someone were to toss the coin, it would land either heads or tails.
For example, while Sam lacks the ability to guarantee that a fully specified way
of satisfying the antecedent of Cf1 and Cf2 will lead to his desired result, he does
have the ability to guarantee - as Vessel says - "that whatever fully specified ways
satisfy the antecedents in the closest antecedent worlds are ways that will ensure
the truth of the consequent of" Cf3 (Vessel 2003: 109).
As a result, rule (β) fails given definition 3.7.1 and Lewis’ theory of counterfac-
tuals. The natural way out thus is to find a different operator, or to make use of a
different inference rule (as Widerker suggested).
3.7.3 "M" and (β) on Lewis’ theory
The first strategy I consider here is to use a different operator (following McKay and
Johnson, and Finch and Warfield, I shall call it "M"). Although agglomeration does
not hold on Lewis’ theory, it does hold if we define "no-choice about" in terms of
the might-counterfactual. This is the simplest way to avoid McKay and Johnson’s
counterexample. That is, even though there is nothing I can do such that, if I were
to do it, the coin would land heads (tails), there is something I can do such that, if
I were to do it, the coin might land heads (tails).
Definition 3.7.2. Mφ if and only if φ∧∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α)∧(Does(x, α)◇→ ∼φ)]
3.7.4 A demonstration of Mφ, M(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢ Mψ on Lewis’
theory
Although Finch and Warfield have suggested this strategy a while ago, they did not
prove that Mφ, M(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢ Mψ. Given definition 3.7.2 we can demonstrate its
corresponding (β)-rule on Lewis’ theory.
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(β-M): Mφ, M(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊢Mψ
I will employ the following inference rules (which spring from Lewis’ definition
of the "might-counterfactual"):
(L) φ◇→ ψ ⊣⊢ ∼(φ ∼ψ)
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1 Mφ
2 M(φ→ ψ)
3 φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼φ)] def, 1
4 (φ→ ψ) ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ))] def, 1
5 ψ ⇒E, 1, 2
6 ∼(ψ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼ψ)]
7 ∼ψ ∨ ∼∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼ψ)] DM, 6
8 ∼∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼ψ) DS, 5, 7
9 ∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼ψ) ¬E, 8
10 Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a)◇→ ∼ψ) ∃E, 9
11 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧Does(x, α)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ))] ∧E, 4
12 ∼[Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ))] ∀E, 11
13 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ)) DM, 12
14 Can(s, a) ∧E, 10
15 ∼(Does(s, a)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ)) DS, 13, 14
16 Does(s, a) (φ→ ψ) L, 15
17 ∼[Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a)◇→ ∼φ)] ∀E, 3
18 ∼(Does(s, a)◇→ ∼φ) DS, 14, 17
19 Does(s, a) φ L, 18
20 Does(s, a)
21 φ Logic, 19, 20
22 φ→ ψ Logic, 16, 20
23 ψ ⇒E, 21, 22
24 Does(s, a) ψ , 20–23
25 Does(s, a)◇→ ∼ψ ∧E, 10
26 ∼(Does(s, a) ψ) L, 25
27 ⊥
28 ψ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼ψ)]
29 Mψ
3.7. Rule (β) and the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals 74
We may then proceed by putting forward a consequence argument using "M"
rather than "N".
One might point out that a drawback of this operator is that it makes "M"
agglomerative, contrary to van Inwagen’s original intention. That is, perhaps what
we want to capture with "M" is the basic locution of "having a choice about whether
P is true" or "to make it not the case that P". And according to our intuitive grasp
of the locution it seems that the operators should not be agglomerative. There are
two responses to this criticism.
First, as Lewis once noticed (1983), since the locution was introduced as a tech-
nical term, it does not really matter what it means in natural language or even
what van Inwagen originally meant. What really matters is whether we can give
any meaning that would make the premises of the consequence argument defensible
without circularity. I guess that this is the point of having those desiderata Huemer
presented. And "M" seems to do the trick.
Second, even if we want to capture the intuitive grasp of the locution (assuming
there is one), Blum (2000) has argued that "no-choice about" as originally intended
is in fact agglomerative. Blum argues for a paradoxical conclusion, for he seems to
agree that McKay and Johnson’s counterexample refutes rule (β) when he writes
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that "N ought to be, and yet ought to fail to be, agglomerative" (Blum 2000: 286)9.
One possible response is that the intuitive locution is better interpreted with
Lewis’ might-counterfactual. And all that McKay and Johnson’s counterexam-
ple shows is that the locution is not agglomerative if interpreted with the would-
counterfactual. But we can also show that "N" on Stalnaker’s theory is i fact
agglomerative, which is in line with Blum’s point.
3.7.5 Stalnaker’s theory and the limit assumption
Here I will show that agglomeration holds on Stalnaker’s theory given some assump-
tion about "can" and definition 3.7.1, the counterfactual sufficiency interpretation,
even though it does not hold on Lewis’ theory.
In order to show that agglomeration holds we need the following inference rule
(Bonevac 2003: 418).
(S) ∼(φ ψ) ⊢ φ ∼ψ
In Stalnaker’s theory (S) is easy to show. It follows from what has been said
9Blum’s argument depends on several principles about our intuitive grasp of the locution "having
a choice about whether P is true". He follows Finch and Warfield when they say that they
"understand one’s having a choice about a truth p as one being able to act as to ensure the falsity
of p" (1998: 516). Again, I think this is just tantamount to the original understanding of the
operator presented by Ginet and van Inwagen. The principles are the following (Blum 2000: 285):
Principle 1: If someone has or had a choice about whether P is true, then someone has or had a
choice about whether the logical consequences of P are true as well.
Principle 2: If someone has or had a choice about whether: either p is true or [that] someone has
or had a choice about whether P is true, then someone has or had a choice about whether
P is true.
Principle 3: If both of two humanly unavoidable truths are each humanly unavoidable then so is
their disjunction.
If the principles are true, then "no-choice about" should be agglomerative. I will not reproduce
Blum’s argument since it consists of a demonstration of 23 steps. And I will not discuss the
plausibility of the principles either. I will just give an explanation as to why he thinks "no-choice
about" should and should not be agglomerative.
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about the meaning of counterfactuals and the limit assumption, namely, that there
is never more than one closest φ-world. If ∼(φ ψ) holds, then ψ does not hold
at at least some closest φ-world. Let w1 be such a world. Thus, ψ does not hold at
w1 where φ holds, which is to say that ∼ψ and φ hold at w1. Since w1 is the only
closest φ-world given the limit assumption, ∼ψ holds at all closest φ-worlds, and so
ψ ∼ψ follows.
(S) goes in only one direction, so that ∼(φ ψ) does not follow from φ ∼ψ,
since φ ∼ψ and φ ψ hold in case φ is impossible. But it does follow if we
suppose that ◇φ.
(S-2) ◇φ, φ ∼ψ ⊢ ∼(φ ψ)
Last, there is a final assumption. To show that agglomeration holds we also need
the assumption that if someone can perform some action-type α, then it is possible
she performs α: in other words, I shall assume that Can(x, α) entails ◇Does(x, α).
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3.7.6 Agglomeration on Stalnaker’s theory
1 Nφ
2 Nψ
3 ∼N(φ ∧ ψ)
4 φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] def. N, 1
5 ψ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼ψ)] def. N, 2
6 ∼[(φ ∧ ψ) ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ∧ ψ)] def. N, 3
7 ∼(φ ∧ ψ) ∨ ∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ∧ ψ))] DM, 6
8 φ ∧E, 4
9 ψ ∧E, 5
10 φ ∧ ψ ∧I, 8, 9
11 ∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ∧ ψ))] DS, 7, 10
12 Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼(φ ∧ ψ)) ∃E, 11
13 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] ∧E, 4
14 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼ψ)] ∧E, 5
15 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a) ∼φ) Logic, 13
16 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a) ∼ψ) Logic, 14
17 Can(s, a) ∧E, 12
18 ∼(Does(s, a) ∼φ) DS, 15, 17
19 ∼(Does(s, a) ∼ψ) DS, 16, 17
20 Does(s, a) φ S, 18
21 Does(s, a) ψ S, 19
22 Does(s, a) ∼(φ ∧ ψ) ∧E, 12
23 Does(s, a) (φ ∧ ψ) Logic, 20, 21
24 ◇Does(s, a) Can, 17
25 ∼(Does(s, a) (φ ∧ ψ)) S-2, 22, 24
26 ⊥
27 N(φ ∧ ψ) ¬I, 3–26
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The upshot is that agglomeration holds on Stalnaker’s theory given a fairly
plausible assumption about "can".
McKay and Johnson’s counterexample seems successful because Cf1 and Cf2
are false according to Lewis’s theory. However, Stalnaker’s theory combined with
the theory of supervaluations takes the truth-values of these counterfactuals to be
indeterminate. That is, Stalnaker’s theory also produces the desired result that Cf1
and Cf2 are not true. But rather than saying they are false, Stalnaker takes their
truth-value as indeterminate. He already made this point clear in this passage:
This time someone ran off with the coin before it was tossed. Having no other
coin, Tweedledee and Tweedledum argue about how it would have landed if it
had been flipped. Tweedledee is convinced that it would have landed heads,
Tweedledum that it would have landed tails. Again, neither has a reason –
they agree that the coin was a normal one and that the toss would have been
fair. This time, there is little inclination to say that one of them must be right.
Unless there is a story to be told about a fact that renders one or the other of
the counterfactuals true, we will say that neither is. (Stalnaker 1984: 165)
On the standard account of supervaluationism, a sentence is true if it is true
on all precisifications, false if it is false on all precisifications, and neither true
nor false otherwise. Cf1 and Cf2 are neither true nor false on all precisifications.
Thus they are neither true nor false. If truth is truth on all precisifications then
supervaluationists account for validity in the following way: an argument is globally
valid if and only if if the premises are true on all precisifications the conclusion is true
on all precisifications. Since on Stalnaker’s theory the premises of agglomeration are
not true on all precisifications, we cannot say agglomeration is invalid. So, if we are
sympathetic to Stalnaker’s theory, we cannot assume that the counterexample is
successful. The counterexample does not show a situation in which the premises are
true and the conclusion false. It shows instead a situation in which the premises are
indeterminate and the conclusion is false.
This result is totally in line with the premises of McKay and Johnson’s coun-
terexample being indeterminate rather than true, so that there is no situation in
which the premises of agglomeration are true and the conclusion is false. But if
agglomeration holds, it seems that those sympathetic to Stalnaker’s theory should
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not be worried about McKay and Johnson’s argument after all. In fact, the second
interesting result is that the original rule (β) holds on Stalnaker’s theory.
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1 Nφ
2 N(φ ⊃ ψ)
3 φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] def.3.7.1, 1
4 (φ ⊃ ψ) ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ⊃ ψ))] def.3.7.1, 2
5 φ ∧E, 1
6 φ ⊃ ψ ∧E, 2
7 ψ ⇒E, 5, 6
8 Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼ψ)
9 Can(s, a) ∧E, 8
10 Does(s, a) ∼ψ ∧E, 8
11 ◇Does(s, a) "Can", 9
12 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] ∧E, 3
13 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼(φ ⊃ ψ))] ∧E, 4
14 ∀x∀α∼[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)] Logic, 12
15 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a) ∼φ) ∀E, 14
16 ∼Can(s, a) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a) ∼(φ ⊃ ψ) ∀E, 13
17 ∼(Does(s, a) ∼φ) DS, 8, 15
18 ∼(Does(s, a) ∼(φ ⊃ ψ) DS, 8, 16
19 Does(s, a) φ S, 17
20 Does(s, a) (φ ⊃ ψ) S, 18
21 Does(s, a) ψ Logic, 19, 20
22 ∼(Does(s, a) ψ) S-2, 10, 11
23 ⊥
24 ∼[Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼ψ)] ¬I, 8–23
25 ∀x∀α∼[Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼ψ)] ∀I, 24
26 ψ ∧∀x∀α∼[Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼ψ)] ∧I, 7, 26
27 Nψ def. 3.7.1, 26
Now, there are some ways to block these results. One may naturally reject the
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assumption about "can". But it is hard to see how someone may be able to do
something if there is no possible world at which she performs it. It is certainly the
case that some abilities are never exercised. But this is different from saying that,
necessarily, abilities are never exercised.
If this is right, it explains how Blum reached that paradoxical conclusion. To
show that we just need to focus on the first step of his demonstration, namely, that
N(NP ∧NQ) implies N(P ∧ Q). This is actually the case on Stalnaker’s theory.
Since "N" is factive,N(NP∧NQ) impliesNP andNQ. And because agglomeration
holds, it follows that N(P ∧Q). But this, of course, will not work on Lewis’ theory.
My suggestion is that it is plausible that the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics have
different results with respect to agglomeration and (β), and this may explain Blum’s
neglected argument about "no-choice about" being and not being agglomerative.
If we however want to use the original interpretation in terms of the would-
counterfactual, and if we do not want to make controversial assumptions such as the
limit assumption on Stalnaker’s theory, one strategy is to employ a different rule,
namely, (β-2) as suggested by Widerker himself. Alexander Pruss (2013) has proved
that (β-2) holds given the weakening rule for counterfactuals.
(Weakening): φ ψ,□(ψ ⊃ γ) ⊢ φ γ
Weakening holds on Lewis’ theory as well as on Stalnaker’s. I will not, however,
reproduce Pruss’ demonstration here. The interested reader is invited to verify
that (β-2) holds given the weakening rule. One option then is to formulate the
consequence in terms of rule (β-2).
1 N(L ∧ Pt0(L, P ))
2 □((Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L) ⊃ P )
3 NP β-2, 1, 2
The only difference is that premise one is stronger than the original formulation,
but since the point of this chapter is to put forward a valid consequence argument
(and, consequently, a valid Mind argument) the formulation is just fine (at least for
now).
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3.8 Final remarks
To sum up, after this long exposition of the background of the discussion, the orig-
inal formulation of the consequence argument fails if we assume Lewis’ theory of
counterfactuals. This is not a problem since we can either formulate it in terms of
rule (β-2) or in terms of "M". And as I have argued, given a plausible assumption
about "can" the original argument goes through if we are willing to accept Stal-
naker’s theory. Although I have presented the first counterexamples in complete
and boring detail, they allowed us to clarify the discussion with the possible-world
semantics for counterfactuals.
This is fine for the purposes of showing that the consequence argument does not
rest on an unjustified inference rule. I still have not shown that the premises are
true. This will be done in chapters 5 and 6, but assuming Bird’s dispositionalist
account of laws (to argue for the premise that the laws are not up to us) and Finch’s
trans-temporality thesis (to argue for the premise that the past is not up to us).
As we shall see in the next chapter, however, the Humean view gives reasons for
thinking that one of the premises of the consequence argument is quite problematic.
Chapter 4
Local Miracle Compatibilism
Chapter 3 had two purposes: to put forward the back and forth of the discussion on
rule (β) and to show that the main question is the one of whether the premises of
the consequence (and Mind) argument are true. It is now high time we evaluated
the plausibility of the premises. Chapter 2 introduced some philosophic accounts of
laws and chapter 3 some interpretations of "no-choice about". Now I combine them
in order to discuss the connection between laws and free will. Here, I discuss the
connection between the Humean account of laws and free will, while in chapter 5 I
look at the connection between dispositional essentialism and free will.
There is one observation before we move on. Although I have mainly focused
so far on the modal formulation of the consequence argument, I will discuss in this
chapter van Inwagen’s "first formal argument" (FFA for short) instead. There are
two reasons for that. First, I attempt to provide a very careful reconstruction of
Lewis’ reply to the consequence argument, one that was directed to FFA. Second, I
discuss in the addendum Jonathan Westphal’s (2012) objection to FFA. In any case,
the arguments I put forward here should go through the modal formulation as well.
One important aspect of the Humean view of laws is that it does not allow
for potency. This is so because the things that L speaks about happen merely in
accord with L rather than on account of L, such as the necessitarian view. It is
not surprising that a Humean conception of laws of nature will be more in line with
compatibilism. Since Humean laws do not govern, they do not place a constraint on
our actions. As a result Humeans will not have trouble in saying that the correct
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set of laws L is deterministic and universal, and sometimes we are able to act
otherwise. Of course, if we were to do otherwise, L would be broken... Remember
that in discussing the question of whether laws are reliable Humeans who follow
Lewis may accept the weak sense of "breaking the laws":
Weak sense: An agent is able to do something such that, if she were to do it, a
law would be violated.
"‘That is to say,’ my opponent paraphrases, ‘you claim to be able to break the
very laws of nature. And with so little effort! A marvelous power indeed! Can
you also bend spoons?’" (Lewis 1981: 114)". In fact, this might look like a very
implausible consequence of the Humean view of laws. But Lewis claimed that the
weak sense is not problematic at all. And it is not even a sense in which one is
actually able to break the laws. For the weak sense does not commit himself to
saying that L would be broken by one of his acts or by something caused by one of
his acts.
There is disagreement among Humeans about this claim. Philosophers such as
Beebee (2002, 2003) see no problem in saying that agents are able to break the laws
in the sense that the laws are violated or broken by our acts. Lewis, on the other
hand, claimed that agents are able to do otherwise than they in fact did even if
determinism is true, but denied that agents are able to break the laws of nature in
that sense. This view is known as Local Miracle Compatibilism (LMC).
Beebee has argued that LMC is untenable because it fails to provide any reason
as to why it is impossible for agents to break the laws. Beebee’s main point is that
there is no account of laws in line with LMC. Here, however, I argue that there
is one if a certain principle is true. One strategy for showing that two theses P
and Q are consistent is to show that P is consistent with another proposition R,
and that the conjunction of P and R entails Q. If so, P will be consistent with
Q. What I try to do is to show that Lewis’ version of the best system account of
lawhood (LBSA) is consistent with LMC given the principle that a freely performed
action requires a contrastive explanation, an explanation of why the agent performed
a rather than not-a. I will argue that LBSA is consistent with the principle of
contrastive explanation and that their conjunction entails LMC, so that LBSA is
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consistent with LMC.
This all requires clarification, of course. Since LMC is discussed in the context
of the first formulation of the consequence argument, I start by briefly introducing
FFA and showing how LMC comes up as a reply to it. Then, I present Beebee’s
objection as well as the back and forth of the discussion1. After reformulating
Beebee’s objection I go on to show that LMC is consistent with Lewis’ BSA.
4.1 Lewis’ reply to van Inwagen’s first formal argu-
ment
The first formal argument starts with the following scenario:
JUDGE: Let us suppose there was once a judge who had only to raise his
right hand at a certain time, T, to prevent the execution of a sentence of death
upon a certain criminal, such a hand-raising being the sign, according to the
conventions of the judge’s country, of a granting of special clemency. Let us
further suppose that the judge – call him ‘J’ – refrained from raising his hand
at that time, and that this inaction resulted in the criminal’s being put to
death. We may also suppose that the judge was unbound, uninjured, and free
from paralysis; that he decided not to raise his hand at T only after a period
of calm, rational, and relevant deliberation; that he had not been subjected
to any ‘pressure’ to decide one way or the other about the criminal’s death.
(van Inwagen 1975: 190-1)
In the argument, let t0 be filled in by some instant of time earlier than j’s birth.
P0, L and P , respectively, by a true proposition about the total state of the world
at t0, the conjunction of all the correct laws of nature and a true proposition that
expresses the whole state of the world at t. Now the argument (van Inwagen 1975:
191):
1. Determinism entails that the conjunction of P0 and L entails P .
2. If j had raised his hand at t, P would be false.
1I shall discuss, in particular, Oakley’s response (2006) and Graham’s objection to Oakley
(2008). However, I shall not discuss other objections to LMC, such as the one presented by Carl
Ginet (1990) and Garrett Pendergraft’s response to it (2010).
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3. If 2 is true, then if j could have raised his hand at t, j could have rendered P
false.
4. If j could have rendered P false, and if the conjunction of P0 and L entails P ,
then j could have rendered the conjunction of P0 and L false.
5. If j could have rendered the conjunction of P0 and L false, then j could have
rendered L false.
6. j could not have rendered L false.
Therefore,
7. If determinism is true, j could not have raised his hand at t.
Lewis (1981) argues that 5 and 6 cannot both be true, and which one is not
depends on how one interprets the phrase “to render a proposition false”. (As Lewis
correctly points out, the phrase was introduced as a technical jargon, and it does
not really matter what it means in natural language. What does matter is whether
one can give any definition of it in which the premises of the consequence argument
are defensible without begging the question).
In order to look at Lewis’ reply to the argument we need to define the notion of
a law-breaking event. And in order to do that we have to define first the notion of
an event falsifying a proposition.
Definition 4.1.1. Event e falsifies a proposition φ iff, necessarily, if e occurs, then
∼φ.
One might wonder why the strict conditional is needed in the definiens2. Suppose
we leave the necessity operator out, and consider the material conditional "if the
event that Brutus saves Caesar’s life occurs, then snow is not white". Since the
conditional is vacuously true, it will follow that the event that Brutus saves Caesar’s
life falsifies the proposition that snow is white. Naturally, e may be replaced by any
2Thanks to Nancy Cartwright for raising this question.
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arbitrary non-actual event and φ by any arbitrary true proposition. Thus any non-
actual event would falsify any true proposition at the actual world. This problem is
avoided with the strict conditional.
Now the notion of a law-breaking event.
Definition 4.1.2. Event e is a law-breaking event relative to world w iff, necessarily,
if e occurs, then ∼L, where L is the proposition stating the conjunction of all the
laws of nature of w.3
With this in mind Lewis aims at disambiguating the phrase "to render a propo-
sition false" by distinguishing two senses in which someone could have rendered a
proposition false.
Let us say that I could have rendered a proposition false in the weak sense iff
I was able to do something such that, if I did it, the proposition would have
been falsified (though not necessarily by my act, or by any event caused by
my act). And let us say that I could have rendered a proposition false in the
strong sense iff I was able to do something such that, if I did it, the proposition
would have been falsified either by my act itself or by some event caused by
my act (Lewis 1981: 120)
There is a minor complication in the passage above because Lewis defines a two-
place relation symbol in order to distinguish the two senses of rendering a proposition
false. However, the weak sense is formulated in terms of "the proposition would have
been falsified". And the question is: what does falsify the proposition? It certainly
needs to be an event. What seems to distinguish the weak sense from the strong
one is that what falsifies a proposition in the strong sense is an actional event or an
event caused by an actional event. Let us then define the two senses of rendering a
proposition false as follows:
Definition 4.1.3. Agent s can render a proposition φ false in the weak sense iff s
is able to perform some action a and if she were to perform a, there would be an
event e such that e occurs and, necessarily, if e occurs then ∼φ.
3Both definitions can be extracted from the following passage: "Let us say that an event would
falsify a proposition iff, necessarily, if that event occurs then that proposition is false. For instance,
an event consisting of a stone’s flying faster than light would falsify a law. So would an act of
throwing in which my hand moves faster than light. So would a divergence miracle" (Lewis 1981:
119).
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Definition 4.1.4. Agent s can render a proposition φ false in the strong sense iff s
is able to perform an action a and if she were to perform a, there would be an event
e such that e occurs and, necessarily, if e occurs then ∼φ and either e is identical to
a or e is caused by a.
I shall put forward Lewis’ argument in as much detail as possible. But some scene
setting is required before doing that. Remember that Lewis argues that premises 5
and 6 cannot both be true, and which one is not depends on how we interpret "to
render a proposition false". I shall start with the weak sense. If we take definition
(4.1.3), premise 6 is true if and only if it is not the case that j is able to perform
some action a such that, if j were to perform it, there would be an event e such that
e occurs and, necessarily, if e occurs, then ∼L. Since premise 6 is now read in terms
of a counterfactual conditional I will consider in a bit more detail Lewis’ theory of
counterfactuals.
4.1.1 Counterfactuals and overall comparative similarity
According to Lewis:
• Lewis’ analysis: “if φ were the case, then ψ would be the case” is (non-
vacuously) true at a world w iff ψ is true in all the worlds in which φ is true
that are closest to w.
On Lewis’ view closeness is similarity; so the idea is that a counterfactual is true
at the actual world if and only if the consequent is true in all the worlds where the
antecedent is true that are most similar to the actual world. In Counterfactuals he
pointed out that his theory was relying on a familiar notion of overall comparative
similarity, one that we somehow do have and that we may use to compare "big,
complicated, variegated things like whole people, whole cities, or even [...] possible
worlds" (Lewis 1973: 92). Lewis argued that, in this view, we may expect most
similar worlds (to a certain world w) to contain law-breaking events relative to w.
Here is the argument.
Suppose a proposition P is false at world w1 and suppose the counterfactual "if
P were the case, then Q would be the case" is true at it. Lewis defines the term
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"deterministic laws" as follows: laws L of a world w are deterministic if and only
if there is no other possible world at which L is true that is exactly like w at some
time, but not exactly like w at another time (Lewis 1979: 460). Consider now the
most similar P -world to w1. If L is true at the most similar P -world to w1, then,
given that laws are deterministic, since it is not exactly like w1 at the time to which
P is true, then it is not exactly like w1 at all times. But this looks quite implausible.
When considering the most similar P -world to w1 we want it to be exactly like w1
up to the time to which P is true, which will be impossible if L is true at the closest
P -world. On the other hand, if we do want to say that the most similar P -world to
w1 is one that is exactly like w1 up to the time to which P is true, then L will not
be true at this world. Lewis took the latter alternative. His idea is that the most
similar worlds are those exactly like w1 up to the time to which P is true, and that
differ from it by what he called a "divergence miracle", that is, a law-breaking event
relative to w1’s laws that pushes the world off the track of w1
4.
The upshot is that we might expect most similar worlds relative to a world w to
contain law-breaking events relative to w’s deterministic laws. However, it is not as
though every law-breaking event should be allowed. In "Counterfactual dependence
and time’s arrow" Lewis warned us that we cannot rely too much on the "familiar
notion" of comparative similarity, for it is not "any respect of similarity you can think
of must enter into the balance of overall similarity with positive weight" (Lewis 1979:
466). There he gives a detailed account of the comparative similarity relation. But
this is better understood as a response in the context of the following objection.
Some counterfactuals appear to be true even when a huge difference from ac-
tuality is required. Imagine a scenario where Nixon could have pressed a button
4Let me give a more precise characterisation of a "divergence miracle" that I adapt from
Jonathan Bennett (1984: 62). If a world w is exactly like the actual world for some period
ending at t, and unlike it for some period starting at t, and if the unlikeness is a result of an event
e occurring in w at t and such that, necessarily, if e occurs then L (the conjunction of the actual
laws) is false, then e is a divergence miracle. The dual of this notion is a convergence miracle;
that is, if a world w is unlike the actual world for some period ending at t, and unlike it for some
period starting at t, and if the likeness is a result of an event e occurring in w at t and such that,
necessarily, if e occurs then ∼L, then e is a convergence miracle.
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connected to other things that would have made a nuclear war unavoidable. Con-
sider the counterfactual “if Nixon had pressed the button, there would have been a
nuclear war” (Fine 1975). This is true in the scenario described. But a world at
which a nuclear holocaust occurs will be a lot unlike the actual world. On the other
hand, it seems that a world at which a law-breaking event prevents the nuclear war
to occur just after Nixon pressing the button is much more similar to the actual.
So, it seems Lewis’ theory would not be able to accommodate true counterfactuals
requiring huge differences from actuality.
Lewis responds to this objection by giving a more detailed account of the sim-
ilarity relation. Roughly, his account allows a trade-off between some violation of
the actual laws and some difference from the actual world in particular matters of
fact.
(1) It is of the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse viola-
tions of law.
(2) It is of the second importance to maximise the spatio-temporal region
throughout which perfect match of particular fact prevails.
(3) It is of the third importance to avoid even small, localized, simple
violations of law.
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of
particular fact, even in matters that concern us greatly (Lewis 1979:
47–48)
A world at which Nixon presses the button and a nuclear war does not happen
is one that certainly has a great spatio-temporal region of perfect match with the
actual world. But this comes at a cost of big, widespread law-breaking events. These
are not divergence miracles like the one that allows Nixon to press the button, thus
pushing the world off the track of the actual world. Rather, it comes at a cost of a
convergence miracle, a violation of the laws that puts it back on track with the actual
world. Lewis claimed that we could often expect convergence miracles to require
big, widespread violations of the laws, and divergence miracles to require only small
violations. Notice that his claim was not an ad hoc manoeuvre to reply to the Nixon
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argument, but – he claimed – a consequence of the asymmetry of overdetermination
instead5. If the asymmetry of overdetermination went in the opposite temporal
direction, convergence miracles would require smaller violations of the laws. Thus,
the Nixon argument fails because if we consider Lewis’ account of the similarity
relation. When the actual laws are deterministic, the most similar worlds to it are
worlds that contain a divergence miracle, but not a convergence one.
4.1.2 Weak and strong abilities
It is now high time we evaluated the objection to the consequence argument. I will
start by considering premise 6. Remember that in order to show that premise 6 is
false it has to be the case that j can render L false in the weak sense; that is, j is
able to perform some action a and if j were to perform a, there would be an event
e such that e occurs and, necessarily, if e occurs, then ∼L. Given compatibilism,
assuming j can raise his hand, there are all sorts of worlds where j raises his hand,
and we want to consider which of them are most similar to the one where j does
not raise his hand (let us say the actual world). For our purposes we just need to
consider two classes of worlds where j raises his hand.
Following Lewis (1979), we consider the class typified by w1 first. Until shortly
before t, the time at which j does not raise his hand, w1 is exactly like the actual
world. "The two match perfectly in every detail of particular fact, however minute.
Shortly before t, however, the spatio-temporal region of perfect match comes to
an end as w1 and [the actual world] begin to diverge" (Lewis 1979: 468). The
actual laws L are violated in some "simple, localized, inconspicuous way" (Lewis
1979: 468). j raises his hand and thus prevents the execution of the criminal. No
convergence miracles occur at w1.
Second, we consider the class typified by w2. No miracles occur at w2 and w2 has
5Let a determinant of a fact be a minimal set of conditions that, together with the laws of nature,
is jointly sufficient for the fact’s occurrence. Lewis claims that, from the point of view of the actual
world, events typically have very few earlier determinants, but very many later determinants. More
precisely, for every fact at time t0 there is a large number of distinct determinants at all times t1
such that t1 > t0, but there is no t1 < t0 for which the fact has a large number of determinants.
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the same deterministic laws as the actual world, so that L is true at w2. However,
as j raises his hand at t in w2, the actual world and w2 are unalike at t. Given that
laws L are deterministic, w2 is unlike the actual world at all times.
Consider now the ranking of priorities Lewis gives. Start with (1): It is of
the first importance to avoid big, widespread, diverse violations of law. Both w1
and w2 avoid big, widespread, divergence violations of law because they do not
contain convergence miracles. Now consider (2): it is of the second importance to
maximise the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect match of particular
fact prevails. Because w2 is unlike the actual world at all times, contrary to w1,
the ranking will tell us that w1 is more similar than w2. The latter would be more
similar to the actual world if (3) were more important than (2). But since this is
not the case, given Lewis’ ranking we are compelled to say that w1 is more similar
to the actual world than w2.
Now, given that w1 is more similar to the actual than w2, it is true that there
would be an event e at the most similar world (that is, at w1) that occurs and such
that, necessarily, if e occurs, then ∼L. Thus, it is false that j cannot render L false
in the weak sense6.
How about the strong sense? What if by “could have rendered P false” we mean
the strong sense? In that case premise 6 is read as "j is not able able to perform
an action a such that, if j were to perform a, there would be an event e such that e
occurs and, if e occurs, ∼L and either e is identical to a or e is caused by a". If this
is the meaning we give to van Inwagen’s phrase, then Lewis thinks premise 6 is true.
He agrees with van Inwagen that no one is able to perform law-breaking events, or
to perform actions that cause law-breaking events. Lewis is committed to
• (WEAK) Agent s is able to perform some act a such that, if she were to
perform a, there would be an event e such that e occurs and necessarily if e
occurs, ∼L,
6Notice that the very same argument may be put forward against the modal formulation. The
judge can do something (namely, raise his hand) such that, if he were to do it, L would be false.
And if this holds NL is not true.
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but not
• (STRONG) Agent s is able to perform some act a such that, if she were to
perform a, there would be an event e such that e occurs and necessarily if e
occurs then ∼L and either e is identical to a or caused by a.
In that case, however, Lewis thinks that premise 5 is the problematic one. The
premise is that "if j could have rendered the conjunction of P0 and L false, then j
could have rendered L false". The idea is that the argument van Inwagen gives in
support of 5 does not compel one to accept it. So let us take a look at what van
Inwagen says first.
(5) This premise may be defended as an instance of the following general
principle, which I take to be analytic:
If Q is a true proposition that concerns only states of affairs that obtained
before S’s birth, and if S can render the conjunction of Q and R false, then S
can render R false.
Consider, for example, the propositions expressed by
The Spanish Armada was defeated in 1588.
and
Peter van Inwagen never visits Alaska.
The conjunction of these two propositions is quite possibly true. At any rate,
let us assume it is true. Given that it is true, it seems quite clear that I
can render it false if and only if I can visit Alaska. If, for some reason, it is
not within my power ever to visit Alaska, then I cannot render it false (van
Inwagen 1975: 192-3).
Now let us take a look at what Lewis says. I will come back to discuss it later.
that does nothing to support Premise 5 taken in the strong sense. Given
that one could render false, in the strong sense, a conjunction of historical and
nonhistorical propositions (and given that, as in the cases under consideration,
there is no question of rendering the historical conjunct false by means of time
travel or the like), what follows? Does it follow that one could render the
nonhistorical conjunct false in the strong sense? That is what would support
Premise 5 in the strong sense. Or does it only follow, as I think, that one
could render the nonhistorical conjunct false in at least the weak sense? The
case of the traveler is useless in answering that question, since if the traveler
could render the proposition about his future travels false in the weak sense,
he could also render it false in the strong sense (Lewis 1981: 120-1).
What is Lewis’ point here? I think there are two ways in which we can interpret
the passage above and one is more charitable than the other. According to the first
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one Lewis is simply saying that the consequence argument is not cogent; he is not
saying that the argument is unsound, for he is just pointing out that the argument
for premise 5 fails to compel one to accept it. Why? Because premise 5 is not
an instance of the general principle the consequence argument appeals to. In the
example R is a proposition in which if someone can render it false in the weak sense,
then she can render it false in the strong sense as well. But we are not entitled to
say that L is such a proposition. The principle the proponent of the consequence
argument appeals to is the following:
a) where Q is a proposition before s’s birth and R is a proposition such that if s
can render it false in the weak sense, she can also render it false in the strong
sense, then: if s can render Q and R false in the strong sense, then s can
render R false in the strong sense.
However, it is not obvious that premise 5 - understood in terms of the strong
sense - is an instance of the above principle, for we are not entitled to say that L
is a proposition such that if someone can render it false in the weak sense, she can
also render it false in the strong sense. Consider this:
b) where Q is a proposition before s’s birth and R is a non-historical proposition,
then: if s can render Q and R false in the strong sense, then s can render R
false in the strong sense.
If (b) is true, then premise 5 is true. Even so, we need an argument to show that
(b) is true. What Lewis seems to be pointing out is that van Inwagen gives an
argument for (a), not (b), so that it is an ignoratio elenchi and thus does not justify
the acceptance of premise 5.
The above interpretation contrasts with one that commits Lewis to be saying
something stronger than that: that is, that the argument is unsound because premise
5 is false7. Lewis accepts that someone can render L false in the weak sense and
accepts as something intuitively plausible that no one can render L false in the strong
7This seems natural if we take the "if-then" of premise 5 to have the force of "entails" (Gallois
1977), but van Inwagen tells this is not right (van Inwagen 1977: 107).
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sense8. The problem with this interpretation is that Lewis does not give a reason
as to why 5 is false. On Lewis’ account of counterfactuals there is nothing requiring
that the first divergence from what actually happens can never be an actional event.
And even if it did require that by stipulation, it would just seem ad hoc for this
problem. This is why I take the first interpretation to be more charitable than the
second.
So, someone who follows Lewis may accept the weak thesis, and since the argu-
ment given for premise 5 does not compel one to accept it, one does not need to
accept:
(5) If j could have rendered the conjunction of P0 and L false, then j could have
rendered L false.
To sum up, Lewis’ strategy consists in disambiguating van Inwagen’s phrase and
to commit himself only to the weak thesis. The consequence argument is not cogent
either way one interprets the phrase "to render a proposition false". Either one
gives the meaning in terms of definition (4.1.3) or in terms of definition (4.1.4). If
we assume definition (4.1.3), then premise 6 is false. If we assume (4.1.4), then
premise 5 is unjustified.
4.1.3 Local Miracle Compatibilism
If one follows Lewis in considering how counterfactuals should be evaluated on the
assumption of determinism, then one is open to reject the consequence argument as
not cogent. But this is certainly not enough to motivate a compatibilist view that
accepts (WEAK) and denies (STRONG) (Beebee 2003: 264). After all, as Fischer
(1988) asks, why exactly should we discriminate between the two senses in which
one can render a proposition false?
8Lewis tells us that his denial of the strong thesis is compatible with his analysis of causation.
That is, where c and e are two distinct possible events, e causally depends on c iff if c occured e
would occur, and if c didn’t occur e would not occur. Let m be the divergence miracle. It is true
that if I had not raised my hand, m would not have occurred. However, it is false that, if I had
raised my hand, m would have occurred. It is false because, had I raised my hand, some or other
miracle would have occurred, but not the miracle m in particular. See, however, Ekstrom (1998).
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This is, I think, a legitimate and important question. Whereas it is true that
there is a gap in the incompatibilist’s argument, the incompatibilist has at least
shown that the compatibilist (of a certain sort) is committed to a distinction
which might appear to be rather "fine". There is an incompleteness in the
incompatibilist’s argument, and thus it is open to a person to reject it, but
in rejecting it, he may be committed to a distinction between claims about
our abilities which is hard to explain and justify (Fischer 1988: 249, also in
Beebee 2003).
The point then is that in order to motivate a view that distinguishes the two
senses in which one can render a proposition false one needs to explain and justify
why there is such a distinction. Let us briefly summarise LMC as the view according
to which:
(W) Agents (sometimes) have the ability to render L false in the weak sense
(S) Agents never have the ability to render L false in the strong sense
(D) Laws L are deterministic9
are consistent.
If the previous discussion is correct Lewis did not provide us with a reason to
think that (S) is true. And even if he had done that, Beebee argues, this would not
have been enough to motivate LMC. Beebee contends that LMC is a flawed view
if (S) is not necessarily true. The reason is that what motivates the claim that (S)
is true is a conceptual claim about the nature of laws: "the laws of nature place
absolute, inviolable constraints on what we are able to do" (Beebee 2003: 268). And
if this is the case, the laws of nature place constraints on what we are able to do as
a matter of conceptual necessity, so it cannot be that (S) is only contingently true.
I will accept for the sake of the argument that this is right. LMC is the view that
(W) and (S) are consistent with determinism and that there are no possible worlds
at which (S) is false. One may find this an attractive aspect of the view because
it shares the incompatibilist intuition according to which agents can never perform
law-breaking events; agents are not able to travel faster than the speed of light,
9"Deterministic" in Lewis’ sense, which boils down to the standard view that laws are both
deterministic and universal in extent.
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violate the principle of the conservation of angular momentum, etc. Nevertheless,
Beebee points out that Lewis does not provide us with any reason as to why the
strong thesis is false (Beebee 2003: 268). She puts forward a counterexample to
show that (S) is possibly false. If it turns out her counterexample is correct LMC
will be in a really bad spot.
4.2 Beebee’s objection to LMC
Before presenting the objection I would like to briefly consider Beebee’s criticism of
Lewis’ understanding of a law-breaking event first. Remember that a law-breaking
event for Lewis is an event e such that, necessarily, if e occurs, then ∼L. Beebee,
however, thinks that this definition is extensionally inadequate. “Plenty of events
that are manifestly law-breaking events [. . . ] fail to satisfy Lewis’s definition” (Bee-
bee 2003: 265). Here is why.
She considers the non-actual event of her arriving at the pub at t (call it event e).
At one e-world, w1, she waits until the very last moment and then “spontaneously
disappear, reappearing in the doorway of the pub a tenth of a second later” (Beebee
2003: 262). At another e-world, w2, she decides to go to the pub 5 minutes before and
arrive there several minutes later “in an entirely non-miraculous fashion" (Beebee
2003: 266). Beebee claims that e, as it occurs in w1, is a law-breaking event relative
to the actual world, but, as it occurs in w2, is not:
Lewis’s definition fails to make e-at-w1 a law-breaking event, because the con-
ditions he imposes on law-breaking events are too strict [...] What is needed
is a definition of a law-breaking event that is sensitive to the circumstances
that obtain, in worlds where the event occurs, when (or perhaps immediately
before) the event occurs. Whether an event is a law-breaking event depends
not just on the nature of the event itself, but also on the circumstances under
which it occurs (Beebee 2003: 266).
In order to overcome that problem by saying that the same event can be a law-
breaking one relative to one world but not all the possible worlds, Beebee provides
the following amended definition of a law-breaking event.
Definition 4.2.1. Event e is a law-breaking event at world w2, relative to world w1,
iff e, together with the circumstances under which it occurs at w2, is incompatible
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with L, where L is the conjunction of all of w1’s laws.
Given definition (4.2.1), she goes on to attack LMC, first, by building up the
following scenario:
Suppose that determinism is true, and suppose I am at a real estate auction.
My opponent has made a bid slightly above the price I had decided would
be my maximum bid, but I really want the house. I have to come to a quick
decision about whether or not to raise my hand, since the auctioneer’s hammer
is about to fall. I decide not to raise my hand (Beebee 2003: 268-9).
About this scenario, she asks us: although she did not raise her hand, was she
able to raise it? Assuming local miracle compatibilism, it seems so. After all, “this
is just the kind of ordinary ability that, according to local miracle compatibilism,
deterministic agents generally posses” (Beebee 2003: 269). Of course, if she had
raised her hand, some law-breaking event would have occurred. But since the ability
to perform that action itself does look like a strong ability, nothing compels the local
miracle compatibilist to deny that she has the ability to raise her hand.
At a first glance, then, the LMC proponents might accept that Beebee was able
to raise her hand. And since LMC endorses determinism being compatible with the
weak thesis, in that scenario, had Beebee raised her hand, a law-breaking event would
have occurred. The controversy is about whether any of Beebee’s actions could be a
law-breaking event, that is, whether there are strong abilities. If LMC is correct, no
act of us can be or cause law-breaking events. Beebee argues that the local miracle
compatibilist is not entitled to make that claim. Here is the counterexample:
Consider the (non-actual) event m, my deciding to raise my hand. There is
no reason to suppose that the closest world at which I raise my hand cannot
be a world where m is the divergence miracle, and hence a law-breaking event.
In that case, if I have the ability to do M then that ability is a strong ability,
and there is no reason to suppose that this is an ability that I do not possess.
Hence there is no reason to suppose that (S) is true. And, of course, if there is
no reason to suppose that (S) is in fact true, then a fortiori there is no reason
to suppose that (S) is true at all possible worlds (Beebee 2003: 269).
Beebee’s decision to raise her hand, together with the circumstances under which
she performs this action, is incompatible with the laws of the world in which she
does not raise her hand. Thus, her action is a law-breaking event, so that strong
abilities are not impossible, contrary to LMC’s claim. So, if (S) is possibly false,
LMC is false, as long as (S) is a necessary truth (Beebee 2003: 273).
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One might ask: why is the law-breaking event her decision? Consider, for ex-
ample, a world w1 at which she decides not to raise her hand, and one femtosecond
before a law-breaking event occurs – say, her arm spontaneously disappears and
reappears raised – so that the world diverges from the actual allowing her to raise
her hand. Beebee’s reason as to why this world does not seem the most similar
to the actual than the one at which m is a divergence miracle is because at w1
the divergence miracle looks much bigger than m. Remember the event of Beebee
arriving at the pub at time t. The closest world to the actual is the one at which
she arrives at the pub 5 minutes later: ′′the loss of a few minutes’ perfect match of
matters of particular fact is compensated by the fact that, given that loss, we only
need a small miracle rather than a big one to get e to happen” (Beebee 2003: 269).
Is this criticism correct? Well, I think Beebee has a very interesting point. I
agree that Lewis’ account does not suffice in showing that the first divergence from
what actually happens is never an actional event. Yet, I am not entirely sure that
the counterexample is persuasive10.
In any case, all that Beebee needs to show is that there is at least one possible
world where the decision is the miracle. And - as I said before - I do not think
that Lewis’ account of counterfactuals can avoid this unless he makes the argument
10For one thing, it is not clear that the example of event e (say, agent b arriving at the pub at t)
motivates the need for an amendment in Lewis’ definition of a law-breaking event. I am not sure
whether e at w1 and e at w2 are the same event. Clearly, w2 is closer to the actual world than w1
is because, as Beebee tells us, "the miracle required at w1 [...] is much bigger". And because "a
large miracle occurs at w1 and only a small one occurs at w2, w2 is closer to the actual" (2003:
262). Lewis tells us that by "big miracle" he means a "multitude of little miracles, spread out and
diverse" (Lewis 1979: 471). Now the main problem is this: does e at w1 include a multitude of
little miracles or not? If it does not, then it is not a big miracle. If it does, then why would one
think that e at w1 and e at w2 are the same event? On Lewis’ account of events they would be
two different classes of spatio-temporal regions, and so different events. That is, something counts
as an event only if it is a class of a spatio-temporal region (Lewis 1986: 244). Given this and the
axiom of extentionality, we can say that for any events x and y, x and y are different if and only
if there is at least one member of x that is not a member of y or there is a member of y that is
not a member of x. In that case, e at w1 will be a class that has a multitude of little miracles as
members, whereas e at w2 will not. Thus, they are different events.
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in terms of a somewhat ad hoc approach. Perhaps Lewis could avoid this if the
following were true: if an actional event were to be a law-breaking event, then it
would involve a "multitude of little miracles, spread out and diverse" and thus would
be a big miracle. Nevertheless, there is no reason to suppose that this would be the
case. It could be that a law-breaking actional event were to involve just a simple
violation of laws. This is why I agree that Lewis does not provide us with any reason
to think that (S) is true, let alone necessarily true.
4.3 Interlude: Oakley’s objection to Beebee
Shane Oakley (2006) has defended LMC from Beebee’s objection by rejecting her
definition of a law-breaking event. He claimed that according to Beebee’s definition
of a law-breaking event "any mundane counterfactual action that one could have
performed in a deterministic world could be considered a law-breaking event” (Oak-
ley 2006: 343), which is something unacceptable according to him. And if (4.2.1) is
replaced by Lewis’ definition, the counterexample will be avoided, for he thinks that
Beebee’s decision to raise her hand is not a law-breaking event according to Lewis’
definition.
Moreover, Beebee has not offered a convincing argument, other than to note
that [Lewis’ definition of a law-breaking event] precludes many mundane ac-
tions from being law-breaking events, which is exactly the motivation for Lewis
advocating such a definition (Oakley 2006: 344)
Oakley accepts alongside Beebee that if (4.2.1) is a good definition of a law-
breaking event, given determinism, it is possible for some non-actual action to be a
law-breaking event. Suppose the truth of determinism and consider some arbitrary
non-actual action a, e.g., raising one’s hand. It could turn out that a occurs together
with the circumstances C in a way that is incompatible with L; for example, the
circumstances may require that in order to act several particles will have to travel
faster than the speed of light. So depending on how the circumstances are, any
non-actual action could be a law-breaking event relative to the actual world. Thus,
it is precisely for this reason that he denies we should adopt definition (4.2.1) in
order to formulate LMC.
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In a nutshell, Oakley claims that Beebee’s objection is an ignoratio elenchi, for
it does not refute LMC as formulated by Lewis (since Lewis’ LMC has a different
understanding of a law-breaking event).
Another reason Oakley gives is that Beebee’s supposed amendment definition
(that is sensitive to the circumstances) is questionable. "Law-breaking event" is
introduced as a technical term in the context of how counterfactuals should be eval-
uated. However, when evaluating counterfactuals on the assumption of determinism,
the similarity relation is already taken to be fixed by the context (that is, the worlds
are similar to one another if they agree on a large number of what the relevant
interlocutors take to be their most important features). Therefore, if the term "cir-
cumstances" fixes the context of the similarity relation, then there is no need for it
in the definition of a law-breaking event. So it is hard to see how there is motivation
for accepting the supposed amendment in (4.2.1) as "counterfactuals events are not
considered in vacuo." (2006: 343)11.
On top of that it seems to me that Oakley could just point out that all that
matters in the context of this discussion is whether one can give a definition of a
law-breaking event in line with Lewis’ ranking of overall similarity and LMC. Lewis’
definition is just a stipulative definition of a law-breaking event and not a definition
of the intuitive notion. One might even wonder whether there is an intuitive notion
of a law-breaking event or miracle. We do seem to have the intuitive notion of a
miracle, such as God changing water into wine, but this is not what is at stake in
this discussion; "miracles" here are never actual events that violate actual laws, as I
discussed in chapter 2 the question of whether laws of nature are reliable. So one may
see no motivation to abandon Lewis’ stipulative definition in favour of (4.2.1); after
all, definition (4.2.1) does seem compatible with some actions being law-breaking
events. Therefore, if Oakley is correct, LMC should be formulated in terms of Lewis’
original definition of a law-breaking event, so that Beebee’s counterexample is no
threat.
11It is true that there are no counterfactuals in either Lewis’ or Beebee’s definitions. But the
point here is that "law-breaking event" is introduced in this context to evaluate counterfactuals
given determinism.
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Why does Oakley believe that m is not a law-breaking event according to Lewis’
definition? Unfortunately he does not give us a reason, but I think he has something
like the following in mind (van Inwagen 1983: 3). Suppose that determinism is true
and let P be a true proposition that the event that there is no eclipse tonight occurs.
The standard way of cashing out determinism is that it has a consequence that P0
and L entail P . Now consider the non-actual event that there is an eclipse tonight;
this event is not contrary to the laws - as van Inwagen says - "for the laws of nature
do not by themselves dictate when particular events such as eclipses shall occur"
(van Inwagen 1983: 3), in the sense that it is not the case that if the event that there
is an eclipse tonight occurs, then L is false. The event is nomologically impossible,
but not contrary to the laws.
Peter Graham (2008), however, has argued that this solution does not protect
the local miracle compatibilist from Beebee’s objection. Although Graham agrees
that in the estate auction scenario m - the event that she decides to raise her hand
- is not a law-breaking event according to Lewis’ definition, he says that
there is nothing stopping Beebee from stipulating that in the real estate auc-
tion scenario, her neurophysiology is such that her choosing to raise her hand
would require and involve a few particles in her brain travelling a short distance
faster than the speed of light. Were she to stipulate this, then it is plausible
that in the real estate auction scenario, the smallest miracle, or divergence
from reality, required in order to bring about her raising her hand would be
an event that is both identical to, or partly constitutive of, her choosing to
raise her hand and a law-breaking event even in the sense given by [Lewis’
definition]. (Graham 2008: 69)
Graham claims that this stipulation, together with Lewis’ account of counterfac-
tual, is sufficient for the truth of the counterfactual “if Beebee had raised her hand,
there would have been an event e such that necessarily, if e occurs then ∼L and e is
identical to m”. This may be right, but as far as I can see, it does not refute LMC
understood as a reply to the consequence argument.
I agree that one may stipulate that the decision involves a few particles travelling
faster than the speed of light. It could also be that the decision is the smallest
miracle relative to the actual laws. Even so, this should not convince the local
miracle compatibilist to accept that it is up to someone to do that. First, LMC can
be understood as a thesis about what actions are up to agents to perform. It states
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that it is up to agents to do things in the weak sense, that is, that would require the
actual laws to be violated by a divergence miracle. On the other hand, given that
thesis, we are not entitled to say that it follows that it is up to agents to perform
events that violate the actual laws. What a counterexample to LMC must show is
that at least someone is able to do something in the strong sense. Now let me go
back to the counterexample. We can easily stipulate that the decision is the event
that Beebee decides to raise her hand in a way that, necessarily, if it occurs, the
actual laws are false. Call it event b. However, can we stipulate that someone is
able to do b? If we stipulate that, we will just be stipulating that someone is able
to perform an action in the strong sense. And this clearly begs the question12.
Since I am saying that Graham’s use of the counterexample begs the question I
should at least motivate my claim by pointing out an account of begging the ques-
tion that supports my point. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong’s account (1999), although
not uncontroversial, will do the trick. Sinnott-Armstrong’s account of begging the
question adopts an epistemic approach according to which begging the question “de-
pends on whether one has the right kind of reason to believe the premise” (Sinnott-
Armstrong 1999: 179). In addition, he embraces a subjective epistemic approach
as opposed to an objective one. Roughly, on the subjective approach, he tells us
that whether a use of an argument begs the question depends on the beliefs of the
arguer or the audience. This is based on his distinction between audience justifica-
tion (when the arguer tries to show the audience that the audience has a reason to
believe in a proposition) and arguer justification (when the arguer tries to show the
audience that the arguer herself has a reason to believe in a proposition). Whether
these purposes are achieved depend on the beliefs of the audience (in case of audience
justification) and the arguer’s beliefs (in case of arguer justification).
So, on Sinnott-Armstrong’s account, begging the question depends on the beliefs
that give reason for the audience (or the arguer) to believe the premises. Further-
12One might object that if no one is able to do b then b cannot be an action. Well, if this is
right, then the mere stipulation that b is an action will presuppose that someone is able to do b
(and thus that someone is able to act in the strong sense). Thus, the mere stipulation that b is an
action will make this use of the argument question-begging.
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more, he tells us that, in order to avoid begging the question, the reasons to believe
the premises must be independent of the conclusion (Sinnott-Armstrong 1999: 182).
He gives then two sufficient conditions of begging the question:
Thus, there are two sufficient conditions of begging the question: dependence
on one’s belief in the conclusion and dependence on one’s reason to believe the
conclusion. Contrapositively, to avoid begging the question one’s reason to
believe the premise must be independent of both (a) one’s belief in the conclu-
sion and also (b) one’s reason to believe the conclusion. (Sinnott-Armstrong
1999: 183)
Although he does not say anything about what he means by the notion of depen-
dence, he does give some instructive examples suggesting that dependence can be
explained in terms of counterfactuals: the reason to believe in the premise depends
on the belief in the conclusion only if if one were not to believe in the conclusion,
then one would not have the reason to believe in the premise.
Suppose Graham is seeking audience justification, so that he is using the argu-
ment to show the audience (in our case, the local miracle compatibilist who accepts
Lewis’ definition of a law-breaking event) that someone is able to decide even though
the decision is by stipulation a law-breaking event. However, the reason to believe
in the premise depends on the belief in the conclusion: that is, (a) if one were not
to believe in the conclusion, then one would not have the reason to believe in the
premise. In other words, if one were not to believe that some law-breaking event is
up to someone, then one would not have a reason to believe that Beebee has the
ability to decide to raise her hand where this event is by stipulation a law-breaking
event in Lewis’ sense. And because no other reason is given as to why one is able to
decide to act if the decision involves an event whose occurrence is sufficient to falsify
L, the counterexample will have bite only if it already presupposes that someone is
able to do some action in the strong sense. In that case it clearly begs the question.
In the original scenario m is just an ordinary action. It happens to be a law-
breaking event because of the circumstances under which it occurs. Even if one
were not to believe that someone is able to perform actions in the strong sense, one
would still have a reason to believe that someone has the ability to m if that ability
were to be a weak one, for the local miracle compatibilist believes that we have the
ability to perform weak abilities. In Graham’s case, however, it is hard to see why
4.3. Interlude: Oakley’s objection to Beebee 105
someone has the ability to m if m by stipulation is not a mundane action, but rather
a law-breaking event that includes a few particles travelling faster than the speed of
light.
One however might object as follows. The local miracle compatibilist presupposes
without argument that strong abilities are impossible. If that is the case then there
is no reason to accept LMC, and there is no reason to deny that someone is able to
perform a law-breaking event.
This criticism is correct, as Fischer pointed out that the local miracle compat-
ibilist needs to motivate the distinction and explain why strong abilities are im-
possible. Yet, this is not necessary if the local miracle compatibilist just aims at
rebutting the consequence argument. That is, she may not be trying to show the
audience (the incompatibilist) that we never have strong abilities. Incompatibilists
already agree with that. The local miracle compatibilist just points out that we are
not entitled to think that the claim we have strong abilities follows from the claim
we sometimes have weak abilities. So, in order to rebut the consequence argument
as not cogent all that the local miracle compatibilist needs is to accept the weak
thesis and deny that we have a good reason to think the strong one follows from
it. And precisely because of that the local miracle compatibilist has no reason to
accept that someone is in fact able to break the laws13.
If Graham’s reply does not go through, does it mean that Oakley’s defence
is a plausible one? If the purpose of LMC is just to reply to the consequence
argument, yes. But it needs much more if it is to be taken as a serious compatibilist
view about free will and determinism. And Oakley’s strategy neither motivates the
distinction between strong and weak abilities nor provides us with any reason why
actional events can never be law-breaking events. Thus, his solution does nothing
in responding to the problem that Beebee and Fischer pointed out.
On top of that, Beebee’s counterexample is supposed to be a symptom of a
bigger problem with LMC. Beebee’s diagnosis of LMC’s problem is that there is no
account of laws in line with it. The notion of a law of nature is central in formulating
13In all fairness, Graham has formulated this weak version of LMC in a similar way as well.
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LMC. If it happens that (W) and (S) cannot sound simultaneously plausible with
any account of laws, then there is definitely a problem with it. Hence, it is crucial
for LMC to get rid of this problem. This is what I shall do in the next section. My
response will give motivation to think that LMC should accept the proposition that
agents never have strong abilities.
4.4 Is LMC compatible with Lewis’ BSA?
Let me briefly rehearse what is at stake here. LMC is the view according to which
• (W) Agents (sometimes) have weak abilities, that is, the ability to render a
proposition false in the weak sense
and
• (S) Agents never have strong abilities, that is, the ability to render a propo-
sition false in the strong sense
are consistent with the truth of determinism and there are no worlds at which
determinism is true, (W) is true and (S) is false. However, Beebee argues that
strong abilities are possible, contrary to LMC’s claim. So, if (S) is possibly false,
LMC is false, as long as (S) is a necessary truth (Beebee 2003: 273). As far as I
see Beebee’s counterexample is an attempt to show a problem that comes from (W)
and (S): there seems to be no account of laws of nature in which one plausibly holds
both (W) and (S). And I agree that this seems to be the case, even though I am
not entirely sure about it.
4.4.1 The problem
Here is a broad way to look at the laws of nature: we can think of them as governing
or as non-governing; or as formulated in chapter 2, as allowing for potency or not.
According to the governing conception laws impose constraints on what happens
in the world. So, if laws have universal extent they govern not only non-actional
events but also actional ones. If determinism happens to be true, then it is hard
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to see how agents may have weak abilities. After all, events - including actional
events - have no effects whatsoever on what laws of nature are. On the other hand,
on the non-governing conception of laws, such as the Humean one, laws impose no
constraints on what happens.
If laws of nature are simply regularities, then the violation of a law (that
is, the violation, in some nearby possible world, of an actual law of nature)
isn’t such a big deal. We happen to live in a world that is such that one
set of regularities obtain; different sets of regularities obtain at other possible
worlds. These are brute facts about the worlds in question, that are not to
be explained by reference to some extra thing upon which those regularities
depend. So there is no reason to think that the fact that my raising my hand
would require a violation of the actual laws compromises my ability to do it.
(Beebee 2003: 274)
Thus while (W) seems true according to the non-governing conception, it seems
false according to the governing one.
With respect to (S), it is just the other way round. Since the governing concep-
tion rejects (W) it makes all the sense for its proponents to accept (S); agents do
not have weak abilities, let alone strong ones.
But from a Humean perspective it is very hard to see what reason there could
be to believe it. If miracles are relatively cheap when it comes to events that
are not actions of mine, or effects of actions of mine—as they must be if we
are to hold that deterministic agents have weak abilities—why should they not
be equally cheap when it comes to events that are actions of mine? (Beebee
2003: 274)
There is certainly a point here. Given the broad way to look at laws, it seems
that neither the governing view nor the non-governing one can make both (W) and
(S) to sound plausible at the same time. If this is the case, then LMC will in fact
strike us as an untenable view. The counterexample to LMC may be unpersuasive,
but there is still a problem that needs to be addressed. Let us put the problem in
this schematic form:
1. If there is no account of laws consistent with LMC, then LMC is untenable
2. There is no account of laws consistent with LMC
Thus,
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3. LMC is untenable
My aim is to show that the local miracle compatibilist may have a good reason
to deny 2. I will argue that the Humean view of laws is consistent with LMC. In
particular, I will show that Lewis’ version of the best system account of laws (LBSA)
is consistent with LMC. I do not claim, however, that LBSA per se entails LMC.
Naturally, the local miracle compatibilist does not need to provide an explanation as
to why LMC and LBSA are consistent given only a certain view of laws and Lewis’
argument about how counterfactuals should be evaluated on the assumption that
laws L are deterministic. This may not be enough. As a result, an option for the
local miracle compatibilist is to appeal to other principles to show why LMC and
LBSA are consistent. The strategy is this. In order to show that propositions P and
Q are consistent, we can show that P is consistent with another proposition R, and
that the conjunction of P and R entails Q, so that P is consistent with Q. I will
argue that this strategy will allow the local miracle compatibilist to have a reply
to Beebee’s problem. This will also motivate the claim that we never have strong
abilities.
Since LMC was already explained, let me briefly rehearse Lewis’ LBSA, as well
as the principle I appeal to.
4.5 LMC and contrastive explanation
Here is how I formulated Lewis’ BSA in chapter 2. Consider a true deductive system
in which the general claims that represent laws of nature appear as a set of true
sentences that is deductively closed and whose non-logical vocabulary contains only
predicates that express perfectly natural properties. The laws of nature will belong
to all the axiom systems with a best combination of simplicity, strength and fit.
The principle that will help us showing the consistency of Lewis’ BSA with LMC
is the following:
• (Contrastive explanation) If agent s performs some action a and there is
no contrastive explanation of why s performed a rather than not-a, then a is
not freely performed.
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This principle comes up in Mele’s formulation of the luck argument against liber-
tarianism about free will (2006) as (roughly) presented in chapter 1. The argument
is one of the biggest challenges to libertarians and the main point is that undeter-
mined actions that lack contrastive explanation are not free. But the notion of an
undetermined action will not be relevant for the purposes of the argument I put
forward, for reasons that will be clear soon. Moreover, I do not claim that the argu-
ment is cogent. My claim is that if the argument is cogent, then the local miracle
compatibilist can make sense of the distinction between weak and strong abilities.
In the original formulation, Mele conceives a scenario in which a goddess, Diana,
creates "agents in an indeterministic universe which whenever they freely perform
an action of deciding to a, they could have freely performed some alternative action"
(2006: 8). Notwithstanding,
She worries that her design does not accommodate this. Her worry, more
specifically, is that if the difference between the actual world, in which one of
her agents judges it best to A straightaway and then, at t, decides accordingly,
and any possible world with the same past up to t and the same laws of
nature in which he makes an alternative decision while the judgement persists
is just a matter of luck, then he does not freely make that decision in that
possible world, W. Diana suspects that his making that alternative decision
rather than deciding in accordance with his best judgement— that is, that
difference between W and the actual world—is just a matter of bad luck or,
more precisely, of worse luck in W for the agent than in the actual world.
After all, because the worlds do not diverge before the agent decides, there is
no difference in them to account for the difference in decisions. (Mele, 2006:
8)
As Franklin correctly notes, Mele "is not claiming that the agent’s decision in
either the actual world or w is just a matter of luck" (Franklin 2011: 22). Rather,
Mele’s claim is that it is the cross-world difference between the actual world and w
that is a matter a luck: that is, that the agent decided to do a at the actual world
rather than decided not to do a as he did at w. And if this is a matter of luck,
then it is partly a matter of luck that the agent decided to do a rather than not-a.
If this is the case, then the decision is not free. Since Mele is considering the case
in which the action is undetermined, we may conclude that indeterminism is also
incompatible with free will.
How this may be used to motivate LMC? By definition, the most similar world
to the actual at which a divergence miracle e occurs is a world whose events do not
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diverge from those of the actual world until e itself occurs. Thus, the cross-world
difference between the actual world and the most similar world where a divergence
miracle occurs is a matter of luck, as there is nothing that accounts for this difference
between these worlds. Now if a divergence miracle turns out to be an actional event,
then it will not be a free action. Let us discuss the argument in its schematic form
as presented by Franklin (Franklin 2011).
1. If agent s performs an undetermined action a at t in w and there is some
world w∗ that shares the same laws and past up to t, but in which s performs
not-a, then there is nothing that accounts for the difference between world w
in which s performed a and w∗ in which s performed not-a.
2. If nothing accounts for this difference, then it is partly a matter of luck that s
performed a in w and partly a matter of luck that s performed not-a in w∗.
3. If an action is partly a matter of luck, then the action is not free
Thus,
4. If s performs an undetermined action a at t in w and there is some world w∗
that shares the same laws and past up to t, but in which S performs not-a,
then both a and not-a are not free.
This formulation will allow us to explain why divergence miracles cannot be free
actions. But there are some problems with Franklin’s formulation of the argument
(in the context of this discussion) that require clarification.
The first problem is with the expression "to share the same laws and past up to
t". On a Humean view this does not make much sense, at least if literally interpreted.
Given the assumption of determinism, w and w′ cannot share the same past and
laws up to t; after all, if this were the case, w and w′ would be identical.
Although w and w′ do not share the same laws and past up to t, the intuitive
idea to be captured seems clear: a pair of worlds w and w′ may be alike up until
a certain time when they then diverge (thus "sharing the same past") and before
they diverge the events of w′ will be compossible with the laws of w (thus something
pretty much like "sharing the same laws"). We can better express this in terms
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of the notion of an initial segment of a possible world (Plantinga 1974; Wierenga
2011). I propose to use the notion of an initial segment of a possible world, rather
than the notion of "sharing the same laws and past up to t". Following Wierenga
in his paper “Tilting at Molinism” (Wierenga 2011: 127), I will adopt the following
to talk about initial segments.
(i) For any world w and time t, there is a state of affairs, Σ(w,t), which is an initial
segment of w terminating at t, and which is included in w.
I shall use this convention to talk about initial segments to make the formulation
of the argument shorter:
(ii) Worlds w and w′ share an initial segment up until a time t if, and only if,
Σ(w,t) = Σ(w′,t)
Furthermore, no world has more than one initial segment terminating at a certain
time:
(iii) If Σ(w,t) and Σ′(w,t) are initial segments, then Σ(w,t) = Σ′(w′,t).
If two worlds share an initial segment up to a certain time, they share all of their
initial segments terminating at earlier times:
(iv) If Σ(w,t) = Σ(w′,t), then for every t′ such that t′ is earlier than t, Σ(w,t′) = Σ(w′,t′)
Notice that worlds may share an initial segment up until a time t without di-
verging at t, for they can continue to share initial segments after that time.
Finally, if two worlds share an initial segment, then the same things exist in both
worlds, at least up until the time at which they diverge.
(v) If Σ(w,t) = Σ(w′,t), then for every x, x exists before t in w if and only if x exists
before t in w′.
This is how I shall understand the notion of a pair of worlds "sharing the same
past". Now we need to explain the notion of "sharing the same laws".
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Because (on the assumption of determinism) Humean laws are the best summary
of all past, present and future events, w and w′ cannot have the same true propo-
sitions if they are distinct14. Let us say that a proposition P is true in an initial
segment Σ(w,t) only if it is not possible that Σ(w,t) obtain and P be false. Since w
and w′ do not have the same laws, L cannot be true both in Σ(w,t) and Σ(w′,t). But
although Σ(w,t) and Σ(w′,t) do not have the same laws, it must be the case that if
L is true in w, L is compossible with Σ(w′,t). After all, w and w′ are exactly alike
up until t. What we can say instead is that the segments are still nomologically
accessible, for the events of Σ(w′,t) are compossible with the laws of w.
This explains why premise 1 does not need to be formulated in terms of an unde-
termined (actional) event, that is, on the assumption that laws L are indeterministic.
According to a governing conception of laws (one that does not allow for potency),
the events of a world happen on account of the laws of that world, so that if laws
are deterministic in Lewis’ sense it cannot be that two distinct worlds share initial
segments. On a Humean view, on the other hand, this is possible. Since the things
that L speaks about happen merely in accord with L, if a pair of worlds shares an
initial segment up until a time t the worlds will be in accord with L up until t.
Now, suppose that worlds w and w′ share an initial segment up until a time t,
and suppose that someone performing an action leads to a divergence of worlds. In
other words, suppose that agent s performs action a at t in w, but not at t in w′, so
that Σ(w,t) = Σ(w′,t) and w and w′ diverge at t:
1. If s performs action a at t in w and there is some world w′ such that Σ(w′,t) =
Σ(w,t), but in which s performed not-a at t, then there is nothing up to t that
accounts for the difference between w in which s performed a at t and w′ in
which s performed not-a at t.
2. If nothing up to t accounts for this difference, then it is partly a matter of luck
that s performed a in w and partly a matter of luck that s performed not-a in
w
′.
14An alternative though is to combine a Humean conception of laws with the Growing Block
Theory, where future events do not exist. See Backmann (2016).
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3. If an action is partly a matter of luck, then the action is not free
Thus,
4. If s performs action a at t in w and there is some world w′ such that Σ(w′,t) =
Σ(w,t), but in which s performed not-a at t, then both a and not-a are not free.
Suppose that a is Beebee’s decision to raise her hand. In the actual world a does
not occur at t, since she does not decide to raise her hand, but there is some possible
world w′ where a occurs and is the divergence miracle relative to the actual, so that
Σ(w,t) = Σ(w′,t). If this is the case, given premise 2, there is nothing that accounts for
the difference between the actual world in which Beebee did not decide to raise her
hand and w′ in which she did decide to raise her hand. Thus, clearly, both actions
are partly a matter of luck. So here we have the problem. For it cannot be that a
free action is partly a matter of luck.
This, of course, can be generalised to every action that is supposed to be a
divergence miracle. If a divergence miracle e is an action at world w relative to the
actual world, then the events of w do not diverge from the actual until e itself occurs.
And there is nothing that accounts for this cross-world difference. Therefore, there
cannot be free actions that are divergence miracles.
My suggestion then is to formulate LMC as follows:
(W) Some agents have the ability to perform a free action a such that, if someone
were to do a, there would be an event e such that necessarily if e occurs L is
false.
(S) Agents do not have the ability to perform a free action a such that, if someone
were to do a, there would be an event e such that necessarily if e occurs L is
false and e is identical to a.
The plausibility of such a view depends on the formulation of the argument being
sound. But why should someone accept its premises?
Premise (1). If two worlds are exactly alike up to t, then what would account
for the difference between them at t? Up to t there is certainly nothing to account
for that. We cannot appeal, for example, to prior mental states that gives reasons
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explanations since the worlds share an initial segment up until t and so agree on the
occurent facts up until t.
Perhaps one might follow Mele’s suggestion that "in a deterministic world, with
the possible exception of chaotic events, all events are explicable, at least in terms
of laws and antecedent conditions" (Mele 2000: 98). This can be reformulated as an
objection in the following way. Given the assumption that laws L are deterministic
at w, then L cannot be true at w′, so that the laws will explain the difference.
I believe Mele’s point is correct only if we are willing to assume a governing
view of laws in which the events happen on account of L. But this is not the
case on the Humean view. The expression "to account for the difference" can be
understood in terms of metaphysical grounding. Humean laws cannot ground the
difference between two identical initial segments simply because the laws do not
ground the mosaic of occurrent features. This is not to say that Humean laws cannot
provide genuine explanations. This is compatible with Humean laws scientifically
explaining in the sense that one may use them to make predictions. But since they
do not ground the difference at t between the worlds, they do not account for the
difference, they do not metaphysically explain the difference.
One might object as follows. It is fair enough that Humean laws do not ground
occurent events. Still, they do allow us to make predictions. And if this is the case, it
cannot be that the action - even if a divergence miracle - is lucky. The problem with
the above objection is to suppose that being able to predict an event is sufficient for
that event not to be lucky. I am not sure about this. A person can be lucky because
she was born in a certain country, or in a certain family, even though - assuming
laws to be deterministic - this can be quite predictable.
This leads us to premise (2). In order to defend premise (2) I need to clarify
what is meant by "luck". In the original formulation of the argument, Mele provides
us with a stipulative definition of "luck" precisely in terms of the unavailability of
contrastive explanation. It is clear that if one defines "luck" in that way the premises
will come out as true. As Franklin has correctly noted, though, this strategy is
fallacious (Franklin 2011: 221). I am persuaded by Franklin’s argument and I follow
his suggestion that the best way out for proponents of the luck argument is to "leave
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the notion of luck unanalyzed, and argue instead that since nothing accounts for the
difference between worlds, each action is partly a matter of luck — where luck here
is understood in an intuitive sense" (Franklin 2011: 222). What is the intuitive
sense of luck then?
One strategy for the local miracle compatibilist is to argue that "luck" means
lack of control in the following sense: "the more an action is subject to luck, the
less it is under our control, and the more an action is under our control, the less it
is subject to luck" (Franklin 2011: 200). As Markus E. Schlosser (2014) points out
there is a connection between explanation and control, and I take it to be open to the
local miracle compatibilist to track control in terms of explanation. For example,
Schlosser suggests that according to the event-causal theory "control consists in
non-deviant causation by mental states that provide [...] reason explanations. This
is not to say that all explanations track control but rather that if the right type of
explanation is available, then it will track control tightly" (Schlosser 2014: 382). If
this is right, then it is open to the local miracle compatibilist to track control in
terms of explanation.
Now, if it is uncontroversial that Humean laws scientifically explain, why cannot
we just say that they account for the difference? And so the divergence will not be a
matter of luck. Leaving aside the question of whether Humean laws provide genuine
explanation, it is not clear whether Humean laws may provide a sort of explanation
that tightly track control. The problem is that such a sort of explanation will have
to appeal to later events. What we need - it seems - is something that accounts for
the difference up until t. Imagine a scenario where w and w′ come to an end at t
even though they share initial segments up until t. If we say that L explains the
difference, we are just saying that what explains the difference is s performing a at
t, for laws L are different at worlds w and w∗ just because s performed a at w but
not at w′. But this cannot be right. After all libertarians could just deny the first
premise of the luck argument by saying that the performance of the action itself
explains the difference15.
15Well, there is such a reply to the argument (see van Miltenburg & Ometto forthcoming), but
it is quite controversial (Mele 2014; Clarke forthcoming). I will come back to this point in chapter
4.5. LMC and contrastive explanation 116
The link between divergence miracles and lack of control can be put in terms
of the event-causal theory. Suppose control consists of (non-deviant) causation by
mental states that provide reason explanations. Imagine two possible worlds where
I have both a reason r1 to perform a at t and a reason r2 to perform not-a at t,
and suppose that I do a. We may ask: why did I do a? The answer will just
be that r1 played a causal role in bringing about my action, whereas r2 did not,
and this explains the difference. However, if r1 played the causal role, then r1 is an
occurrent mental state, that is, it is a “going on” or “happening” in my consciousness,
as opposed to a dispositional mental state16. However, when we consider the world
at which I decided not-a, r2 will have to be the occurrent mental state that does the
causing, and r2 will have to occur earlier than t, the time at which I decided not-a.
This contradicts the assumption that the worlds are exactly alike up to t, as at w1
r1 was the occurent mental state.
Premise (3). If an action is partly a matter of luck, then the action is not free.
This is the least problematic premise of the argument. Since by "luck" it is meant
"lack of control" it is clear that not having control over an action implies that the
performance of that action is not free.
Here is a worry, though. If the luck argument is sound, even my decision to raise
my hand at t in w will not be free. This looks implausible.
I agree that this seems implausible. Nevertheless, this does not mean that all
actions are not free according to LMC: only those actions that lack a contrastive
explanation will not be free. What LMC might require is that the cause of a free
action is not an earlier free action, but an earlier non-free action. If it happens that
a divergence miracle is the activation of the reasons to do otherwise, then this will
explain the cross-world difference. To go back to that earlier case where I have both
a reason r1 to perform a at t and a reason r2 to perform not-a at t, what will explain
the difference is that r1 plays the causal role at one world and r2 at another world.
7.
16I follow Alvin Goldman (1970) in saying that dispositional wants and beliefs do not by them-
selves cause acts; they “can affect action only by becoming activated, that is, by being manifested
in occurrent wants and beliefs” (Goldman 1970: 88).
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In any case, my free action is caused by a non-free action (say, the activation of the
reasons).
This completes the presentation of the argument. The upshot is that this for-
mulation of the luck argument, if cogent, may be an advantage for the local miracle
compatibilist, but a problem for compatibilists who endorse a Humean view of laws,
but deny Lewis’ distinction. In articulating "Humean compatibilism", Beebee and
Mele (2002) had already raised this worry about luck:
[A] Humean compatibilist holds that an agent, Barney, could have done other-
wise than decide to steal his neighbour’s cake if and only if there is a possible
world that... is exactly like the actual in every detail up to the moment at
which he decided to steal her cake, and, in it, he does something other than
decide to steal it.
A worry about luck leaps out. What accounts for its being the case that
although, in the actual world, Barney decides at t to steal the cake, in another
’world that ... is exactly like the actual world in every detail until t, Barney
decides at t to go bowling instead? Apparently, there is nothing about the
powers, capacities, states of mind, moral character, practical reasoning and
the like of Barney the cake stealer and Barney the bowler that explains the
difference in decision, given that the two worlds are exactly the same until t.
So the difference seems to be a matter of luck. A Humean compatibilist may
attempt to account for the difference in decision by appealing to a difference
in laws; but if the pertinent laws themselves hinge on Barney’s decisions, this
smacks of unacceptable bootstrapping. (Beebee & Mele 2002: 221)
There is an important difference between the view above and local miracle com-
patibilism as articulated here. The difference can be explained if we consider the
following principles:
(Alternative possibilities) If agent s freely performs some action a at t in w,
then there is another possible world w∗ that is exactly like w up until t where
s refrains from performing a at t.
(Contrastive explanation) If nothing accounts for the difference between world
w in which s performs a at t and w∗ in which s refrains from performing a at
t, then a is not free.
If there is free will, clearly, we cannot accept both principles. If one accepts the
principle of contrastive explanation, then one has to deny the principle of alternative
possibilities.
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Now, of course, the plausibility of local miracle compatibilism depends on the
truth of the principle of contrastive explanation. I believe that a correct response
to this problem will depend on what control is, which is something I am not dealing
with in the thesis. But either the explanatory formulation of the luck argument is
sound or not. If it is sound, then LMC is not an untenable view. If the argument is
not sound, then one can abandon the claim that agents do not have strong abilities
and adopt a Humean compatibilist view as developed by Beebee and Mele (after
all, they will not have to worry about luck anymore). In any case, I think that at
least some Humean compatibilist view motivates the rejection of premise 2 in the
dilemma presented in chapter 1.
4.6 Conclusion
If this formulation of the luck argument is sound, then free actions cannot be diver-
gence miracles. So I suggest to formulate LMC as follows:
(W) Some agents have the ability to perform a free action a such that, if someone
were to do a, there would be an event e such that necessarily if e occurs L is
false.
(S) Agents do not have the ability to perform a free action a such that, if someone
were to do a, there would be an event e such that necessarily if e occurs L is
false and e is identical to a.
I have presented the luck argument to show that (W) and (S) are consistent with the
assumption that the actual laws are deterministic and universal. All that the local
miracle compatibilist needs to do is to accept the connection between explanation
and control, such as the idea of tracking control in terms of the causal theory of
action. If some actions are divergence miracles then they will lack any type of
explanation that will track control.
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4.7 Addendum: reply to Westphal
Westphal has recently objected to FFA by pointing out a series of difficulties in
van Inwagen’s argument, and the most serious one is - according to him - a modal
fallacy presented in support of the second premise. My claim is that Westphal’s
objection fails. First, I will briefly put forward FFA and Westphal’s objection.
After that, I will go on to argue that there is no modal fallacy presented in support
of its second premise. The argument presented in An essay on free will is slightly
different from the original one (that I discussed before) because van Inwagen changed
the formulation of premise 2:
1. The truth of determinism entails that the conjunction of P0 and L entails P .
2. It is not possible that j have raised his hand at t and P be true
3. If 2 is true, then if j could have raised his hand at t, j could have rendered P
false.
4. If j could have rendered P false, and if the conjunction of P0 and L entails P ,
then j could have rendered the conjunction of P0 and L false.
5. If j could have rendered the conjunction of P0 and L false, then j could have
rendered L false.
6. j could not have rendered L false.
Therefore,
7. If determinism is true, j could not have raised his hand at t.
Westphal objects to van Inwagen’s argument for the second premise, calling it
invalid. Here is what van Inwagen gives in support of (2):
“The symbol ‘P’ is our name for the proposition that expresses the state the
world was in fact in at t, a time at which j’s hand was not raised. It is therefore
impossible for P to be true if j’s hand was raised at t, or indeed if things were
in any way different at t from the way they actually were.” (van Inwagen, 1983:
70)
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van Inwagen writes that it is impossible for P to be true if [my emphasis] j’s hand
was not raised at t. Following Westphal I will use the italic capital letter J for the
proposition that the judge did raise his hand at t, and the italic capital letter P for
the proposition denoted by "P".
4.7.1 Westphal’s objection
Westphal argues in his paper that either plausible reading of van Inwagen in the
argument for (2),
(K) ∼◇ (J ⊃ P )
or
(C) J ⊃ ∼◇ P ,
is false.
Consider (K). If (K) is true, then it follows that □J and □∼P . However, it
cannot be that the conjunction is true. Since j doesn’t raise his hand, ∼J is true,
and so it follows (assuming a modal system at least as strong as T ) that◇∼J , which
contradicts □J .
Now consider (C). Westphal argues that the argument for (C) is a modal fallacy.
If J is true, it only follows that ∼P . It doesn’t follow that P cannot be true.
What is wrong with what van Inwagen actually writes is to be found in the
proposition that if p is true, then p cannot be true. It is one thing to say that
(i) it is a necessary truth that, if Tp, then T∼∼p. It is quite another thing to
say (ii) that if Tp, then it is a necessary truth that F∼p. For (i) is true and
(ii) is false. And so most certainly (ii) does not follow from (i). (Westphal
2012: 38)
Westphal thinks that van Inwagen genuinely meant to assert J ⊃ ∼◇P . I do not
agree with him. Instead I contend that there is a more charitable way to understand
the argument for (2).
First, van Inwagen could just have said that (2) is conceptually true. What the
expression "it is therefore impossible for P to be true if j’s hand was not raised"
means in English is that it is impossible for P to be true and j’s hand to be raised
at t. If Westphal’s point is that van Inwagen used the wrong connective, then one
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might just say that this is no modal fallacy but a careless way to state a necessary
truth. In that case, he should have written:
(2*) “It is impossible for P to be true and [my emphasis] j’s hand to be raised at
t.”
That is, (2*) should be read as:
(2*) ∼◇ (P ∧ J)
This is a necessary truth that falls out of the definition of "P". P is a proposition that
describes the whole state of the world at t, one that includes j not raising his hand.
That is, necessarily, if P is true, then j does not raise his hand. Contrapositively,
necessarily, if j raises his hand, P is not true, which is equivalent to (2*). Thus, it
is impossible for P to be true and j’s hand to be raised.
This is the correct argument for the second premise of van Inwagen’s “First formal
argument”, and it is entirely unproblematic. Consequently, Westphal’s arguments
against van Inwagen’s presumed motivations for J ⊃ ∼◇P are beside the point and
leave the "First Formal Argument" unscathed.
(2*) allows one to avoid the charge of modal fallacy, and it is compatible with
Westphal’s understanding of premise (2). However, the premise as stated in the
original argument (in 1975) is not a conjunction, but a conditional (van Inwagen
1975: 191):
(2) If j had raised his hand at t, P would be false.
Since (2*) is true, it follows that, necessarily, if j raises his hand at t, then P is
false, that is, □(J⊃ ∼P ). So it follows that if j had raised his hand at t, P would
be false, simply because the strict conditional implies the counterfactual one. Thus,
premise (2) as originally formulated is true.
Moreover, in the first sentence of the paper Westphal claims: “I believe that the
argument given by Peter van Inwagen for the second premiss in his ‘First Formal
Argument’ (van Inwagen 1983: 70) is invalid, and that accordingly the entire ‘First
Formal Argument’ is unsound” (Westphal 2012: 36). Even if, counterpossibly, the
argument for the second premise was invalid, which it can’t be since the conclusion
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is a necessary truth, it would not follow that the second premise is false, so it would
not follow that the argument is not sound.
Chapter 5
The dispositional conception of laws
and agent causation
In the previous chapter I argued that at least some Humean compatibilist view
motivates the rejection of premise 2 in the dilemma presented in chapter 11. In
this chapter I explore the consequences of adopting (i) a completely anti-Humean
account of laws and (ii) O’Connor’s metaphysical assumptions of agent causation.
With respect to (i), I show that it justifies the premise of the consequence argument
that the laws of nature are not up to us. I will argue that the premise is necessarily
true given the assumption that laws are DE-deterministic (as defined in chapter 2)
and universal in extent, and the counterfactual sufficiency interpretations of "no-
choice about" (as discussed in chapter 3). With respect to (ii), I explore the view that
free will requires the laws of nature to be limited in extent; that is, the distinctive
characteristic of this view is that it requires laws to be limited in extent (because
they do not apply to agents), rather than indeterministic.
Here is how the chapter is structured. In section 5.1 I briefly rehearse the con-
sequence argument and present Warfield’s modal fallacy objection. After that, I
argue that the dispositionalist view of laws allows the incompatibilist to reply to
1As pretty much every philosophical view, there are of course some problems with this sort
of position, and they include the objections to the Humean view of laws (cf. Demarest 2017;
Callender and Cohen 2009), and Lewis’ argument for the existence of miracles, which has been
recently challenged (Dorr 2016; Goodman 2015).
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Brian Cutter’s (2017) objection to the consequence argument. In sections 5.3 and
5.4, I discuss the objection that dispositional essentialism is incompatible with the
Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals, one I have adopted to interpret the
common phrases of the consequence argument such as "to have the power to make
P false", "to make it the case that ∼P , "to have a choice about whether P", etc. In
order to reply to this problem I appeal to Handfield’s solution (2001, 2004) in terms
of the notion of space-invaders. After that, in section 5.5, I consider the theory of
agent causation and draw some parallels between space-invaders and the view that
free will requires the laws of nature to be limited in extent.
5.1 The charge of modal fallacy
Very briefly, let us consider the "counterfactual sufficiency" definition of "N". Again,
where x ranges over agents and α ranges over all possible past, present and future
action types:
Definition 5.1.1. Nφ if and only if φ∧∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α)∧ (Does(x, α) ∼φ)]
The consequence argument may be formulated as follows on Stalnaker’s theory
(where the box is to be understood in terms of metaphysical necessity):
(α) □Mφ ⊢ Nφ
(β) Nφ, N(φ→ ψ) ⊢Stalnaker Nψ
Suppose that laws are deterministic and universal. Here is the argument once
again:
1 □M((L ∧ Pt0(L, P )) ⊃ P ) DE-deterministic
2 □M(L→ (Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P )) Modal logic, 1
3 N(L→ (Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P )) α, 2
4 NL premise
5 NPt0(L, P ) premise
6 N(Pt0(L, P ) ⊃ P ) β, 3, 4
7 NP β, 5, 6
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Warfield (2000) has objected to it by pointing out that, as long as it is an argu-
ment for incompatibilism, it needs to be an argument for the claim that determinism
strictly implies NP (or MP if we formulate it on Lewis’ theory of counterfactuals).
Let us consider the second proposition of the dilemma presented in chapter 1:
(2) If determinism is true, then NP .
(2) is supposed to be incompatibilism, the view that determinism (in the stan-
dard sense) and free will are incompatible. However, I have not said much about
the meaning of "if-then" in (2). Warfield’s point is that if by "if-then" we mean the
material conditional, then (2) is not a thesis that may be properly called "incom-
patibilism". (2) understood in terms of the material conditional does not establish
the incompatibility of free will and determinism. In this sense, one might be an
incompatibilist just because she thinks determinism is not true. But this cannot be
right.
Now, if (2) is a thesis that may be properly called "incompatibilism", then a
better way to understand it is in terms of the strict implication. That is, rather
than being an argument for
(Weak) If determinism is true, then NP ,
where the "if-then" of (Weak) does not have the force of the strict implication,
it should be an argument for
(INC) Necessarily, if determinism is true, then NP .
(Here I use "determinism" in the sense that laws are universal and deterministic).
As Warfield correctly notices, (INC) does not follow from the premises if they are
contingently true:
Most incompatibilists, to be precise, seem unaware that in order to get the
incompatibilist conclusion that determinism and freedom are strictly incom-
patible (that no deterministic world is a world with freedom), their conditional
proofs must not introduce or in any way appeal to premises that are merely
contingently true in between the assumption of determinism and the step at
which the “no freedom” conclusion is reached. (Warfield 2000: 169)
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This generates a problem if one is an incompatibilist and thinks - perhaps by
adopting the Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske view of laws - that laws are contingent.
After all, "N" is a factive operator. If □NL is true, then it will follow that □L.
Because L is contingently true, it follows that □NL is not true. Thus, the con-
sequence argument in its standard formulation is an ignoratio elenchi : at best, it
merely establishes (Weak), not (INC).
Hence, if one adopts the Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske view of laws, one cannot
justify the premise that □NL. What someone who adopts this view can do is to
appeal to the following principle:
Necessary Fixity of Laws (NFL): for every world w, it’s true in w that NLw
(where Lw is a conjunction of all the laws of nature that prevail at w).
But why should one think that NFL is true? Cutter (2017) has recently chal-
lenged NFL. His argument appeals, as he says, "to creatures in the far reaches of
modal space, creatures whom" he calls miracle workers (Cutter 2017: 283). First,
Cutter’s idea is that the possibility of miracle workers entails the falsity of NFL2.
He defines a miracle worker as follows: s is a miracle worker in w if, and only if, s
has, in w, the ability to do something such that, if he did it, the laws that prevail in
w would be violated. (What he means by a miracle worker is tantamount to Lewis’
weak thesis presented in the last chapter). And he also introduces the notion of a
coy miracle worker: a coy miracle worker is a miracle worker who never exercises the
ability to violate the laws of nature. What premise 4 in the consequence argument
tells us is that no one is a miracle worker. Cutter agrees that this premise is actually
true, but disagrees that it is necessarily true.
Although I find it implausible to suppose that actual human beings are miracle
workers [...] I do not have any trouble with the claim that it’s possible for there
to be miracle workers. After all, there are all sorts of bizarre things out in the
far reaches of modal space – seven-headed monsters, golden mountains, and
talking donkeys, for instance. And if it’s possible that there should be miracle
workers, then surely it’s possible that there should be coy miracle workers.
(Cutter 2017: 283)
2Actually, Cutter has argued for a more shocking conclusion: that the consequence argument
is not even an argument for incompatibilism.
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Cutter does not claim that it is obvious that miracle workers are possible. He
claims that "we do not have good positive reason to think they are not possible"
(Cutter 2017: 284). For example, he tells us that the possibility of miracle workers
is compatible with the view that a proposition P is a law of nature at w only if P
is true in w. What follows from this view is that:
• For each world w and each agent s in w, s does not act, in w, in such a way
that the laws that prevail in w are violated/false.
The only thing that follows from it is that, necessarily, every miracle worker is a
coy miracle worker. Cutter also points out that this does not mean, naturally, that
"coy miracle workers are such that it’s impossible for them to exercise their abilities.
It just means that if they were to exercise their abilities, the proposition they would
thereby falsify would, in that event, not qualify as a law of nature" (Cutter 2017:
284).
Are miracle workers impossible according to the Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske view
of laws? I am not entirely sure. Perhaps what the governing view justifies is the
claim that actual human beings are not miracle workers, but not the claim that
miracle workers are impossible. Perhaps not. Although I agree with Beebee that the
governing view seems more in line with incompatibilism, I do not know how to show
the impossibility of miracle workers according to the Armstrong/Tooley/Dretske
view of laws. Even so, I think I can show that miracle workers are impossible
according to dispositional essentialism.
5.2 Dispositional essentialism and laws
As we have seen in chapter 2, dispositional essentialism is the view according to
which at least some natural, fundamental properties are essentially dispositional
(although Bird himself adopts the stronger view that all, natural, fundamental
properties are essentialy dispositional). Dispositional essentialists follow Sydney
Shoemaker’s suggestion (1980) that properties are "individuated" by their causal
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powers3. Chris Swoyer (1982) developed it as view about laws of nature, and the
connection between essentially dispositional properties and laws has also been pro-
moted by Ellis (2001, 2002), Bostock (2001), Kistler (2002) and Bird (2005, 2007).
Here, I will mainly focus on Bird’s dispositional account of laws, but my argument
depends only on the view that the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary. My
choice for presenting Bird’s dispositional account of laws is because it will make the
connection between the laws of nature and free will much more precise and simpler
to be discussed.
On Bird’s account, the truth of generalisations can be explained on the basis of
the dispositional essence of a property. A consequence of this view is that the laws
of nature are metaphysically necessary. If this is so, it will follow that no one has
or ever had any choice about whether L is true. In other words, I will argue that
if laws are DE-deterministic as defined in chapter 2 and universal, miracle workers
are impossible.
I start by briefly recapitulating Bird’s dispositional account of laws presented in
chapter 2. Here is how the dispositionalist may account for laws of nature. Start
first with the conditional analysis of dispositions (CA for short). Where D is a
dispositional property, S(D) is a stimulus property appropriate to it and M(D) is
its manifestation property, (CA) may be symbolised as follows:
(CA) Dx↔ (S(D)xM(D)x)
As Bird points out, (CA) does not merely provide an analysis of the concept D;
instead, it characterises the nature of the property D. Thus, as Bird says, (CA) is
to be read as being metaphysically necessary.
(CA□) □M(Dx↔ (S(D)xM(D)x))
Second, dispositional essentialists endorse the view that at least some fundamen-
tal properties are essentially dispositional. To say that a property P is essentially
dispositional is to say that, necessarily (in the metaphysical sense), to instantiate P
3Dispositional essentialists include, among others, Harré and Madden (1975), Ellis and Lierse
(1994), Ellis (2001, 2002), Molnar (2003), and Bird (2005, 2007).
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is to possess a disposition D(P ) to yield the appropriate manifestation in response
to an appropriate stimulus:
(DEp) □ (Px→ D(P )x)
From (CA□) and (DEp) we have: □M(Px → (Sx Mx)). Here is how the
truth of generalisations can be explained on the basis of the dispositional essence of
a property.
1 □M(Px→ (SxMx))
2 Px→ (SxMx))
3 Px ∧ Sx
4 Px ∧E, 3
5 Sx ∧E, 3
6 SxMx ⇒E, 2, 4
7 Mx E, 5, 6
8 (Px ∧ Sx)→Mx ⇒I, 3–7
9 ∀x((Px ∧ Sx)→Mx) ∀I, 8
10 □M(∀x((Px ∧ Sx)→Mx)) □I, 1, 2–9
I think I can now reply to the modal fallacy challenge (at least with respect to
premise 4).
Premise 4 is true if and only if L ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼L)].
Now, because L is necessarily true, there is no situation in which the counterfactual
"Does(x, α) ∼L" is true. Or to put it in another way, consider rule (α). Given
this rule we can derive NL. Perhaps one may wonder whether rule (α) is correct
(see van Miltenburg and Ometto forthcoming). This should not worry us. It can be
proved on Stalnaker’s system that the inference is legitimate.
(S) φ ψ, ◇φ ⊢Stalnaker ∼(φ ∼ψ)
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1 □ML
2 L E□, 1
3 Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼L)
4 Does(s, a) ∼L ∧E, 3
5 Does(s, a)
6 L E□, 1
7 Does(s, a) L I, 5–6
8 Can(s, a) ∧E, 3
9 Can(s, a)→◇Does(s, a)
10 ◇Does(s, a) ⇒E, 8, 9
11 ∼(Does(s, a) L) S, 4, 10
12 ⊥
13 ∼(Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a) ∼L)) ¬I, 3–13
14 ∀x∼(Can(x, a) ∧ (Does(x, a) ∼L)) ∀I, 13
15 ∀x∀α∼(Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼L)) ∀I, 14
16 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼L)] Logic, 15
17 L ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α) ∼L) ∧I, 2, 16
Since 17 is equivalent toNL, given definition (5.1.1), the dispositionalist account
of laws allows us to show why no one has or ever had any choice about whether L
is true. We can get the same conclusion if we interpret "no-choice about" in terms
of Lewis’ might-counterfactual.
Definition 5.2.1. Mφ if and only if φ∧∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α)∧Does(x, α)◇→ ∼φ)]
The following proof can be given on Lewis’ system:
(L) φ◇→ ψ ⊣⊢Lewis ∼(φ ∼ψ)
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1 □ML
2 L E□, 1
3 Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a)◇→ ∼L)
4 Does(s, a)◇→ ∼L ∧E, 3
5 Does(s, a)
6 L E□, 1
7 Does(s, a) L ⇒I, 5–6
8 Does(s, a)◇→ ∼L ∧E, 3
9 ∼(Does(s, a) L) L, 8
10 ⊥
11 ∼(Can(s, a) ∧ (Does(s, a)◇→ ∼L)) ¬I, 3–10
12 ∀x∼(Can(x, a) ∧ (Does(x, a)◇→ ∼L)) ∀I, 11
13 ∀x∀α∼(Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼L)) ∀I, 12
14 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼L)] Logic, 13
15 L ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼L) ∧I, 2, 14
The upshot is that, contrary to Humeans, dispositional essentialists should be
committed to the truth of the premise that the laws of nature are not up to us. But
remember that the main challenge is to argue that the premise is necessarily true.
Now we can also show how this view supports the strong version which Warfield
says incompatibilists should argue for. The charge of modal fallacy can be avoided
by appealing to the S4 axiom: □φ → □ □ φ. And dispositionalists may proceed as
before in showing how it is necessary that the laws of nature are not up to anyone.
That is,
1 □ML
2 □M □M L S4, 1
3 □ML
4 NL α, 3
5 □MNL E□, 2, 3–4
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Thus, dispositional essentialism allows us not only to show why premise 4 is
true but also that it is necessarily so. Moreover, there is no need to appeal to a
principle such as the necessary fixity of laws. Thus, we have a reason to think that
miracle workers are impossible: the dispositionalist conception of laws. According
to this view, it follows that □MNL, which is just the denial of the claim that miracle
workers are possible.
(A final point: if this is correct, then premise 4 is true. This is not enough to
establish incompatibilism, though. There is still the question of whetherNPt0(L, P )
is necessarily true. And Campbell has argued (2007) that that premise, even if it is
true, is not necessarily true. If the main point is to argue for incompatibilism given
the dispositional account of laws, Campbell’s objection needs to be discussed. This
will be done in the next chapter.)
5.3 An objection to dispositional essentialism
One worry that someone might have is that I have used the Lewis-Stalnaker seman-
tics in order to show premise 4 is true according to DE. However, as we have seen
in the last chapter, Lewis presented an argument to tell us how we should evaluate
true counterfactuals on the assumption that laws L are deterministic and univer-
sal. This argument may be presented as an objection to dispositional essentialism.
Remember that I have defined DE-deterministic laws as follows:
Definition 5.3.1. Laws L are DE-deterministic if and only if for any P that L
covers and any Pt0(L, P ) and any metaphysically possible worlds w, w′ in which L,
if w and w′ agree on Pt0(L, P ) they agree on whether P obtains.
How should we evaluate counterfactuals on the assumption that laws L are DE-
deterministic and universal? It seems Lewis’ argument could be put forward for this
definition. Following work with Cartwright I will put forward the argument in the
following way.
Let P stand for the proposition that I raise my hand, suppose that P is false
at the actual world w0. Assuming DE-laws are deterministic and universal, we ask:
is L true in all the most similar worlds at which P is true? If we consider Lewis’
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argument as presented in chapter 4, the answer is "no". Lewis’ suggestion is to
regard as "most similar" those worlds where the past - but not the laws - are fixed.
Clearly, however, the above manoeuvre is not available to dispositional essential-
ists. If laws are metaphysically necessary, there cannot be any divergence miracles.
And if this is the case, then Lewis’ overall comparative similarity ranking will be at
odds with dispositional essentialism4.
‘So much the worse for possible-worlds analyses of counterfactuals’, you might
reply. And indeed, that is a response perfectly consistent with the spirit of
dispositional essentialism. Possible-worlds analyses are the product of try-
ing to get modal truths by having a large number of non-modal truths. If you
have enough worlds which are not themselves intrinsically modal, then you get
modality free. But dispositional essentialists are prepared to bring modally
thick properties into the actual world, so arguably they need no supplementa-
tion from others (Handfield 2001: 487).
Fair enough. Just because DE seems at odds with it it does not mean DE is un-
tenable. In any case, I still think there is motivation for at least trying to show that
DE may be in line with the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics. (I guess we have nothing to
lose if there is a way to show that DE is in line with it). First, DE is not incom-
patible with, say, Lewis’ and Stalnaker’s formal systems for counterfactuals5. What
4Handfield tells us that this argument is due to John Bigelow (1999) who attributes its genesis
to Jonathan Bennett.
5Consider, for example, Lewis’ semantics for counterfactuals (call it LC). The following is given
in Sider (2010: chapter 8): An LC-model, M, is an ordered triple ⟨W,⪯,F⟩, where
• W is a nonempty set
• F is a two-place function that assigns either True or False to each sentence letter relative
to each w ∈W
• ⪯ is a three-place relation over W.
The valuation function for M and ⪯ satisfy the conditions that:
• for any x, y if ⪯x x, then x = y.
• for any w ∈W: ⪯x is strongly connected in W
• for any w ∈W: ⪯x x is transitive
The truth condition for is: LVM(φ ψ,w) = True iff either φ is true in no worlds, or: there
is some world, x, such that LVM(φ, x) = True and for all y, if y ⪯x x, then LVM(φ→ ψ, y) = True.
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dispositional essentialists cannot accept is Lewis’ argument about how to evaluate
counterfactuals on the assumption of determinism, so it seems incompatible with
his ranking of comparative overall similarity as presented in the previous chapter,
which is part of Lewis’ account of counterfactuals. If so, as Handfield himself puts
it, one’s modus ponens is another’s modus tollens. According to Handfield, Bigelow
presented the argument as an objection to dispositional essentialism. Yet, if the
dispositional account of laws is correct, then this is a reductio of Lewis’ account of
counterfactuals. This is why Handfield tells us that there is at least something at
stake for both dispositional essentialists and those who follow Lewis’ account.
A solution to this problem is interesting by its own rights. But it may reveal
itself useful to this discussion as well. After presenting Handfield’s solution, I will
draw a parallel between Handfield’s solution to the problem and a certain libertarian
view.
5.4 Space-invading properties and Handfield’s solu-
tion
The ranking of overall comparative similarity is supposed to capture the idea that the
respects of similarity and dissimilarity (concerning the laws of nature and particular
matters of fact) are traded off against one another. In providing such a ranking
we want to say that, if a certain proposition P is false at the actual world, on the
assumption of determinism, the most similar P -world will be the one that is exactly
like the actual up to the time to which P obtains, and then diverges as a result of a
divergence miracle. Clearly, this is possible according to a Humean view, for if the
laws of nature are different so are the particular matters of fact. Handfield’s solution
tries to accommodate this idea without allowing laws to be broken, and so without
allowing divergence miracles. He proposes something perhaps even more exotic: a
law-abiding miracle.
The "nearness relation" ⪯ does not make any reference whatsoever to laws. So, I do not see a
reason to suppose that ⪯ is incompatible with DE-laws.
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I now introduce the concept of a space-invading property-instance: a property-
instance which occurs spontaneously, without any preceding cause. Let X be
a property instantiated spontaneously at the same time as event d. X has the
following causal powers: (a) to inhibit the causal process through which the
properties of d normally lead to e-events (there are at least two ways familiar
from recent literature on dispositions in which this inhibition might occur: the
space-invader may be a fink for the disposition associated with d-events, it may
act so as to make them lose the disposition to cause e-events; alternatively,
the space invader must be an antidote to the process whereby d-events lead
to e-events, i.e., it may interfere with the causal chain between d-events and
e-events; and (b) to cause, in conjunction with the properties of d, e′-events.
(Handfield 2001: 488)
Phew! Let me try to explain what this all means in complete detail and how
this helps replying to the objection to DE. Start with finks.
5.4.1 An interlude: finks and antidotes
Finks
Finkish dispositions are better grasped in the context of the counterexamples to
the conditional analysis of dispositions (CA). Charlie Martin (1994), for example,
famously presented a counterexample to (CA) that hinges on finkish dispositions.
I follow Bird in saying that in order to understand finkish dispositions we need
to note two of their characteristics. First of all, dispositions have duration; the
process whereby a disposition manifests will take time. Birds gives as examples the
poison’s disposition to kill which in order to manifest needs first to interact with the
metabolism of the victim. Or consider someone who has the disposition to be angry:
"the irascible man may swift to anger but not literally instantaneously" (Bird 2007:
25). Second, things may have a certain disposition at time t but not at a different
later time t′, that is, dispositions may be gained or lost. "Some food may become
infected with the bacterium Clostridium botulinum and thereby become poisonous.
It can lose that disposition by cooking or irradiation" (Bird 2007: 25).
To sum up:
(1) The process whereby a disposition manifests will typically take time.
(2) Many dispositions may be gained or lost.
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Now suppose a certain object o has the disposition to M in response to stimulus
S. Suppose o receives stimulus S at t1 and that the manifestation occurs at t3 such
that t1 is earlier than t3, that is, t1 < t3. However, suppose that o loses its disposition
just after it receives the stimulus and in a way that it loses the disposition before
t3, say, at t2. How is that possible? As dispositions may be gained or lost, it could
be that o loses the disposition at a time before t3, such as t2. Therefore, o will not
manifest its disposition at t3 since it was lost at a time earlier than that, namely,
at t2. Now we have the ingredients to put forward a counterexample to the simple
conditional analysis. Just to recapitulate:
(SCA) Something x is disposed to manifest M in response to stimulus S if, and only
if, if x were to undergo stimulus S, x would give response M .
"Simple indeed - but false", as Lewis puts it (1997). Well, (1) and (2) allow us to
build a scenario in which (SCA) fails. Let us consider the original counterexample
presented by Martin who, as Lewis says, decisively refuted (SCA). Martin focuses
on the left-to-right implication of (SCA):
(SCA←) If, if something x were to undergo stimulus S, x would give response M , then
x is disposed to manifest M to stimulus S.
Suppose that a certain wire is "live" if it is disposed to conduct electrical current
when touched by a conductor. And let us assume
(A) The wire is live.
(SCA) will tell us that the wire is disposed to be live if and only if "if it were
touched by a conductor, it would conduct electrical current". Now consider the
following scenario:
Electro-fink: The wire referred to in (A) is connected to a machine, an
electro-fink, which can provide itself with reliable information as to exactly
when a wire connected to it is touched by a conductor. When such contact
occurs the electro-fink reacts (instantaneously, we are supposing) by making
the wire live for the duration of the contact. In the absence of contact the
wire is dead. For example, at t, the wire is untouched by any conductor, at
t2 a conductor touches it, at t3 it is untouched again. The wire is dead at t1,
live at t2, and dead again at t3. In sum, the electro-fink ensures that the wire
is live when and only when a conductor touches it (Martin 1994: 2).
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The original counterexample Martin presented shows why the left-to-right impli-
cation of (SCA) is false. Suppose that at t1 the wire is not touched by a conductor.
Thus, since the electro-fink ensures that the wire is live when and only when a con-
ductor touches it, the wire is not live at t1. However, the counterfactual "if the
wire were touched by a conductor at t1, it would conduct a current" is true, since
the electro-fink would ensure that the wire would conduct a current if touched by a
conductor. Thus, (SCA←) is false.
If we consider the electro-fink in its reverse cycle, we have a counterexample to
(SCA→). That is, suppose that the wire is dead when and only when it is touched
by a conductor. Suppose that at t1 the wire is not touched by a conductor. Thus,
the wire is not dead, that is, it is live. However, the counterfactual "if the wire were
touched by a conductor at t1, it would conduct a current" is false, since the electro-
fink would ensure that the wire is dead whenever it is touched by a conductor. Thus,
(SCA→) is false.
In sum, some object’s dispositions are finkish because the object may lose the
disposition after the stimulus occurs but before the manifestation can occur. In
Martin’s scenario the electro-fink is connected to the stimulus in a way that whenever
the object receives the stimulus it also loses the disposition. But things do not need
to be put in that way. It could be that the object loses its disposition after the
stimulus occurs in a completely accidental way.
Antidotes
Finks are not the only problem to the conditional analysis. Lewis’ (1997) for example
has tried to wipe out the counterexamples to the conditional analysis by precluding
finks. Finks may occur because the object may lose the disposition after the stimulus
occur but before the manifestation can occur. Lewis argued that in order to rule out
finkish dispositions the causal basis of the disposition needs to remain for a sufficient
time, so that the manifestation can occur. His reformed analysis may be presented
in the following way:
(LCA) Something x is disposed at time t to give manifestation M to stimulus S
iff, for some intrinsic property B that x has at t for some time t′ after t, if x
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were to undergo stimulus S at time t and retain property B until time t′, S
and x’s having B would jointly be an x-complete cause of x’s giving response
to M .
An x-complete cause of y includes all the intrinsic properties of x which causally
contribute to y’s occurrence. (As Bird points out, this stipulation is required to rule
out certain other finkish counterexamples).
I am not entirely sure how Lewis’ reformed analysis may rule out Martin’s case.
Perhaps the idea is that the electro-fink interferes in the process of the wire con-
ducting electrical current when touched by a conductor; and by doing so the causal
basis of the disposition to conduct electrical current when touched is lost.
Nevertheless, Bird has argued that Lewis’ reformed analysis does not rule out
antidotes :
Many dispositions have what I call antidotes. An object x is disposed to
display reponse r under stimulus s. At time t it receives stimulus s and so
in the normal course of things, at some later time t′, x gives response r. The
time gap between t and t′ is what allows, in finkish cases, for the loss of a
disposition. An antidote to the above dispositions would be something which,
when applied before t′, hs the effect of breaking the causal chain leading to r,
so that r does not in fact occur. Thus one can ingest a lethal dose of poison, yet
not die if a suitable antidote is administered soon enough. (For instance, the
antidote to arsenic poisoning is dimercaprol, which,incidentally, is also known
as British Anti-Lewisite.) I suggest that the existence of antidotes provides
counter-examples to Lewis’ analysis (Bird 1998: 228).
Let "fatally poison" mean disposed to kill if ingested. LCA tells us that this is
so if the poison has the causal basis remained for a sufficient time. I may ingest
the poison and yet survive, for I may ingest the poison at the same time I ingest
an antidote. Of course, the poison is left unchanged and all its intrisinc properties
(whatever they are) are left unchanged, so that the causal basis remains unchanged.
If that is so, then it is not a finkish disposition. The object in question still has
the disposition. The poison has the disposition to kill when ingested, and this
disposition is not lost; contrary to finkish cases, the disposition is not lost because
of the time gap between stimulus and manifestation. That is, in the case of antidotes
"the disposition and its causal basis remain throughout"6 (Bird 1998: 228).
6Lewis, however, was unconvinced that antidotes are counterexample to (CA) or (RCA). Rather,
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5.4.2 Space-invaders
Now that I have briefly explained what finks and antidotes are we may come back
to Handfield’s point. He talks about space-invaders in a context where he considers
the following chain of global events in a world w (a global event is a state of an
entire world at a time):
(World w): a caused b caused c caused d caused e caused f .
Let us also consider his concept of a space-invading property instance again:
Space-invasion: Let X be a property instantiated spontaneously (without any
preceding cause) at the same time as event d. X has the following causal
powers: (a) to inhibit the causal process through which the properties of d
normally lead to e-events; and (b) to cause, in conjunction with the properties
of d, e′-events7.
Handfield’s suggestion is that a space invader is not incompatible with the laws
of w. That is, he tells us that when the global event d occurs, it brings about the
"miraculous" result of e′.
But this is a completely law-abiding miracle. This instance of X is a space-
invader, which occurs spontaneously; but that is not incompatible with the
laws which govern X. The laws make no mention of how instances of X must
be brought into being. Moreover, when X is instantiated as a component of a
global [d]-event, the law-governed effect is to bring about e′-events (Handfield
2001: 489).
As Handfield points out, the doctrine of dispositional essentialism is compatible
with the concept of a space-invading property instance. All that DE tells us is that
he considers them as counterexamples to simplistic analyses of covert dispositional locutions (such
as covert dispositional property names, like "fragility" and "combustibility", or predicates, such as
"fragile", combustible") into overt dispositional locutions (such as "the disposition to break when
stressed" or "is disposed to M when S").
7Handfield himself considers an ambiguity in this formulation. "When X occurs, is the global
event the mereological sum of d and X, or does the instantiation of X change the nature of the
world so that d does not occur at all?" (Handfield 2001: 488-489). For ease of exposition I will
admit the compossibility of d and X.
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"the powers of a property are essential to it. It does not, however, assert about the
causal means by which a property can come to be instantiated" (Handfield 2001:
489). If this is so, then perhaps the dispositionalist may allow that all of the actual
properties could have space-invaders instances.
Back to our discussion, the idea is that the dispositional essentialist can replace
the notion of a divergence miracle with the notion of a space-invader8. For example,
assuming that I did not raise my hand at the actual world but that I could have,
the most similar world to the actual will not be the one at which a divergence
miracle occurs. Rather, it will be the one at which a space-invader occurs; perhaps
a spontaneous firing of a neuron in my brain causing me to raise my hand contrary to
what was expected to actually happen. "In this way, space-invaders can do their job
of bringing about counterfactual antecedents in just as subtle a fashion as Lewisian
miracles." (Handfield 2004: 412).
There is a very important point, however. Handfield’s conception of space-
invaders - contrary to Lewisian divergence miracles - is incompatible with DE laws
being deterministic and universal in extent. For consider world w. Let Pd stand for
d occurs, and let Pe stand for e occurs, such that the global event e includes that I
do not raise my hand. Let us suppose that the laws of w are DE-deterministic and
universal, so that they cover Pe and that Pd(L, Pe) is input to L for Pe. Now, let us
consider the closest world to w where I raise my hand. Call it w∗. We want w∗ to
be just like w up until the time at which I raise my hand. That is, we want w∗ to
agree on Pd(L, Pe). But if w∗ agrees on Pd(L, Pe), it will also agree on Pe. Thus,
8If we consider Lewis’ ranking of priorities as presented in chapter 4, the dispositionalist will
have something like this:
(1) It is of first importance to avoid big widespread, diverse space-invaders.
(2) It is of second importance to maximise the spatio-temporal region throughout which perfect
match of particular fact prevails.
(3) It is of third importance to avoid even small, localised, simple space-invaders.
(4) It is of little or no importance to secure approximate similarity of particular fact, even in
matters that concern us greatly.
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w∗ will not be a world where I raise my hand.
But isn’t this a problem for Handfield’s solution? After all, the main point
was to defend that some counterfactuals are true on the assumption that laws are
deterministic and universal. But if Handfield is right, then DE-laws cannot be
deterministic and universal. Here is what he says in response to that:
Well, in the strong sense in which it is usually meant, I am suggesting that
it is open to the dispositional essentialist simply to deny the supposition that
determinism is possible. This does not mean that dispositional essentialists
cannot endorse some weakened sense of determinism. That sense would be that
a world might be such that no space invaders and no chancy properties are ever
instantiated. For example, a Newton-world might exist, and it might have no
space-invaders instantiated in it. This world would satisfy the most hard-core
Laplacean variety of determinism, but this fact about the world would not be
a law in and of itself. It would be a contingent de facto regularity that no
determinism-disrupting properties were ever instantiated in the world. That
does not amount to determinism de jure. (Handfield 2001: 490)
Now, if laws can be interfered with by a space-invader, we need to say something
about the logical form of Handfield’s deterministic laws. First, if any dispositional
properties are capable of space-invasion, then the laws of nature will be ceteris
paribus laws, or at least they will have a ceteris paribus clause concerning the absence
of space-invasion. Second, Handfield tells us that the law will require some sort of
global formulation, that is "for the simple reason that otherwise factors extrinsic to
the antecedent always get in the way and prevent from coming about" (Handfield
2001: 492). Finally, "these sorts of laws will work only for non-chancy dispositional
properties" (Handfield 2001: 492).
The way I see how the possibility of space-invaders is compatible with Handfield’s
deterministic laws can be presented as follows. The question we must ask is this:
what follows from these deterministic laws? It seems to me that Handfield will be
committed to something like the following, where SI is the proposition that there
is space-invasion:
(D*): If L is deterministic* then for any P that L covers and any Pt0(L, P ),
□((Pt0 ∧ L ∧ ∼SI) ⊃ P )
That is, (D*) is consistent with accepting that "SI" is possible, and hence is
consistent with space-invasion. This is a sense in which the laws of nature are
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limited in extent; Handfield’s reformed deterministic laws can be cast as a call for
domain restriction.
In the next section, I shall use use a similar strategy to introduce the view that
free will requires the laws of nature to be limited in extent. It is usually assumed
that the theory of agent causation is not consistent with the laws of nature being
deterministic and universal. What I suggest is that, if free will and determinism
are incompatible and there is free will, the laws of nature do not have to be inde-
terministic. We can accept that they are limited in extent: they do not apply to
agent-caused actions. This is because an agent-caused event can be conceived as
spontaneous in the same way that space-invaders are spontaneous.
5.5 Agent causation
Handfield explains the inhibition of the causal process through which the properties
of d normally lead to e-events in terms of a property that is instantiated sponta-
neously. To that I add something else: agent-causation. It seems that, just like finks
and antidotes, (a) and (b) can be satisfied by an agent exercising her agent-causal
powers - if there is agent-causation.
But what is the theory of agent causation? Roderick Chisholm remarkably in-
troduced it as follows:
we have a prerogative which some would attribute only to God: each of us,
when we act, is a prime mover unmoved. In doing what we do, we cause
certain events to happen, and nothing - or no one - causes us to cause those
events to happen. (Quoted in Vihvelin 2013: 57)
Here, I shall discuss O’Connor’s account because he is very clear about the fact
that the metaphysical assumptions of agent-causation are anti-Humean. My aim is
to use it as a working hypothesis to give more flesh to the parallels between space-
invaders and agent causation. O’Connor provides an account of reasons explanations
and the metaphysics of agent-causation, and here I will only focus on the latter9.
9See O’Connor’s chapter 5 of Persons and Causes (O’Connor 2000). For the general conditions
"to explain an action in terms of an antecedent desire" see O’Connor (2000: 86).
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5.5.1 The metaphysics of agent causation
O’Connor’s account of the metaphysics of agent causal-powers springs from his un-
derstanding of causation in general: agent causation is just another species of the
same causal relation10. The first assumption of O’Connor’s theory concerns the gen-
eral concept of causation. He accepts a non-reductive understanding of causation
where the primitive idea of the causal production, or "causal oomph" in a more
technical jargon, is at its heart (O’Connor 2000: 67). He tells us that G. E. M.
Anscombe advocates the non-reductive understanding of causation in her inaugural
lecture "Causality and determination":
[C]ausality consists in the derivativeness of an effect from its causes. This is
the core, the common feature, of causality in its various kinds. Effects derive
from, arise out of, come of, their causes. For example, everyone will grant that
physical parenthood is a causal relation. Here the derivation is material, by
fission. Now analysis in terms of necessity or universality does not tell us of
this derivedness of the effect; rather it forgets about that. For the necessity
will be that of laws of nature; through it we shall be able to derive knowledge
of the effect from knowledge of the cause, or vice versa, but that does not show
us the cause as source of the effect. Causation, then, is not to be identified
with necessitation. (Anscombe 1981: 67)
By adopting a non-reductive account O’Connor automatically rejects those ac-
counts along Humean lines. (For instance, causation cannot be explained in terms
of a chain of causally dependent events). As O’Connor says, "the acceptance of
the irredutibility thesis leaves open more than one direction on the way towards
a ‘thick’ theory of event causation" (O’Connor 2000: 69). He rejects the Drestke-
Tooley-Armstrong approach for reasons that needn’t concern us here and adopts a
causal powers account instead, that is developed by R. Harré and E. H. Madden in
Causal Powers: a theory of natural necessity (1975).
O’Connor tells us that "there is another species of the causal genus, involving
the characteristic activity of purposive free agents" (O’Connor 2000: 72). According
10Even though I am introducing the notion of causation to present O’Connor’s view, I am
assuming in this chapter that properties are essentially such as to confer certain causal powers or
dispositions. According to Handfield it seems that dispositions and causes are somehow “deeply
connected”, and "a reasonable heuristic assumption, therefore, is that a correct understanding of
dispositions would shed light upon the nature of causation, and vice versa”. (Handfield 2009: 9)
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to him:
Parallel to event causes, the distinctive capacities of agent causes (‘active
powers’) are grounded in a property or set of properties. So any agent having
the relevant internal properties will have it directly within his power to cause
any of a range of states of intention delimited by internal and external cir-
cumstances. However, these properties function differently in the associated
causal process. Instead of being associated with ‘functions from circumstances
to effects’, they (in conjunction with appropriate circumstances) make possi-
ble the agent’s producing an effect. These choice-enabling properties ground a
different type of causal power or capacity - one that in suitable circumstances
is freely exercised by the agent himself. (O’Connor 2000: 72)
The ontological commitments of his account are these: universals and particulars
are basic ontological categories.
Concerning particulars, and specifically agents, there are two general metaphys-
ical assumptions. First, it is required that particulars continue to exist through
time by being entirely located at each moment of their existence. That is, agent
causation is committed to endurantism, as opposed to perdurantism. So it is possi-
ble that particulars can cause in a way that does not consist in causation by states
or events. Also, it is not that all ordinary things that do not have temporal parts
(and so are wholly present when they exist) may be considered "agents"; following
Thomas Reid, O’Connor says that if something is an agent, then he is able to "rep-
resent possible courses of action to himself and have desires and beliefs concerning
those alternatives (O’Connor 2000: 72). Second, the powers of agents must not
be reducible to the powers of their micro-physical constituents, so that the powers
of agents are "emergent". Concerning properties, "we require that they be uni-
versals that have essentially their dispositional tendencies" (O’Connor 2002: 73).
Clearly, all the assumptions are very disputable, but they are not incompatible with
dispositional essentialism.
There are two main differences between agent and event causation. The first and
most obvious one concerns the causal relata. While the relata of event causation are
events, the relatum of the "cause side" of agent- ausation is an enduring substance.
Agent-causation is, as Ginet says, "the notion of a causal relation whose relatum on
the cause side is not any event but the agent as such" (Ginet 1990: 12). There is
an analogy here with our ordinary talk that may support such a distinction (Lowe
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2001). We make statements concerning event-causation such as "the explosion of
the bomb caused the collapse of the bridge", but we may also say something such
as "the bomber caused the collapse of the bridge" (Lowe 2001: 2). In the latter
example, the verb "to cause" takes as its grammatical subject a noun-phrase that
might refer to an enduring substance, whereas in the former it might refer to a
particular event. And since particular events and enduring substances belong to
quite different ontological categories, it could be that the verb "to cause" has two
different senses when referring to particular events and enduring substances. In any
case, if O’Connor’s view is right, the locution "s is the [agent]-cause of e" is to be
interpreted literately, in the sense that the agent herself is the cause of e, and it
cannot be analysed in terms of "Agent s caused event e if and only if there was
some event, x, such that x involved s and x caused e".
The second difference concerns the idea of causal production or "causal oomph".
With respect to event-causation, O’Connor says that it can be thought of as "func-
tions from circumstances to effects". But agent-causal power cannot be thought in
this way. It is not that someone agent-causes her coming to have a certain inten-
tion by being in the appropriate circumstances. Rather, the agent bears a set of
essentially dispositional properties that can be thought of as choice-enabling, in the
sense that if the agent has those properties, she is able to manifest the distinctive
agent-causal power. The manifestation of such a power depends, of course, on the
agent herself and not only on the circumstances where she is in.
5.5.2 Agent causation and space-invasion
Let us briefly go back to Handfield’s world w, where the chain of global events from
the dawn of time to the present goes like this:
a caused b caused c caused d caused e.
Let Pd stand for d occurs, and let Pe stand for e occurs, and suppose that the
global event e does not include the event that I raise my arm. If laws are DE-
deterministic and cover Pe, if another possible world w
′ agree on the laws and on
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whether Pd(L, Pe), they agree on whether Pe. Now consider what O’Connor tells
us.
One important feature of agent-causal power is that it is not directed to any
particular effects. Instead, it confers upon an agent a power to cause a certain
type of event within the agent: the coming to be of a state of intention to
carry out some act, thereby resolving a state of uncertainty about which action
to undertake. (For ease of exposition, I shall hereafter speak of “causing an
intention,” which is to be understood as shorthand for “causing an event which
is the coming to be of a state of intention.”) This power is multi-valent, capable
of being exercised towards any of a plurality of options that are in view for
the agent. We may call the causing of this intentional state a ‘decision’ and
suppose that in the usual case it is a triggering event, initiating the chain of
events constituting a wider observable action. (O’Connor 2009: 12)
The idea is that by manifesting the power distinctive to agent-causation, the
agent causes an intention; we can say, for example, that the agent causes her coming
to have a certain intention. Suppose that this occurs at the same time as event d,
so that it initiates "the chain of events constituting a wider observable action"
(O’Connor 2009: 12). Thus, the agent (a) inhibits the causal process through which
the properties of d lead to e-events and (b) causes e′-events (the global e′ event will
include the agent raising her arm).
Handfield tells us that a space-invader is some sort of spontaneous event: "a
property-instance which occurs spontaneously, without any preceding cause" (Hand-
field 2001: 488). In this sense, it is the event of the agent causing an intention.
Consider an agent-caused event, such as
Agent-caused event (ACE): Pedro caused event e.
Chisholm raised the following question: "what, now, of that event - the event
which is his thus causing e to happen? [...] Shall we say it that was not caused by
anything?" (quoted in O’Connor 1995: 184). O’Connor’s answer to this question is
that an event such as (ACE) cannot be caused (O’Connor 2000: 58). If O’Connor
is right, then events such as (ACE) are by their own nature uncausable. They pop
into existence and interfere in the natural order11.
11To give a bit of historical context, Chisholm’s worry was that if we answer "no" to the question
of whether an agent causes the complex event (ACE), we cannot hold the agent responsible for his
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But if O’Connor is right about the fact that (ACE) cannot be caused, the worry is
this: how can the agent have control over his decision if the agent herself cannot cause
the complex agent-caused event? His idea is that, once we admit that agent-caused
events are by their own nature uncausable, the question is "ill framed, resulting from
a failure to understand the distinctive nature of such an event. Agent-causal events
are intrisically actions - the exercising of control over one’s behavior. It is senseless
to demand some further means of controlling this exercise of control" (O’Connor
2000: 59).
If the above is right, O’Connor provided a solution to a long-standing objection
to agent causation. Now, this is certainly controversial, and it is not my aim to
causing e to happen. And he thought that if the agent is not responsible for (ACE), then the agent
is not responsible for e either. Given this worry, Chisholm thought that the best answer to the first
question is "yes", that is, that the event of the agent causing e to happen is caused by the agent.
In other words, according to Chisholm, (ACE) is itself caused by the agent. Now, what about the
event that (ACE) is caused by the agent? Of course, Chisholm’s answer is that this event has to
be caused by the agent as well, and so on, ad infinitum. To have a better grasp of this, consider
Chisholm’s account of agent-causation where he introduces a basic undefined locution: "he makes
it happen that... in the endeavour to make it happen that...", where the gaps are to be filled in
by sentences. Chisholm uses "M–..." in order to abbreviate the undefined locution and stipulates
that it obeys the following axiom schemata:
(A1) Any instance of "M–..." implies ∃p∃qM(p, q)“
(A2) Any instance of "M–..." implies the corresponding instance of “—-“.
(A3) Any instance of "M–..." implies its reiteration "M(M–...)...".
Chisholm introduced the axiom schema (A3) precisely to avoid the problem of explaining what
causes (ACE). For O’Connor’s objection to Chisholm, see O’Connor (2000: chapter 3, section 3.4).
O’Connor, of course, disagrees. As I said, he thinks that agent-caused events are by their own
nature uncausable. The reason is this: consider a complex event such as
Complex event (CE): e causes d.
What does cause such a complex event? According to him, (CE) may be caused only indirectly.
If c causes e, then c will cause the complex event (CE). However, if the relatum of the "cause side"
is an enduring substance, say, Pedro, then nothing may cause it. For there is no clear meaning of
something causing a substance qua substance.
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provide a defence of agent causation. My main interest here is in the consequences
of his view with respect to the dispositionalist conception of laws.
Remember that Handfield’s reformed deterministic laws will cover situations
where no space-invaders obtain. If agent causation can be thought of as space-
invasion because agent-caused events are uncausable (at least according to O’Connor’s
view), what happens when agent-caused actions obtain? If we consider O’Connor’s
view, they will be constituted by essentialist dispositional properties (because agents
bear a set of essentially dispositional properties). However, these properties are not
like the properties that are "functions from circumstances to effects". In this sense,
when an agent-caused action obtains, it will not be covered by the universal gener-
alisation that supervenes on the dispositions that are "functions from circumstances
to effects". Just like space-invaders, the reformed deterministic DE laws will not
cover agent-caused events. What we have, thus, is something like this, where AC
is the proposition that there is agent causation. Let P be the proposition that I do
not raise my arm.
1. □(AC ⊃◇(Pt0 ∧ L ∧ ∼P ))
2. ◇AC
3. ◇◇ (Pt0 ∧ L ∧ ∼P ) (from 1, 2, modal logic)
Hence,
4. ◇(Pt0 ∧ L ∧ ∼P ) (from 3, S4).
The idea of introducing (1) is to cash out the idea that agent causation (just like
space-invaders) may interfere in the natural order (Although I am not saying that
agents can change, say, water into wine). It is clear that 2 and 1 are not consistent
with DE laws being deterministic and universal (for the same reason that Sehon’s
interventionist God is inconsistent with the standard view of determinism). On the
other hand, if we claim that the laws of nature are limited in extent because they
do not apply to agent-caused events, we have
• □((Pt0 ∧ L ∧ ∼AC) ⊃ P ),
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which is consistent with accepting that "AC" is possible, and hence is consistent
with agent causation. Again, this is a sense in which the laws of nature are limited
in extent, not that they are indeterministic.
Now, the formulation above may sound too implausible because it seems that we
are requiring the laws to be silent about our actions. This is certainly a legitimate
worry. But I do not think that I am requiring anything too implausible. What
I am saying is just that, since dispositional essentialism is compatible with space-
invasion, a formulation of the laws will - as Handfield himself writes - "require very
strong restrictions on the possible interference of occurrences. Law statements will
consequently refer only to highly idealised situations, which almost never obtain in
actual practice" (Handfield 2001: 491). So, I think that it is not too surprising that
these highly idealised situations will rule out interference by agents, especially in
the case of agent causation. As we shall see in the interlude of the last chapter, this
has some consequences with respect to the luck argument.
5.6 Final remarks
The dispositional account of laws justifies one of the premises of the consequence
argument, namely, that the laws are not up to us. And the reason is that they
are metaphysically necessary. I also have argued that, if dispositional essentialism
is compatible with space-invasion, and if agent-caused events are uncausable, then
DE laws will need to have a ceteris paribus clause with respect to the interference
of agents. The view I just sketched has limitations, of course, because I did not
argue for the view that events such as (ACE) cannot be caused. But I believe that
this shows an alternative to the idea that, if determinism rules out free will, the
laws of nature have to be indeterministic. I suspect that this requirement of laws
being "indeterministic" is the one that generates worries about indeterminism and
control, especially with respect to the luck argument. In any case, if we accept the
dispositional account of laws and the add-ons we need for the truth of determinism,
does it mean that there is no free will? That depends not only on the premise that
the laws are not up us, but also on the premise about the past. And this is what I
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will discuss in the next chapter.
Chapter 6
Can we change the past?
In order to reply to Warfield’s charge of modal fallacy, proponents of the conse-
quence argument need not only to show that its premises are true, but that they are
necessarily true. This problem has been just partly responded since I have shown
that □MNL and □MML follow from the dispositionalist view of laws. The plausi-
bility of incompatibilism depends thus on a successful reply to the main objection
to the premise that no one has or ever had any choice about the past: Campbell’s
no past objection.
One intuitive picture in line with this premise being necessarily true is the garden
of forking paths. One of the ways to spell this out is in terms of the idea that an
agent’s future is open, whereas the past and the present are not. That is, although
an agent may have a choice about the future, she (1) cannot have a choice about
the past (2) nor the present.
But how should (1) and (2) be formulated in a more precise way? Following the
discussion on chapter 3, I will make use of the "no-choice" operator in order to draw
up (1) and (2). I formulate the theses of the necessity of the past and the necessity
of the present in terms of the "M" operator. I fill a gap in the literature on this
discussion: although it has been already argued that the necessity of the present
and the necessity of past allow us to reply to the no past objection, no one (as far as
I know) has formulated those theses in terms of an operator in which the conclusion
of the consequence argument follows from its premises.
In section 6.1 I present the back and forth of the discussion on the necessity
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of the past. In section 6.2 I formulate the theses of the necessity of the present
("NN" for short) and the necessity of the past ("NP" for short). After that I show
that, contrary to Campbell’s claim, they do not entail fatalism. Then I argue that
MPt0(L, P ) is necessarily true given the assumption that there is no time earlier
than t0. This argument holds water if the necessity of the present is true. However,
Bailey (2012) has provided counterexamples to it. In the final section I consider
Finch’s solution (2013a, 2013b) to this problem.
6.1 Campbell’s no past objection
Following Warfield’s considerations, Campbell has objected to the consequence argu-
ment by attacking premise 5. His first (well noticed) point is that the most obvious
arguments presented in support of premise 5 are not cogent. There are two sorts of
argument identified by Campbell. The first one goes like this:
(a) NPt0 because Pt0 is a true proposition about the past and "no one can change
the past" (Campbell 2007: 107).
The above argument is clearly invalid. It rests on the following invalid inference
rule; where "PP" stands for "it has at some time been the case that P", the argument
goes as follows.
1. PP
Thus,
2. NP
Let P be the proposition that I apply to study philosophy at Durham University.
It is true that it has at some time been the case that P . And it is also true that,
right now, I have no choice about whether P is true. However, just because I do not
have a choice about whether P is true now it does not follow that I did not have
a choice about whether P . I could have applied to study at a different university.
Thus, 2 does not follow from 1.
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Of course there is a straightforward response to that. For the premise the in-
compatibilist relies on is about a state of the world before any agents existed. The
premise of the consequence argument is about the remote past. The argument for
premise 5 can be better formulated, thus, in the following way:
(b) NPt0(L, P ) because Pt0(L, P ) is a proposition about the remote past.
Even so, Campbell argues that (b) will not do. The thesis that the laws of
nature are deterministic does not need to involve a proposition about the remote
past. We can think of a possible world at which the laws of nature are deterministic
and agents existed throughout its history. Consider the following scenario:
[No past] Consider, for instance, the possible world W . Suppose that W
is a determined world such that some adult person exists at every instant.
Thus, W has no remote past. At its first moment of existence lived Adam,
an adult person with all the knowledge, powers, and abilities necessary for
moral responsibility. Shortly after Adam comes Eve, and the rest is history.
For each of the propositions that comprise W , someone is such that he has,
or had, a choice about whether that proposition is true – at least there is no
reason to doubt this claim. The Third Argument [that is, the modal conse-
quence argument] is not a general argument for incompatibilism. At most, the
Third Argument proves the weaker claim that persons cannot have free will
in determined worlds with a remote past (Campbell 2007: 109).
If incompatibilism is to be formulated in terms of the strict conditional, then
the no past scenario seems to show that the consequence argument fails to be an
argument for incompatibilism. Put in that way, this looks like a boring (although
correct) technical point. But Campbell does not put it in that way. He thinks the
scenario tells against a weaker formulation of "incompatibilism" as well, that is, the
thesis that determinism actually precludes the existence of free will:
given only the Weaker Argument, we should judge that Adam is free in W
but that Eve is not free. Yet it is hard to see how Adam and Eve differ
in important respects. Good arguments for incompatibilism should expose
the tension between the thesis of determinism and the free will thesis. If the
Weaker Argument is the best that the incompatibilist has to offer, it remains a
mystery why it cannot show that Adam lacks free will in world W. (Campbell
2007: 110)
Anthony Brueckner (2008) has tried to fix the problem by introducing a "N"
operator with times in it. Brueckner employs the operator "NtP", which stands for
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"P and no one has any choice at t about whether P" (Brueckner 2008: 11). And
he puts forward the same argument by mimicking the original inference rules:
(α*) For all t: from □P derive NtP .
(β*) For all t: from NtP and Nt(P ⊃ Q) derive NtQ.
Now, let P0∗ be a proposition that expresses the total state of the world at some
time t0∗ prior to t (as Brueckner says, t0∗ could be one second prior to t) (2008: 11).
Here is Brueckner’s new argument (BCA for short):
1 □((L ∧ P0(L, P )∗) ⊃ P ) det. def.
2 □(L ⊃ (P0(L, P )∗ ⊃ P )) exportation, 1
3 Nt(L ⊃ (P0(L, P )∗ ⊃ P )) α∗, 2
4 NtL premise
5 NtP0(L, P )∗ premise
6 Nt(P0(L, P )∗ ⊃ P ) β∗, 3, 4
7 NtP β∗, 5, 6
Obviously, the most striking difference between BCA and the original argument
is that the latter uses "N...,t". Brueckner’s point, it seems, is that the trick of
BCA is to show that no one can perform a free action at a time relative to which
there is a past. The "appropriate" input to L for P , namely, Pt0* expresses the
total state of the world at some time prior to t. This has an advantage over the
original formulation; for example, Pt0* may be replaced by a proposition that is true
5 minutes before t, whereas the original one cannot.
Even so, it is clear why BCA does not rule out the no past scenario. For suppose
Adam performed action a at the first instant of w, say, t. For all BCA shows, Adam
performed a freely at t.
Brueckner’s idea here is to point out that, even though this is right, "no subse-
quent act of Adam’s is free, and no subsequent act performed by any other human
is free" (Brueckner 2008: 12). And that is perhaps the only limitation of BCA, one
that seems quite unproblematic. After all, (historical) determinism spells out the
idea that the past and the laws necessitate the future:
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On this conception of determinism, the assumption that there is no past rel-
ative to the time at which A is performed will quite naturally give rise to the
consequence that there is no argument from the assumption of determinism
to the conclusion that A is not free. (Brueckner 2008: 13)
Does it undermine Campbell’s argument against weak incompatibilism as well?
Campbell recognises that this might make some trouble for the argument against
weak incompatibilism. And he has replied to Brueckner by presenting another sce-
nario. His idea is to appeal to a situation at which time is circular; the instants
are linearly ordered in a way that forms a circle, something like the conception of
"eternal recurrence". See figure 1 (Mortari 2001).
Figure 6.1: Circular time
If a stands for now, the instants to the right constitute the future - but notice
that if we go sufficiently far into the future, we will get to the past. Here is the
scenario:
[Oscillating Adam]. Suppose that there is a deterministic world, W*, where
time is circular. In that world exists oscillating Adam. Oscillating Adam
has always existed and will always continue to exist. He is in the grips of
an everlasting, eternal recurrence. Oscillating Adam spends his time growing
’older’ and getting ’younger’. He begins each cycle with powers comparable
with the average 25 years old and eventually develops powers comparable with
the average 50 years old. Then he slowly regresses back to the state at which
he began, and the cycle starts all over again (2010: 72-3)
Campbell claims that this is a better scenario "because Adam no longer has an
initial moment of existence. Still, Adam has no remote past; there is no necessity
of the past to transfer onto Adam’s future" (Campbell 2010: 73).
I will not discuss the question of whether Campbell’s new scenario refutes Brueck-
ner’s argument. My aim is to use the definition of "M" presented in chapter 3 and
show that the premise that no one has a choice about the input to L for P (boundary
conditions, facts about the past, etc.) holds, so that even the new scenario should
not worry incompatibilists.
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6.2 Time-indexing in the "M" operator
The might-counterfactual sufficiency interpretation of "no-choice about" we consid-
ered in chapters 3 and 5 does not have times in it. And it is not clear at all how
we can discuss Campbell’s objection without time indexing. (After all you may
think of Pt0 as a proposition describing an event event, just like P ). My strategy
thus is to introduce the method of temporal arguments. And I shall introduce it
for propositions as well. That is, instead of having the 0-ary predicate P we will
use a monadic predicate P () where the argument place is to be filled in by a term
denoting a time. Let x, α and t range over, respectively, agents, action-types and
times:
Definition 6.2.1. Mt′φt if and only if φt∧∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′)∧(Does(x, α, t′)◇→
∼φt)]
Here is how Campbell’s objection can be formulated now. If one wants to avoid
the charge of modal fallacy, then one needs to show why Mt′Pt0(L, P ) is necessarily
true. That is, necessarily, there is no agent x, no action α, no time t′ such that x can
do α at t′ and if she were to do that at t′, Pt0 might be false, that is, P might be false
at time t0. But there seems to be a simple way to show that this is not necessarily
true. Suppose that t0 is the first instant of time at w in Campbell’s original scenario.
Let Pt0 be a proposition about the total state of the world at t0 in w and suppose
that Adam did not raise his hand at t0. According to Campbell, the possible world
w is a world at which Adam can do something at t0 (e.g., raise his hand) such
that, if he were to do it at t0, Pt0 might be false. Since t0 includes Adam’s not
raising his hand, it is necessary that if he raises his hand, Pt0 is false. Thus, if the
antecedent is possible, it follows that if he were to raise his hand, Pt0 might be false.
That is, Campbell claims that it is possible that Pt0 and Can(adam, raise, t0) ∧(Does(adam, raise, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0).
If the purpose of the argument is to show that premise 5 is not necessarily true,
the original scenario seems to do the trick. At least the way it was presented, if
there is nothing wrong with it, then premise 5 is not necessarily true.
There is also an interesting aspect about the objection. If something happened
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a while ago, I cannot do anything now to change it. This was the intuitive principle
I formulated in the beginning of this chapter. I cannot do anything to change
something that already happened. "M" helps us formulate this principle1:
(NP) □∀t∀t′[t < t′ → (Pt → ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼Pt))].
That is, necessarily, for any time t and any time t′, if t is earlier than t′, then
if P is true at t, then no one can do anything at t′ such that, if one were do it, P
might be false at t.
Campbell’s objection is interesting because it does not violate (NP) - the neces-
sity of the past. This is so because Campbell is not claiming that Adam can raise
his hand at some time t′ later than t, the time at which P is true. Thus, (NP) alone
will not help us in showing the truth of the premise that no one can change the past.
As Roberto Loss has already argued (2009), if we want to establish that thesis, we
need to appeal to another thesis: the necessity of the present.
Before I formulate this thesis, I would like to remind that it is in line with that
intuitive "model": the garden of forking paths (whose name springs from Jorge Luis
Borges’ narrative). The idea is that the past and present are fixed; what happened
and what happens cannot be changed. But the future is different; it is open and
there many "alternative" futures, as it were.
What this model tries to capture is that it is only the future that is up to us.
Neither the past nor the present are up to us. Of course, we can make choices in
the present and they will affect the future. But that is different from saying that we
can change how things are now.
It is this view, I believe, that motivates Loss’ (2009) reply to Campbell. As far
as I know, Loss was the first one to appeal to the necessity of the present in order
to argue against Campbell.
if I am running now, I cannot now do anything about the fact that I am
running now. I can perhaps decide whether I will still be running in the next
1Notice that this has an advantage over the formulation of the so called "necessity of the past",
at least as formulated by Arthur Prior: that is, if PP, then □PP. The problem is the one of whether
the principle expresses the thesis of the necessity of the past in a mixed modal tense logic, and
there are reasons to think it does not (White 1984: 60).
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hour, minute or second, but if it is true (if it is a fact, part of the actual
world) that I am now running, this is something I cannot now make otherwise
or prevent: facta infecta fieri non possunt. (Loss 2009: 67)
His formulation of the principle makes use of Brueckner’s operator. But Brueck-
ener did not provide an interpretation of "N" where we can prove its inference rules.
I shall formulate the principle thus:
(NN) □∀t(Pt → ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α, t) ∧ (Does(x, α, t)◇→ ∼Pt)]
That is, necessarily, for every time t, if P is true at t, then no one can do anything
at t such that, if one were to do it at t, P might be false at t.
We can use NN as a weapon to refute Campbell’s objection. I will show that the
assumption of the no past scenario leads to a contradiction.
1 □∀t(Pt → ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α, t) ∧ (Does(x, α, t)◇→ ∼Pt)] NN
2 Pt0 ∧ Can(adam, raise, t0) ∧ (Does(adam, raise, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0) No past
3 Pt0 → ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, a, t0) ∧ (Does(x, α, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0)] NN, 1
4 Pt0 ∧E, 2
5 ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, a, t0) ∧ (Does(x, α, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0)] ⇒E, 3, 4
6 ∀x∀α∼[Can(x, a, t0) ∧ (Does(x, α, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0)] , 5
7 ∼[Can(adam, raise, t0) ∧ (Does(adam, raise, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0)] ∀E, 6
8 Can(adam, raise, t0) ∧ (Does(adam, raise, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0) ∧E, 2
9 ⊥
10 ∼[Pt0 ∧ Can(adam, raise, t0) ∧ (Does(adam, raise, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0)] ¬I, 2–9
I take this to be a refutation of Campbell’s objection if the necessity of the
present is a plausible thesis. Campbell has responded to Loss by claiming that the
necessity of the present entails fatalism. Here, I will show that this formulation of
(NN) does not entail fatalism. After refuting Campbell’s point against Loss, I will
go on to show how we can derive premise 5 of the consequence argument.
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6.3 NP and NN do not entail fatalism
Campbell has argued that the necessity of the present and the necessity of the past
entail fatalism. If this is the case, then it is a reductio to the response to the no past
objection. Campbell’s argument makes use of Loss’ formulations of the principles,
and Loss employs Bruckener’s operator.
(γ) ∀t∀t′(t < t′ ⊃ (Pt ⊃ Nt′Pt)
(δ) ∀t(Pt ⊃ NtPt)
Campbell tries to establish that no one is able to do otherwise given these prin-
ciples.
I prove the generalization on the basis of a single, arbitrary case. I show that
I am unable now to get my nose pierced, given that it was and is and always
will be false that I get my nose pierced. The person (me), time (now) and
proposition (that Joe gets his nose pierced) are arbitrary. Thus, no one is ever
able to do otherwise and fatalism is true. (Campbell 2010: 74)
The strategy is as follows. If he is able now to get his nose pierced before, say,
2020, then it must be possible that his nose be pierced at some particular moment
in time, say, Pt (Campbell 2010). And if that is the case, that moment will be either
in the past, or in the present, or in the future. Suppose that that moment will be
in the past. Let t be any past time and n be the present moment.
1 ∼Pt ⊃ Nn∼Pt (γ)
2 ∼Pt Assumption
3 Nn∼Pt ⇒E, 1, 2
Thus, the moment cannot be in the past. Now suppose that it will be in the
present.
1 ∼Pn ⊃ Nn∼Pn (δ)
2 ∼Pn Assumption
3 Nn∼Pn ⇒E, 1, 2
Finally, if he is able now to get his nose pierced in the future, there must be some
possible future moment of time when his nose is pierced. However, let t∗ stand for
any possible future moment.
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1 ∼Pt∗ ⊃ Nt∗∼Pt∗ (δ)
2 ∼Pt∗ Assumption
3 Nt∗∼Pt∗ ⇒E, 1, 2
Campbell thinks that this is a reductio to the suggestion that an argument for
incompatibilism should employ both γ and δ. Fortunately, he is not right.
Consider definition 6.2.1. Following Campbell I will characterise fatalism as the
thesis that "no one can do otherwise":
(Fatalism) Mt′φt, that is φt∧∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′)∧(Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼φt)].
This thesis is not established. The only thing he shows is that, if φ is true at a
particular time t, then no one can do anything at that particular time t such that,
if one were to do it, φ might be false at t. He does not show that no one can do
anything at another time t′ such that, if one were to do it at t′, φ might be false at
t. In other words, Campbell needs to show that for every t, no one has any choice
about whether φ. The only thing he shows is that no one has a choice about whether
the proposition is true at the time (or after the time) the proposition is true.
Thus, the principles do not entail fatalism, and Campbell’s objection fails2.
6.4 Arguing for premise 5
Now I want to argue that premise NPt0 is necessarily true. Notice that the sentence
Pt0 serves as a dummy which we can replace by any true sentence about the past or
present we like (provided it is about the total state of the world).
(I) Pt0
By (NP), we have:
(II) Pt0 → ∼∃x∃α∃t′>t0[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼Pt0)]
Given that, by stipulation, there is no time t′ earlier than t0, we can infer:
2After writing this section, I discovered that Loss (2010) replied to Campbell as well.
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(III) Pt0 → ∼∃x∃α∃t′<t0[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼Pt0)]
By (NN):
(IV) Pt0 → ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α, t0) ∧ (Does(x, α, t0)◇→ ∼Pt0)]
Thus we can infer:
(V) Pt0 → ∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼Pt0)]
Finally, from (I) and (V) we can deduce:
(VI) Pt0 ∧ ∼∃x∃α∃t
′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼Pt0)]
Notice that (VI) is equivalent to Mt′Pt0. Since w is any arbitrary world, we can
derive the necessity of Mt′Pt0, that is, □Mt′Pt0. Thus, premise 5 follows.
It is high time that we considered the plausibility of (NN) and (NP). I will only
make some very brief comments.
I am assuming without argument that there is no question of having a choice
about a proposition about the past by means of time travel or the like. After all,
Campbell’s counterexamples did not show that agents may be free in a world with
backwards causation, time travel, etc. On the contrary, his argument is compatible
with the necessity of the past as formulated in this chapter. So, it seems that this
premise should not worry us.
How about (NN)? This is certainly the most controversial one. I do think that
this is quite plausible. If only the future is up to us, we can only have a choice about
the future. This is formulated as follows: I can do something such that, if I were
to do it at t, P might be false at t′ > t. Now we need to do more to motivate this
thesis. I will do this by considering Finch’s defence of the principle (in the context
of a reply to Bailey’s objection to the necessity of the present).
6.5 Bailey’s objection to the necessity of the present
Bailey has presented three counterexamples to the necessity of the present. Here I
shall consider what I take to be the most interesting one:
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The Instantaneous Chooser. I exist for but a moment (call it t): no more, no
less. And when I exist, I freely perform an action; I choose, say, to consider
the question of whether I will dream. [I consider the question of whether I will
dream] is a fact about t, but I had a choice in the matter. And surely I didn’t
have a choice in the matter before—or after—my one moment of existence. So
I had a choice in the matter at t. As before, we could, if we liked, add that
indeterminism is true in at least this sense: for every proposition x expressing
the complete state of the world at any time up to but not including t, the
conjunction of x with the laws of nature is compatible with [I do not consider
the question of whether I will dream]. (Bailey 2012: 366)
Bailey claims that, for all he can tell, this is a possible case. In that scenario, he
chooses to consider the question of whether he will dream. Let Pt be the proposition
that he chooses to dream at t. Still, he can do something at t such that, if he were
to do that at t, P might be false at t. If this is right, then (NN) is false and so the
strategy to derive MPt0 fails.
Bailey anticipates one objection to that counterexample. The idea is that the
instantaneous chooser requires instantaneous causation. "That is, it can’t be that
any cause (a mental episode, say) exists for but an instant and is simultaneous with
its effect (an action, say)" (Bailey 2012: 368). His reply to that objection is that the
impossibility of instantaneous causation is less than obvious3. "And if arguments
for incompatibilism must rest on such abstract considerations about causation, this
does not bode well for them" (Bailey 2012: 368).
There are two responses to Bailey’s objection to the necessity of the present.
The first - and more plausible one - is Finch’s strategy, where she defines "abstract
time" and shows that (NN) follows from it. The second one - considered by Bailey
himself - has more costs and requires to appeal to the necessity of origin.
6.5.1 Abstract times and Finch’s trans-temporality thesis
It seems to me that the best way out for incompatibilists is to follow Finch’s strategy
in showing what she calls "the trans-temporality thesis". However, Finch’s argu-
ment depends on some technical machinery. She follows Alvin Plantinga (1976) in
3Bailey tells us that philosophers such as Gordam (2004), Huemer and Kovitz (2003) have at
least endorsed the possibility of instantaneous causation.
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constructing modal claims as claims about possible worlds, where possible worlds
are maximal possible states of affairs. Here is a brief paraphrase of it (Plantinga
1976: Sect. II. 1; Finch 2013b section 3). A state of affairs is possible if it might
obtain and actual if it obtains. A state of affairs O obtains if and only if some object
instantiates some property or stands in some relation to itself or something else. A
state of affairs O includes a state of affairs O′ if it is not possible for O to obtain
and O′ to fail to obtain; and O precludes O′ if it is not possible that both obtain.
O is a maximal state of affairs if and only if for every state of affairs O′, O either
includes or precludes O′.
Now we turn to the definition of abstract time:
Abstract times might fruitfully be thought of as present-tense maximal states
of affairs. Intuitively, and very roughly, a present-tense maximal state of affairs
is a total state of the world at an instant, minus all of the past- and future-
tense truths. More rigorously: Say that a state of affairs O is future directed
just in case either O’s obtaining entails that some contingent thing will exist
or O’s obtaining entails that no contingent thing will exist; and then define
a past-directed state of affairs in the obviously parallel way. Then a state
of affairs O is present-tense maximal if and only if, for every atomic state of
affairs O’ that is neither future-directed nor past-directed, either O includes
O’ or O precludes O’ (Finch and Rea 2008: 10).
Finally, this is the trans-temporality thesis to be shown (T’T):
(T’T): Necessarily, for any agent x, any act a, any time t, and any time t′, if (i)
x performs a at t and (ii) it is up to x at t′ whether x performs a at t, then
∼(t = t′).
An important aspect of this formulation is that it has a double time index: one
being the time at which the agent performs the action and the other one being the
time at which the action is up to the agent4. In other words, there is a transition
from how-x-is-at-t′ to how-x-is-at-t: x at t′ has the property of being up to her to
perform a at t and the property of being up to her to refrain from performing a at
4Finch seems to follow Lehrer when he says that "statements affirming that a person can do
something have a double time index, one time reference being to the time at which the person
has the capability, and the second being to the time of action" (Lehrer 1976: 243). See also van
Inwagen (1983: 231 footnote 12) for a nice comment on this.
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t. But by performing a at t, x lacks the latter property. Finch gives a necessary
condition for an action being up to an agent:
(A): Necessarily, if it is up to an agent x at some time t′ whether x performs an
act a at time t, then x at t′ is both (i) able to perform a at t and (ii) able to
refrain from performing a at t.
From (A), it follows that:
(MP): Necessarily, if it is up to an agent x at some time t′ whether x performs an
act a at time t, then (i) it is possible at t′ that x performs a at t and (ii) it is
possible at t′ that x refrains from performing a at t.
With this, it is worthwhile to remind ourselves that if x performs a at t, t
includes x’s performing a at t. Indeed, given the definition of a time, it is
logically impossible that t not include x’s performing a, and so it is logically
impossible that t includes x’s refraining from performing a at t. What this
means, then, is that if it is possible, at t′, that x refrains from performing a
at t, it is possible, at t′, that t not obtain. And, by extension, this means that
it is logically possible, at t′, that some time t∗ obtains, where t∗ is some time
that precludes x’s performing a. (Finch 2013b: 478-9)
With this argument Finch claims that
(TP): Necessarily, if (i) it is possible at t′ that x performs a at t and (ii) it is
possible at t′ that x refrains from performing a at t, then ∼(t = t′)
follows. "And, if we consider (A) alongside (MP) and (TP), it is clear that the
trans-temporality thesis (T’T) follows" (Finch 2013b: 479).
Here is how I see her argument. The idea is to show that if x performs a at t,
then x is not able at t to refrain from performing a at t. Suppose that x in fact
performs a at t. Given the definition of a time, it is not possible for t to obtain and
x not to a at t. This is just to say that it is not possible for t to obtain and for x to
refrain from performing a at t. Thus, x at t is not able to refrain from performing a
at t. However, x at t′ is able to refrain from performing a at t. Hence, t and t′ are
not identical. (T’T) and (NN) are just two different ways to express the same idea
(cf. Finch 2013a: footnote 34). If the trans-temporality thesis is plausible, so is the
necessity of the present. For if an agent has a choice about some proposition, the
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agent has the ability to render this proposition false at some time different from the
one at which the proposition is true. Finch’s point is that her formulation gives a
more detailed explanation as to why the necessity of the present is true.
The purposes of presenting Finch’s argument for the necessity of the present was
to show that the thesis is motivated by a certain definition of abstract times, and so
that the necessity of the present is not an unjustified principle. There is, however, a
different strategy that incompatibilists may take, although one that has some costs.
6.5.2 The necessity of origin and essentialist incompatibilism
The point of this strategy is to defend a certain assumption about the past in
order to solve Campbell’s problem; namely, that every actual person x is such that,
necessarily, if x freely performs an action, there is a time prior to x’s first moment
of existence. Bailey considers this strategy, and correctly warns us that it has some
costs. In any case, I think it is worth considering this strategy for the following
reason.
My defence of the other premise of the consequence argument depends on a
certain essentialist assumption, an essentialism concerning properties, that funda-
mental, natural properties are essentially dispositional. And this allowed us to show
the necessary truth of ML and NL. The idea here is to appeal to essentialism
concerning individuals, namely, the necessity of origin. The reason is that the the-
sis that "every person is such that they cannot freely perform an action if there
is no time prior to their existence" is an essentialist one, and I tend to agree with
Lowe’s suggestion that essentialist theses cannot be deduced from premises which
do not already include an essentialist thesis (Lowe 2002: 107). The combination
of a thesis concerning essentialism about properties (dispositional essentialism) and
a thesis concerning essentialism about individuals (the necessity of origin) justifies
a very strong form of incompatibilism: perhaps this could be called "essentialist
incompatibilism".
The task of such a view is to justify the following claim:
(Temporal origin): every actual person x is such that, necessarily, if x freely
performs an action, there is a time t prior to x’s first moment of existence.
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The essentialist thesis that we can appeal to (and that Bailey himself has also
considered) is the necessity of origin. According to the necessity of origin, if some-
thing originated from a certain source in the actual world, then it also originates
from the same source in every possible world in which it exists. Saul Kripke (1980:
114-16) has claimed that every human person essentially has the parents she has.
Suppose this is the case. Then someone who follows Kripke could argue as follows
(Bailey 2013: 363).
O1 Every actual human person s is such that necessarily, if s exists and s has
parents, s has the parents s in fact has. (Premise, Origin Essentialism)
O2 Therefore: every actual human person s is such that necessarily, if s exists,
there are some xs such that the xs are s’s parents. (From O1)
O3 Necessarily, for any xs and any y, if the xs are the parents of y, then there is a
time prior to y’s first moment of existence. (Premise)
O4 Therefore: every actual human person s is such that necessarily, if s exists,
there is a time prior to y’s first moment of existence. (From O2, O3)
Now, premises O1 and O3 are quite controversial. But since I am here just
interested in the consequences of such a view, let us suppose they are true. Given
the argument is valid, if the premises are true it is also sound. Even so, there is still
a problem, for O4 still does not justify the premise that □MPt0(L, P ). The reason is
that the modality in O4 is de re, while in □MPt0(L, P ) it is de dicto. (One possible
solution, nevertheless, is to appeal to the Barcan formula: ∀x □ φ→ □∀xφ).
The problem with such a view is that it cannot justify incompatibilism given
the assumption that the laws of nature are universal in extent and deterministic. It
needs to appeal to a very controversial thesis that is independent of our concerns
about determinism. For this reason I believe that the necessity of the present - and
also Finch’s trans-temporality thesis - is a better response to Campbell’s objection.
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6.6 Final remarks
The main goal of this chapter was to put forward an argument for the premise
that no one can change the past. One contribution to the current discussion was to
formulate the theses in terms of an operator whose interpretation allows us to deduce
the main inference rules in the consequence argument. Furthermore, it allowed us
to show why the theses of the necessity of the present and the necessity of the past
do not entail fatalism. This makes a strong case for premise 5, provided one finds
the necessity of the present a plausible, or that Finch’s trans-temporality thesis is
plausible. If this is right, and given the dispositionalist view of laws, incompatibilism
is true, which leaves the question as to whether indeterminism is compatible with
free will to be answered.
Chapter 7
The Mind (and luck) argument
In chapter 2 I argued that the standard formulation of the problem of free will
depends on certain add-ons about laws. Even so, I have assumed these add-ons
throughout the following chapters of the thesis in order to look at the the concep-
tual relationship between determinism and free will with respect to the traditional
problem. A Humean conception of laws allows the compatibilist to deny one of the
premises of the consequence argument. Things are different for the dispositional
account of laws, however. If laws are DE-deterministic and universal in extent, and
the arguments presented in chapters 5 and 6 are cogent, then incompatibilism is
true.
Nevertheless, remember that the Mind argument - just like the consequence
argument - can be formulated in terms of a (β)-like transfer rule. It seems that
accepting the validity of a (β)-like transfer rule boils down to accepting the validity
of the Mind argument. But if the Mind argument is cogent (and determinism is
incompatible with free will), there cannot be any room for free will. Here, I will
argue that accepting the validity of the consequence argument does not commit one
to accepting the cogency of the Mind argument. I will argue that there are many
problems with the standard formulation of the argument, and that there are reasons
to think that (β) is not pivotal to the Mind argument. After arguing that the main
worry about the compatibility of indeterminism1 and free will is not about accepting
1For ease of exposition I am still assuming that "indeterminism" here means that "determinism
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a (β)-like transfer rule, I conclude with some brief remarks about the explanatory
formulation of the luck argument. The chapter is structured as follows.
First, I consider some attempts to fill in the details of the Mind argument,
as since Graham’s objections (2010) it is not clear whether the argument is well-
formulated. I look over the back and forth of the discussion surrounding the Mind
argument, and argue that it fails to establish the incompatibility of free will and
indeterminism. I begin with van Inwagen’s original formulation and then discuss
Finch andWarfield’s response (1998) to the argument. Dana Nelkin (2001), however,
convincingly argued that Finch and Warfield’s response fails. After this exposition
of the debate concerning the cogency of the Mind argument, I argue that we do not
have good reasons for accepting its cogency. The overall conclusion is that the Mind
argument formulated in terms of a (β)-like rule fails. After that I turn to the luck
argument and show that there is a gap in one of its premises.
7.1 Van Inwagen’s formulation of the Mind Argu-
ment
In An Essay on Free will van Inwagen sums up the argument as follows: "a free
act is an act one has a choice about; but no one has any choice about that which
is undetermined". Remember that van Inwagen defends this claim by asking us to
imagine a mechanism the salient features of which are a red light, a green light, and
a button. If someone presses the button of the mechanism, one of the lights will
flash, but it is undetermined which. "Now suppose that you must press the button
on this mechanism. Have you any choice about which of the lights will flash? It
seems obvious that you have no choice about this" (van Inwagen 1983: 142).
Now consider the following scenario:
THIEF: Let us consider the case of a hardened thief who, as our story begins,
is in the act of lifting the lid of the poor-box in a little country church. He
is not true". In this sense, if the laws of nature are indeterministic, then indeterminism is true.
But if indeterminism is true, it follows that either laws are indeterministic or that they are limited
in extent.
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sneers and curses when he sees what a pathetically small sum it contains. Still,
business is business: he reaches for the money. Suddenly there flashes before
his mind’s eye a picture of the face of his dying mother and he remembers the
promise he made to her by her deathbed always to be honest and upright. This
is not the first occasion on which he has had such a vision while performing
some mean act of theft, but he has always disregarded it. This time, however,
he does not disregard it. Instead, he thinks the matter over carefully and
decides not to take the money. Acting on this decision, he leaves the church
empty-handed. (van Inwagen 1983: 127-28)
An important assumption about the argument is that van Inwagen adopts the
standard theory of action in which, very roughly, something counts as an intentional
action if it is non-deviantly caused by the mental states and events that rationalise
the action (such as beliefs and desires). The standard theory also provides a causal
account of reasons explanation. In THIEF we have an explanation telling us why
the thief left the church empty-handed by revealing the thief’s reason for performing
the action. According to the standard theory, there is a causal connection between
the explanandum - the thief leaving the church empty-handed - and the explanans
- the desires and beliefs of the thief that do the explaining.
In the scenario, the thief’s beliefs and desires caused the event of his refraining
from robbing the poor-box. In the argument, let DB stand for the proposition that
at t the thief has both a desire to keep the promise he made to his dying mother and
a belief that the best way to do this would be to refrain from robbing the poor-box.
Let R stand for the proposition that at t′ the thief refrains from robbing the poor-
box. Remember that the basic idea of the Mind argument is that no one can have
a choice about something that is undetermined. Here, it is undetermined whether
R follows from DB. This gives the following argument.
1. N(DB ⊃ R)
2. NDB
Thus,
3. NR (from 1, 2, and β)
Suppose that the scenario about the red-green device justifies the claim that
"no one has a choice about that which is undetermined". Since it is undetermined
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whether R follows DB, premise 1 is true. Van Inwagen asks us to imagine that the
green-red device is "hooked up" to the thief’s brain
in such a way that, if it flashes green he will steal the money and if it flashes
red he will repent and depart; and we may suppose that his coming to be
in a state of uncertainty about whether to steal or to repent has the effect
of pressing the button. It should be clear that the thief has no choice about
whether to steal or to repent. (van Inwagen 1983: 143)
If the device is "functionally equivalent" (van Inwagen 1983: 143) to the thief’s
brain, then it seems he has no choice about that which is undetermined. And van
Inwagen’s point here, it seems, is that what drives this intuition is not the device
itself, but the indeterministic outcome involved in it. (I will come back to this point
later).
With respect to 2, it is also assumed that the thief has no choice about whether
DB is true. For example, Franklin says that this "assumption is harmless as the thief
could only have had a choice about DB [...] if he performed some earlier action which
itself would have been brought about by yet earlier mental states. We could then
raise the same questions about this earlier action and these earlier mental states.
Someone might again insist that the agent had a choice about these still earlier
metal states. But this cannot go on forever and we will eventually discover the
thief’s ‘initial’ mental states for which he had no choice" (Franklin 2011: footnote
35).
7.1.1 A libertarian solution: Finch and Warfield
The problem with van Inwagen’s formulation is that (β) is too controversial. Al-
though I have argued that (β) is valid if one is willing to accept Stalnaker’s theory,
it is pretty much consensual that proponents of the debate accept McKay and John-
son’s counterexample. In other words, (β) is invalid given definition 3.7.1 according
to Lewis’ theory2. Well, at least Finch and Warfield’s solution to the argument
depends on (β) being invalid. Their strategy hinges on McKay and Johnson’s in-
fluential counterexample to (β) so that they focus their criticism on "improved"
2Just to refresh the reader’s memory, the definition is this: Nφ iff φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧(Does(x, α) ∼φ)].
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formulations of the Mind argument that are parallel to the consequence argument.
Their goal is to defend the cogency of the consequence argument while denying the
cogency of the Mind argument.
Let us consider the formulation of the consequence argument based on (β-2),
which is a valid inference rule on the Lewis-Stalnaker semantics for counterfactuals
given definition 3.7.1.
(β − 2) □(φ ⊃ ψ),Nφ ⊢ Nψ
1. □((Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L) ⊃ P )
2. N(Pt0(L, P ) ∧ L)
Thus,
3. NP (from 1, 2 and β-2)
Nevertheless, if the same rule is used in order to formulate the Mind argument,
Finch and Warfield argue, we will have a valid but (clearly) unsound argument:
1. □(DB ⊃ R)
2. NDB
Thus,
3. NR (from 1, 2 and β-2)
Premise 1 is false. In THIEF there is the assumption that the event DB de-
scribes causes (but does not necessitate) the event R describes. As a result, they
argue that since (β)’s invalidity is (pretty much) uncontroversial and the original
formulations are invalid, the best solution is to go on offering an improved version
of the arguments. And although both arguments rest on a valid inference rule the
improved Mind argument is undoubtedly unsound. As a result, libertarians have
nothing to fear.
One might object that premise (2) in the improved consequence argument is
stronger than the premises in the original formulation. After all, if Finch and
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Warfield are assuming the successfulness of McKay and Johnson’s counterexam-
ple, what the counterexample shows, for starters, is that agglomeration is invalid.
As a result, N(Pt0(L, P )∧ L) does not follow from NPt0(L, P ) and NL. However,
Finch and Warfield mantain that this should not be a problem:
While it is true that the premise of the improved Consequence argument is
formally stronger than the pair of premises in van Inwagen’s argument, we
maintain that the core intuition motivating the acceptance of van Inwagen’s
premises likewise motivates the acceptance of our premise. This core intuition
is, we maintain, the intuition that the past is fixed and beyond the power of
human agents to affect in any way. P describes the state of the world at some
time in the distant past (before any human agents existed). L is a conjunction
of the laws of nature which, we presume, in addition to being inalterable by
human agents, do not change over time. Thus the conjunction (P and L)
offers a description of what might be called the “broad past”—the complete
state of the world at a time in the distant past including the laws of nature.
We maintain, in asserting our premise, that the broad past is fixed in just the
way that van Inwagen maintains that the past is fixed (and that the laws are
fixed). (Finch and Warfield 1998: 523)
Finch and Warfield also consider a formulation with the "M" operator3.
1. M(DB ⊃ R)
2. MDB
Hence,
3. MR (from 1 and 2)
And they also argue that this will not do because premise 1 is false:
The premise states that R follows from (is indeterministically caused by) DB
and there is nothing anyone could do (or could have done) which might result
(or might have resulted) in R’s not followingDB. But given thatDB’s causing
R is a case of indeterministic causation, there clearly is something one could do
that might result in R’s not following DB. In particular, any action (including
inaction) at all that one performed is such that it might have resulted in R’s
not following DB. (Finch and Warfield 1998: 526)
It seems to me, however, that the above needs a much more detailed justification.
But I will not attempt to provide such a justification because I think Nelkin has
refuted Finch and Warfield’s solution.
3Mφ if and only if φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α[Can(x, α) ∧ (Does(x, α)◇→ ∼φ)].
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7.1.2 Nelkin: why the libertarian solution fails
Finch and Warfield assumed that the Mind argument could not be sound if for-
mulated in terms of (β-2). However, Nelkin (2001) interestingly showed that (β-2)
allows one to put forward an improved version of the Mind argument as well:
1. □((DB ∧ (DB ⊃ R)) ⊃ R)
2. N(DB ∧ (DB ⊃ R))
Thus,
3. NR (1 and 2, β − 2)
The justification for the premise of this improved version is analogous with the
justification for the premise of the improved consequence argument. Nelkin thinks
that the sort of reason that supports the premise in Finch and Warfield’s improved
consequence argument is exactly the same as there is in support of (2):
Just as we can think of the conjunction of P and L as the ‘broad past,’ we
can think of the conjunction of DB and (DB ⊃ R) as the ‘broad nature of
our mental states’. In other words, the conjunction of DB and (DB ⊃ R)
represents the nature of an agent’s mental states, including (some of) their
causal properties. And, just as in a deterministic world the broad past is not
up to us, in an indeterministic world it is not up to us what the nature of our
mental states is. (Nelkin 2001: 113)
Nelkin’s point is that the improved Mind argument is as strong as the improved
consequence argument. As she says, “if the core idea behind the consequence argu-
ment is right, then so is the core idea behind the Mind argument”. It is possible that
both arguments fail, but Nelkin claims that “as long as we understand the ultimate
conclusion in the way van Inwagen does, it is difficult to see how they could” (Nelkin
2001: 114).
If the arguments are sound, then libertarians are in a bad spot, since both deter-
minism and indeterminism are incompatible with free will4. However, I shall argue
that this formulation of the Mind argument is far from showing the incompatibility
of free will and indeterminism.
4Nelkin thinks that this leaves some room for the idea that libertarianists do not need to be
“leeway theorists”, that is, that acting freely does not require the ability to do otherwise. This is
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7.1.3 Graham: the discussion is confused
According to Graham (2010), this discussion is confused. He has noticed that an
evident problem in the discussion is the assumption that N(DB ⊃ R) correctly
symbolises the claim that no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether R
follows DB. As he reminds us, the fact that N(DB ⊃ R) is assumed throughout
the discussion to symbolise the claim that R follows DB is made evident in the
following passages:
If an agent’s act was caused but not determined by his prior inner state, and
if nothing besides that inner state was causally relevant to that agent’s act,
then that agent had no choice about whether that inner state was followed by
that act. (van Inwagen 1983: 149, our emphasis)
Once DB occurs, given indeterminism, perhaps R will follow and perhaps it
will not but since once DB occurs everything relevant to R’s occurrence has
taken place it seems clear that no one has a choice about R’s following DB.
That is, it appears to follow that N(DB ⊃ R). (Finch and Warfield 1998: 518,
our emphasis)
Now, since R is an indeterministic consequence of DB, it seems that no one has
a choice about whether or not R follows DB. That is, N(DB ⊃ R). (Nelkin
2002: 109, our emphasis)
The problem is to translate into logical notation the following claim:
(&) R follows DB and no one has, or ever had, any choice about whether R follows
DB.
But Graham tells us that N(DB ⊃ R) is not the right way of symbolising
(&). This is so because the claim that R follows DB entails both DB and R -
and consequently the material conditional DB ⊃ R. But DB ⊃ R does not entail
DB and R. Clearly, the claim that R follows DB is stronger than the material
conditional DB ⊃ R (cf. Graham 2010: 279-80).
What is then the right way to symbolise the claim that R follows DB? Graham
claims that to say that R follows DB is to say that what R describes takes place
a time later than what DB describes. Recall that DB is to be filled in by the
so because “it is strictly consistent with libertarianism that we act freely as long as our states of
mind cause our actions and that indeterminism is true, even if we lack the ability to ensure that
we do otherwise.” (Nelkin 2001: 114).
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proposition that at t the thief has the relevant belief/desire pair, and R by the
proposition that at t′ the thief refrains from robbing the poor-box. In other words,
the event DB describes takes place at t while the event described by R takes place
at t′. What we need is the additional claim that t′ is later than t. Let F be the
proposition that describes the event that t′ is later than t. Then the right way to
translate (&) is N((DB ∧ F ) ∧R).
Yet, if N((DB ∧F )∧R) is the premise of the Mind argument, there is no need
to employ rule (β) (or any similar β-like transfer rules) in the argument. After all
we can put forward the argument like this:
(δ) ∶ N(φ ∧ ψ) ⊢ Nψ
1. N((DB ∧ F ) ∧R)
Thus,
2. NR (from 1 and δ)
But if that is the argument, Graham says it is “blatantly question-begging” be-
cause “to be justified in accepting N((DB ∧ F ) ∧ R) one would have to be an-
tecedently justified in accepting the conclusion of the argument, namely, NR” (Gra-
ham 2010: 280).
At this point one may wonder why we are spending so much time with this boring
examination of the argument’s formalisation. This passage is instructive:
Why, you might ask, couldn’t they all have just dispensed with talk of R’s
following DB and presented the Mind Argument explicitly in terms of the
material conditional? Here is why. The Mind Argument’s premises are offered
as intuitively obvious. No arguments are offered in their support. The thief
scenario is presented and it is simply asserted that it is obvious from the
situation presented that the two premises are true. Given that this is how the
premises are supported, it makes all the difference in the world what we take
the ordinary language formulation of those premises to be because it is only
in their ordinary language formulations that we can at all claim them to be
intuitively obvious. (Graham 2010: 281)
If Graham is right, then the Mind argument fails to be a problem for libertarians
who accept the validity of a (β)-like transfer rule. After all, the premises of the
7.1. Van Inwagen’s formulation of the Mind Argument 177
argument formulated in terms of the material conditional are not, as Graham says,
intuitively obvious.
I think that there some other difficulties with this formulation of the argument.
Let us take a look at them.
Are the premises necessarily true?
The argument is supposed to be one for the incompatibility of indeterminism and
free will. One of the ways to formulate it is as follows: "if determinism is not
true, there is no free will". However, that conditional cannot be the material one.
To see that, consider a hard determinist who thinks that incompatibilism is true
and determinism is true. A hard determinist will accept the truth of the material
conditional "if determinism is not true, then there is no free will", just because he
thinks that the antecedent is false. If we want to establish the incompatibility of two
theses, we cannot just show that the material conditional is true.
Now, what if the "if-then" of that conditional is the one of the strict implica-
tion? In that case, if indeterminism strictly implies that there is no free will, then
free will and indeterminism are incompatible. However, in that case, the standard
formulation of the Mind argument would be a modal fallacy. In order to get the
conclusion that indeterminism strictly implies that there is no free will, we need the
premises of the argument to be necessarily true. But no arguments are presented for
the necessity of the premises. It seems to me that, given the assumption that inde-
terminism is true, at least one premise is not necessarily true, and which one is not
depends on where indeterminism is "located" in this formulation of the argument.
If incompatibilism is true, then if there is free will, free will needs to be compat-
ible with the laws of nature being indeterministic (assuming, of course, that they
cover everything, but I shall ignore this complication for now). But where exactly
indeterminism should be located? It cannot be that there is free will because some
particles in a far, far away galaxy are not determined. Although libertarians dis-
agree about where to posit the requisite of indeterminism, it must be somewhere
in the aetiology of a free action. Now, in our discussion, we can understand DB
as being undetermined ("undetermined" in the sense that laws are indeterministic
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with respect to DB), or R being undetermined, or R being undetermined by DB.
For our purposes, it does not really matter, for at least one premise will not be
necessarily true.
Suppose, for example, that it is undetermined that R follows DB. If laws were
deterministic and were to cover R, then DB and L would entail R. However,
since they are indeterministic with respect to it, it is possible that L and DB
and ∼R. If so, it follows that it is possible that DB ∧ ∼R. As a result, even if
one takes N(DB ⊃ R) as intuitively obvious, the argument still does not prove
the incompatibility of indeterminism and free will, for the very same reason that
the original formulation of the consequence argument fails to be an argument for
incompatibilism. If we need to defend that the premises are necessarily true, it needs
to be the case that □N(DB ⊃ R). But □N(DB ⊃ R) entails □(DB ⊃ R), which
contradicts the assumption that it is possible that DB ∧ ∼R.
On the other hand, if we understand DB as being undetermined, then it possible
that L and ∼DB, so that it is possible that ∼DB. If so, then □NDB is false, for
□NDB entails □DB, which contradicts the assumption that it possible that ∼DB.
I am not saying that there is no other way to put forward an argument for the
incompatibility of indeterminism and free will. I am just saying that this formulation
fails to do so. Anyway, even if one gets rid of this problem, there is a more serious
one concerning the notion of "undetermined". I attempt to show that this reveals
that rule (β) is not really pivotal to the Mind argument.
What does "undetermined" mean?
Remember that van Inwagen defends the claim that "no one has any choice about
what is undetermined" by appealing to the green-red device scenario. It is not totally
clear to me, however, what "undetermined" means in this context. According to
Franklin’s formulation of van Inwagen’s argument, if someone presses the device’s
button, "there is an objective probability of 1 that either the red light or green light
will flash, but an objective probability of less than 1 that the red light will flash
and an objective probability of less than 1 that the green light will flash" (Franklin
2011: 225, my emphases). So, according to Franklin’s formulation, "undetermined"
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here means that determinism is not true in the sense that the laws of nature are
indeterministic with respect to the outcome of the device. In other words, the laws
of nature do not always select a single outcome (for example, that the red light will
flash), although they lay down at least a probability.
Now, suppose we distinguish the questions about extent and permissiveness
(chapter 1). If determinism is not true, what follows is that, either the laws of nature
are not deterministic, or that they are not universal. If we consider Franklin’s for-
mulation, "undetermined" means that the laws are not deterministic. But suppose
that - as articulated in chapter 5 - the laws of nature do not cover free actions. If
so, the scenario seems beside the point. What free will requires is that the actions
of agents are outside the domain of the laws, not that they are indeterministic in
Franklin’s sense. The upshot is that even if free will is incompatible with laws being
indeterministic for agents, free will is still possible as long as laws are limited in
extent and do not cover actional-events.
Of course, there is a clear objection to the above point. For suppose that by
"undetermined" we mean that the laws are limited in extent and do not cover the
device. Even so, it seems we do not have a choice about this. We do not have a
choice about whether the red or green light will flash, after all this is undetermined.
I remain unconvinced. I agree with Franklin that the example van Inwagen
gives establishes far less than what he thinks. What he seems to be assuming is
that, by pressing the button, the agent does all he can, and then just has to wait
to see what the outcome is (Franklin 2011: 205), that is, the outcome comes about
"indeterministically" or "randomly". In that case, of course, the agent has no control
over the outcome. However, I do not see how this is supposed to follow from the
claim that the laws do not cover such an outcome because they do not cover agent-
caused events. If by exercising her agent-causal power the agent brings about R,
then the agent exercises her control, even though the laws do not cover it.
In fact, Seth Shabo (2013) has made the same point when he claimed that rule
(β) is not really central to the Mind argument:
According to these libertarians, rational agents (qua substances) sometimes
make a further causal contribution to their free actions, one that we overlook
if we attend only to their beliefs, desires, and other mental states. Suppose for
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discussion’s sake that the thief makes this further, "agent-causal" contribution
to R. On this basis, these libertarians will say, it is up to the thief whether R
occurs, notwithstanding that DB are the only states relevant to R’s occurrence.
If this appeal to agent-causation succeeds in explaining how R can be up to
the thief, the libertarian can reject N(DB occurred ⊃ R occurred). (Shabo
2013: 295)
On the other hand, if agent causation is not the correct account of control, then
agent-causalists will not be able to explain why N(DB ⊃ R) is false. In any case,
the crucial question here is whether agent causation can correctly explain control.
Of course, "[t]he same point applies, mutatis mutandis, to libertarian opponents
of the Mind Argument who reject agent-causation" (Shabo 2013: 295). Here is what
Franklin, for example, says:
[van Inwagen’s] claim that the thief does not have a choice about whether R
follows DB does not seem well-formed. To ask whether the thief had a choice
about whether DB brought about R is, on the face of it, a rather awkward
question since, according to the event-causal theory of action, DB’s bringing
about R just is the thief’s exercising control over R. (Franklin 2011: 227)
So, the crucial question here is not whether accepting (β) commits one to accept-
ing the cogency of the Mind argument. The crucial question is the one of whether
we can successfully explain what it means to exercise control over an action5.
We have three difficulties with the Mind argument. First, we do not have good
reasons to think that the claim that "no one has a choice about whether R follows
DB" can be symbolised in terms of the material conditional. And if we present the
Mind argument explicitly in terms of the material conditional, it is not intuitively
obvious that the premise N(DB ⊃ R) is true. Second, even if it is obvious that the
material conditional is true, the standard formulation of the Mind argument is an
5Not surprisingly, there is disagreement among agent-causalists (such as Griffith 2010; O’Connor
2011) and event-causalists (such as Franklin 2011, 2014). Both theories are supposed to fulfil the
requirement of control without assuming the truth of determinism. The disagreement however
is about whether control can be "solely analyzed in terms of, or reduced to, states and events
involving the agent" (Franklin 2014: 141). Event-causalists also include Wiggins (1973), Ekstrom
(1993, 2000), Kane (1996, 1999). One recent argument against the event-causal approach that
favours the agent-causal one is the disappearing agent objection (Pereboom 2007: 102). See also
Franklin (2014), Runyan (2016), and Clarke (forthcoming).
7.1. Van Inwagen’s formulation of the Mind Argument 181
ignoratio elenchi, for it does not establish the incompatibility of indeterminism and
free will. In order to do that, we need to show that the premises are necessarily true,
but the participants of the debate agree that it is possible that DB∧∼R, so that the
premise cannot be necessarily true. (And even if we say, on the other hand, that DB
is undetermined, the first premise will not be necessarily true). Third, there is the
problem of explaining what "undetermined" means in the context of this discussion.
And what is crucial here is whether we can have a correct account of control even
on the assumption that determinism is false. But it is far from being intuitively
obvious that, just because laws are silent (or indeterministic) with respect to our
actions, it follows that we have no choice about them.
The main worry that the Mind argument seems to pose - at least the way I
understand it for the purposes of this thesis - is that we cannot simultaneously
accept a (β)-like transfer rule while denying the cogency of the Mind argument.
But if what I have considered here is correct, this not a problem at all. First,
because it is implausible to think that the argument should be formulated in that
particular way in terms of a (β)-like transfer rule. And second because even if there
is no problem in formulating the argument in that way, it is far from obvious that
its premises are true, let alone necessarily true. Because the main interest here is in
the compatibility of indeterminism and free will, I conclude that this formulation of
the Mind argument does not compel us to accept that free will entails determinism.
This does not mean that there are no better formulations of the argument. Graham
himself considers several different formulations of the argument only to conclude
that they all fail, but none of them relies on a (β)-like transfer rule as discussed
here, and none of them rely on premises that are necessarily true.
The main worry then is about whether the falsity of determinism rules out con-
trol, independently of whether the argument is formulated in terms of a (β)-like
transfer rule. A correct answer to this worry, however, depends on a discussion of
how an agent may have a choice "about that which is undetermined". And here
there is a huge disagreement between libertarians, and I am not getting into the
discussion of who is right (the agent-causalist or the event-causalist).
Anyway, the luck argument seems to raise this worry in a better way than the
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Mind argument, even without relying on a transfer rule like (β). As I said, I am not
getting into the debate between event and agent-causalists. But I think that the
distinction in chapter 1 between extent and permissiveness shows a gap in Mele’s
formulation of the luck argument.
7.2 Interlude: The luck argument
The Mind argument and the luck argument may be taken to be the same argument,
but here I have distinguished them because the formulations I am discussing are
different. The worry about the Mind argument was a worry related to (β)-like
transfer principles. Here I will focus instead on the explanatory formulation (Mele
2006). Let us discuss the argument in this schematic form (Franklin 2011):
1. If agent s performs action a at t in w and there is some world w∗ that has
the same laws and past, but in which s performs not-a, then there is nothing
that accounts for the difference between world w in which s performed a and
w∗ in which s performed not-a.
2. If nothing accounts for this difference, then it is partly a matter of luck that s
performed a in w and partly a matter of luck that s performed not-a in w∗.
3. If an action is partly a matter of luck, then the action is not free
Thus,
4. If s performs action a at t in w and there is some world w∗ that shares the
same laws and past, but in which s performs not-a, then both a and not-a are
not free.
The worry about luck can be raised if we consider the thief scenario in the Mind
argument. In that scenario, the thief has reasons for robbing the box (he wants some
money, he is confident no one will catch him, etc.) and reasons for refraining from
robbing the box (he made a promise to his mom, he wants to fulfill that promise,
etc.). What happens in the story is that the thief decides not to rob the box at t.
According to the standard libertarian, this implies that there is another world that
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shares an initial segment up until t, the time of the decision, with the same laws of
nature. That is, there is another world with the same laws and past where the thief
decides to rob the box at t. However, since both worlds have the same laws and
past, the thief has exactly the same mental states, reasons, deliberations, etc., prior
to t. How is the decision up to him if there is nothing to explain this difference?
One of the ways to reply to that argument is by saying that "Mele is right that
nothing can explain the occurrence or non-occurrence of a other than [the thief’s]
decision. But this is no argument against the libertarian, since it is exactly her
position that we have this undetermined capacity to shape the future according to
our own decisions" (van Miltenburg & Ometto forthcoming: 4).
Mele however has already replied to that objection:
I have heard it said that what I am presenting as a problem for typical liber-
tarians cannot possibly be a problem for them because their view entails that
cross-world differences of the sort at issue are required for directly free action.
But, of course, sometimes a philosopher’s view entails something impossible
[...] And the answer that it has to be possible because its possibility is required
by typical libertarian views is a remarkably poor answer. (Mele 2014: 548)
I agree that this is a poor answer. Yet, I do not think that the libertarian needs
to require this sort of cross-world difference for free will, at least not if we consider
the view I articulated before. In chapter 5, I put forward an argument for the claim
that agent causation (or at least O’Connor’s account of agent causation) requires the
laws of nature to be limited in extent, rather than being indeterministic. I argued
that agent-causation is compatible with the laws of nature being deterministic if
the laws have a "no agents intervening" clause. And I think this plays a role in the
discussion concerning the conditional "necessarily, if determinism is not true, there
is no free will", especially with respect to the first premise of Mele’s formulation of
the luck argument.
If the luck argument is an argument for the claim that free will entails determin-
ism (that is, the contrapositive of "necessarily, if determinism is not true, then there
is no free will"), there is a gap in it. The crucial point can be raised by the following
question: does the antecedent of premise 1 follow from the claim that determinism
is not true?
Remember that "determinism" here means that the laws of nature are both
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universal in extent (that is, they cover everything) and are deterministic. However,
if we say that laws are limited in extent in the sense I mentioned above, it does not
follow that we need to accept that "agent s performs action a at t in w, and there
is some other world w∗ with the same laws and past in which s does otherwise".
So, agent-causation (conceived as space-invasion), contrary to what Mele says, does
not entail the impossible.
It seems to me that Mele’s formulation presupposes that the laws of nature are
indeterministic with respect to the event that agent s performs a. Clearly there are
further implicit conditions in the antecedent if (1) is to follow from the assumption
that the laws of nature are indeterministic. I take it that it is presupposed that a is
the kind of happening that is governed by laws and that those laws that govern it
are indeterministic with respect to it. In other words, let us say that P is an action
of a person (agent s performs a). Laws L are indeterministic in the sense that for
any P that L covers and any input Pt0(L, P ) and any possible worlds w and w∗
in which L, w and w∗ agree on Pt0(L, P ) but not on whether P obtains. But, of
course, this already presupposes that L covers P .
However, I argued that since dispositional essentialism is compatible with space-
invasion, a formulation of the laws requires - as Handfield himself writes - "very
strong restrictions on the possible interference of occurrences. Laws statements will
consequently refer only to highly idealised situations, which almost never obtains
in actual practice" (Handfield 2001: 491). And I argued that these laws would
have to rule out the interference by agents as well, for agent-caused events (at least
according to O’Connor’s view) are uncausable and interfere in the natural order. If
so, it cannot be that a is the sort of event governed by the laws.
The difference in this response is that I am not attacking premise 2:
2. If nothing accounts for the cross-world difference, then it is partly a matter of
luck that s performed a in w and partly a matter of luck that s performed
not-a in w.
Agent-causal libertarians, for example, think that what gives control over the
action is not a certain sort of explanation but rather the agent-causal power exercised
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by the agent. The reply then is to point out that the cross-world difference does not
entail that the agent did not have control over a, so that a is not a matter of luck.
I do not claim that control requires lack of contrastive explanation. I am just
saying that the agent-causal libertarian does not need to commit herself to the claim
that the denial of determinism entails the antecedent of 1 in Mele’s argument. But
then again, the plausibility of such a reply will depend on agent causation (and, in
particular, O’Connor’s account of agent causation) being the right account of free
will, which is something I did not consider in this thesis. While this is not a decisive
refutation of the argument, at least shows that the libertarian does not need to be
committed to the view that free will "requires the impossible".
7.3 Final remarks
I have argued the Mind argument - at least the standard formulation - is quite
problematic. I also considered an implication of the view outlined in chapter 5 for
the formulation of the luck argument. For if the "limited laws" account is right,
the antecedent of 1 in the luck argument will not follow from the assumption that
determinism is not true. If such an account of agent-causation is correct, the ex-
planatory formulation of the luck argument will fail to establish the incompatibility
of indeterminism and free will.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
My aim in this chapter is to give a very brief summary of the preceding discussion,
focusing more on the big picture.
In chapters 1 and 2, I have formulated the problem of free will and determinism in
terms of a dilemma against the view that there is free will. I have also distinguished
several important questions with respect to "contingency", contending that the tra-
ditional problem of free will and determinism depends on the claim that the laws of
nature are universal in extent and deterministic. However, as I argued in chapter 2,
the claim that the laws are universal and deterministic is a controversial one that
is just an add-on to the mainstream philosophical accounts of laws. I discussed,
in particular, the "Humean" regularity theory, laws as relations among universals
and the dispositional account. I also considered how the term "deterministic laws"
should be defined relative to the philosophical accounts discussed there. My claim
was that "Humeans" and powers advocates could adopt different definitions of "de-
terministic laws". I motivated the definitions by discussing Sehon’s objection to the
claim that deterministic laws are reliable.
In sum, if the arguments in chapter 2 are sound, there is nothing in the very
nature of a law that implies that things could not happen other than the way they
do consistent with the laws staying the same, nor even that probabilities need be
fixed. Laws may be universal in extent and yet totally impermissive, and one may -
or may not – have good independent arguments for these add-ons; but in all senses
of "laws" surveyed that is just what these are: add-ons. It is important to keep this
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questions separate from one another because they have consequences for the free will
debate. In particular, I think that the distinction between extent and permissiveness
plays an important role in the typical arguments for the incompatibility of free will
and indeterminism. If determinism is not true, it does not follow that that the laws
of nature are indeterministic.
Now, if determinism is true, then laws are deterministic and universal in extent.
The compatibility problem is that of understanding whether determinism and free
will are compatible. My focus was, of course, on the consequence argument. And
because the bulk of the discussion concerned the modal formulation, I had to con-
sider the debate over the (in)famous rule (β). Contrary to initial expectations, rule
(β) and agglomeration are actually valid according to Stalnaker’s theory (on the
counterfactual sufficiency of "N"), although they are invalid on Lewis’. However,
(β-M) is valid on Lewis’ theory if we use an operator defined in terms of the "might-
counterfactual". So, the discussion in chapter 3 showed that the main question is
not that of whether the consequence argument is valid, but whether it is sound.
So, the question of whether the consequence argument is sound depends on what
the laws of nature are. Different philosophical views have different approaches with
respect to the compatibility of free will and determinism. If we assume the Humean
view of laws - and Lewis’ argument for miracles - then the premise that no one
has a choice about the laws of nature is false. On the other hand, if we accept the
dispositionalist conception of laws, this premise is necessarily true. If the arguments
presented in chapter 5 are sound, then incompatibilists should take dispositional
essentialism seriously.
Even if the premise that the laws of nature are not up us is necessarily true
according to the dispositionalist conception of laws, the consequence argument relies
on another premise: namely, that the past is not up to us. The real challenge here
was to defend that this premise is necessarily true. Anyway, I believe that the defence
of this premise is not really crucial for the purposes of the consequence argument
because, even if Campbell is right, we can appeal to a restricted incompatibility
thesis: namely, that free will and determinism are incompatible for agents relevantly
like us (who do not live in a world where time is circular, or where there is no first
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instant, etc.).
If the crucial question concerning the consequence argument is that about whether
or not the laws of nature are up to us (and not the past), then it seems to me that
the compatibility problem (the problem of whether determinism and free will are
compatible) depends on what is the right account of laws. But does it depend on
the view that laws govern? I think that this is an interesting question, and this is
something that I would want to work on more. My impression is that Demarest’s
(2017) view that combines a best system account of lawhood with the thesis that the
fundamental properties are essentially dispositional may also justify the the claim
that the laws of nature are not up us. Also, a best system account does not require
that the laws of nature cover everything, and it seems to me that this view could be
articulated in a way not to cover actional events. This view would still be compatible
with agent causation, and so would be a sort of non-governing libertarianism.
In chapter 7, I tried to show how important the distinction between extent and
permissiveness is. My suspicion is that the problem with respect to indeterminism
and free will arises because we presuppose that the laws govern or cover our actions,
and are indeterministic with respect to it. This is even more evident in Mele’s
formulation of the luck argument. Clearly, that argument only goes through if we
already presuppose that the laws govern everything and are indeterministic with
respect to our actions. But what are the reasons for accepting that the laws govern
everything else? Perhaps they do not need to. If so, premise 1 in the luck argument
need not be true.
This brings us here. If my overall argument is sound, there is nothing in the
very nature of a law that implies that there are no genuine alternative possibilities.
Agents are able to do otherwise if we accept a Humean view of laws, where laws
do not govern, or if we accept a view where deterministic laws obtain only on the
assumption that there is no interference by agents. The only difference is that the
Humean view is compatible with alternative possibilities even if determinism is true,
while the dispositional essentialist view requires determinism not to be true (which,
by the way, does not require laws to be indeterministic). However, showing that
laws are consistent with various paths available to the agent does not show that
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the agent has control, that is, that "the agent (and not some outside force or mere
chance) selects which path will be the path into the future" (Fischer 1999: 99). The
problem is that finding out what control is requires a trek farther down than the
one I have traversed.
Appendix A
Better best system accounts
In chapter 2 I focused only on Lewis’ BSA. But there are recent accounts of the BSA
that make a departure from Lewis’ formulation. The standard view of determinism
has problems in accommodating recent accounts of laws in which laws of nature and
laws of science go hand in hand. My goal in this interlude is to take a look at this
issue in a bit more detail.
One of the attractive aspects of the BSA is that it does not appear to be an
account of laws disconnected from science. Loewer, for example, is "very much
attracted to the BSA because of the way it incorporates the criteria physicists use
for counting generalizations and equations as expressing laws" (Loewer 2007: 313).
Van Fraassen, however, has raised a problem concerning the connection between
laws of science and laws of nature according to Lewis’ BSA. The main controversy
is on whether the BSA should depend on the language of natural properties. This,
of course, needs clarification.
In formulating Lewis’ BSA I pointed out that laws appear in the best systems
that are deductively closed and whose non-logical vocabulary contains only predi-
cates that express perfectly natural properties. Clearly, according to this formula-
tion, Lewis’ BSA depends on the notion of a perfectly natural property. But what
does it mean?
Bird (2007) considers a distinction between two uses of the term "property". A
philosopher may use the term "property" in a sense that “there is a property for
every predicate or open sentence"; for example, she might say something like “the
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property of being either blue or made of plastic". By contrast, there is a more
restricted use of the term "property":
For example, a scientist may discover or synthesize a hitherto unknown molecule.
It would be natural to say that her next task is to “discover its properties”. In
that sense, its properties do not include “the property of being first synthesized
on a Wednesday” or “the property of being φ” (where something is φ iff it is
a member of the set (molecule, the Eiffel tower, the power set of the natural
numbers) (Bird 2007: 9).
Lewis (1986) distinguishes the liberal use from the restricted one by distinguish-
ing "non-natural" (or abundant) properties from "natural" (or sparse) properties.
This is what he says about the distinction:
Many philosophers are skeptical about the distinction between natural and
gruesome properties. They think it illegitimate, unless it can somehow be
drawn in terms that do not presuppose it. It is impossible to do that, I think,
because we presuppose it constantly. Shall we say that natural properties
are the ones that figure in laws of nature? - Not if we are going to use
naturalness of properties when we draw the line between laws of nature and
accidental regularities. Shall we say that they are the ones that figure in the
content of thought? - Not if we are going to say that avoidance of gratuitous
gruesomeness is part of what constitutes the correctness of an ascription of
content. Shall we say that they are the ones whose instances are united by
resemblance? - Not if we are going to say that resemblance is the sharing of
natural properties. Unless we are prepared to forgo some of the uses of the
distinction between natural and unnatural properties, we shall have no easy
way to define it without circularity. That is no reason to reject the distinction.
Rather, that is a reason to accept it - as primitive, if need be. (Lewis 1983:
344)
So, on Lewis’ view not all properties are on a par; some of them - the perfectly
natural properties - belong to a select group and are sparse. The distinction plays
a crucial role in his formulation of the BSA because of the following problem.
Given any arbitrary system of true sentences S, we can always find a way to
axiomatise S in a very simple way. Let F be a primitive predicate that applies to
all and only things at worlds where S holds (Lewis, 1983: 42, cf. Loewer 1996:
185) and let S be axiomatised by ∀xFx. Here is the problem. Suppose S is a
system that includes all the truths of the actual world, so that it contains all true
generalisations (including of course accidental generalisations). If we axiomatise S
by the axiom ∀xFx, we will have a very simple and informative system. But, of
course, every true generalisation will be a law. As a result, the BSA will be unable
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to distinguish laws from accidental true generalisations. This is how the distinction
between natural and non-natural properties comes into play: “the simple predicates
of the language in which systems are formulated (and in which their simplicity is
evaluated) must express [perfectly] natural properties” (Loewer 1996: 185). That
axiomatization of S will not be the best system because the predicate "F" does not
express a perfectly natural property.
The distinction between natural and non-natural properties thus plays an im-
portant role in Lewis’ formulation of the BSA. Without it, it seems the BSA will
be unable to distinguish laws from accidental regularities. However, van Fraassen
argues that there is a problem with Lewis’ BSA precisely because it requires the
simple predicates of the language in which systems are formulated to express such
properties.
A.1 Van Fraassen’s problem
Suppose that "at a certain point in history, all the primitive scientific predicates
are natural ones" (van Fraassen 1989: 53). Van Fraassen invites us to imagine a
scientist who enters the field with a new system, much simpler and stronger than
the previous systems. However, this new system is formulated in a language whose
basic predicates do not express perfectly natural properties. As van Fraassen points
out, this cannot be a bad day for science. One should expect scientists to consider
the new system the best one. And if that is the case, it could turn out that what
scientists regard as laws of nature are not laws according to Lewis’ view.
Loewer formulates the problem as follows:
Suppose that FT is what Steven Weinberg calls "a final theory." FT maximally
satisfies all the requirements that the tradition and practice of fundamental
physics puts on a fundamental theory of the world. FT is true, simple, highly
informative, comprehensive; FT reconciles relativity and quantum theory, ex-
plains statistical mechanical probabilities, and explains special science regu-
larities, and so on. It does all this better than any alternative theory whether
the alternative has ever been or ever will be thought up by anyone. There is
no true theory that better than FT balances all these virtues. Even so it may
turn out that some contingent generalizations/equations entailed by FT are
not L-laws [laws according to Lewis]. Further, there may be L-laws that FT
fails to entail (2007, 322)
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The reason why this might happen is that FT - our "final" theory - may be
formulated in a language - say LF - whose basic predicates do not express perfectly
natural properties. Now suppose that FT is translated into a language LN whose
basic predicates correspond to perfectly natural properties. As Loewer points out,
it could be that, when translated into LN , FT is beaten out in the contest for
best system by another system LT : when both systems need to be formulated in a
language whose predicates express perfectly natural properties, such as LN , LT is
stronger and simpler than the final theory FT . But it is also possible that, when
both systems need to be formulated in LF , the original language of the final theory
FT , FT is stronger and simpler than LT . So, which one is the best system after
all? According to Lewis, LT is the best system, not the final theory. Loewer argues
that this raises two problems, an epistemological problem and a metaphysical one.
The epistemological problem is that “knowing all the non-nomological contingent
truths in every possible language isn’t sufficient for knowing which truths are the
laws. One would also have to know which predicates refer to Lewisian natural
properties” (2007, 322). Another way to put the epistemological problem is in terms
of epistemic accessibility (see Wheeler 2016), that is, Lewis’ formulation seems to
fail Earman’s empiricist loyalty test (Earman 1986: 85). Earman formulates the
problem in the following way:
Epistemic accessibility: for any two worlds w1 and w2, if w1 and w2 agree on all
occurrent facts, then they agree on the laws of nature.
The only problem is to cash out the notion of occurrence, since it means dif-
ferent things to different philosophers who call themselves “Humean”. How should
one fill in this notion? There are many ways, "ranging from very strict empiricist
(e.g., occurrent is actually observed) through less strict empiricist (e.g., occurrent is
observable in principle), through much less empiricist (e.g., occurrent allows unob-
servable entities like quarks reached through expansive methods such as Glymourian
boot- strapping or “inference to the best explanation”)" (Cohen and Callender 2009:
9)1. Thus, it seems what distinguishes w1 from w2 is not something accessible via
1Armstrong’s account of laws is usually thought to fail the test. Armstrong tells us that laws
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standard scientific inquiry. On the other hand, the metaphysical problem is the one
of “justifying why the aims of science should be coupled to the aims of Lewisian
metaphysics” (Loewer 2007: 322).
In sum, it seems van Fraassen’s problem undermines the attractive aspect that
the BSA is connected to science. But since the problem is related to the dependence
on the notion of perfectly natural properties, this is a good motivation to develop a
version of the BSA without appealing to natural properties. That is exactly what
Loewer, Callender and Cohen attempted to do.
A.2 Recent attempts to solve van Fraassen’s prob-
lem
If one is willing to reject natural properties in order to formulate the BSA, then one
option is to let scientists to decide what the acceptable terms are. This is Loewer’s
solution to the problem. According to him, science should tell us what is the right
language. If scientists manage to carry out the "final theory", then one will be able
to tell what the predicates of the best system express.
Here is a way of thinking of the BSA in which Lewisian natural properties
play no role. Consider the world w of all pairs < L, T > of possible languages
L and candidates for best systems of w T such that
• T is formulated in L
• T is true of w
• T is a final theory for w (i.e., T is true and best satisfies the criteria of
simplicity, informativeness, comprehensives, and whatever other condi-
tions the scientific tradition places on a final theory for w.
of nature are necessary relations among first-order universals. Suppose the generalization “All
F’s are G’s” is true at both worlds w1 and w2. F-ness and G-ness are taken to be first-order
universals. According to Armstrong, if “All F’s are G’s” is a law of nature, then there is a second-
order contingent relation holding between these two universals, call it “N(F,G)”, such that N(F,G)
entails the corresponding generalization. Since N is a contingent relation, it could turn out that
N(F,G) entails “All F’s are G’s” at w1 but not at w2. Now, if “All F’s are G’s” is a law at w1
but not at w2, then w1 and w2 are distinct worlds. And what distinguishes w1 from w2 is the
necessitation relation that only holds at w1. However, as Earman says, N(F,G) “is contingent on
another category of facts which transcend the occurrent” (Earman 1986: 104).
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From all such pairs < L, T > select the one (ones) < FL,FT > that includes the
best theory [where FL refers to the language of the final theory]. < FL,FT >
is the ‘best of the best’ and determines the laws of w. (Loewer 2007: 324)
Here is how to assess the best theory according to this view. First, there is a
comparison of systems formulated with a particular language in order to determine
the best system for that language. Second, from all such possible languages and
best systems < L1, T1 >, < L2, T2 >, ... < Ln, Tn >, there is a selection of the "best
of the best" with respect to the conditions the scientific tradition places on a final
theory. Loewer calls this view "the package deal account" (PDA) of laws because
it identifies the laws and the nomological properties together (Loewer 2007: 324).
This is why van Fraassen’s problem should not be a problem. Furthermore, (PDA)
can deal with Lewis’ trivial system ∀xFx, for Loewer may just claim that it lacks
explanatory appeal from the point of view of the scientific community.
If we accept Cartwright’s view (1989, 2009, 2010) that what we think of as the
usual laws of physics may well be limited in extent, then the laws of nature according
to Loewer’s view account will be limited in extent.
A.3 Cohen and Callender’s account
Just like PDA, Cohen and Callender’s view allows the scientific community to de-
cide the acceptable terms in which systems are formulated as well. There are three
guiding ideas that motivate the development of their better best system account of
laws (BBSA for short). That is, BBSA is supposed to satisfy the following three
desiderata: the problem of immanent comparisons, the problem of epistemic acces-
sibility and how to account for special science generalisations. I will focus for now
on the first and the second and leave the third one for last.
With respect to epistemic accessibility I have already mentioned Earman’s em-
piricist loyalty test. BBSA and PDA will agree on the fact that it is up to the
scientific community to decide the acceptable terms in which systems are to be
formulated. And I have already mentioned the concern about immanent compari-
son by considering the trivialisation worry raised by Lewis. But since Cohen and
Callender think that the problem of immanent comparisons is prior to that worry
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(2009: 6), a few comments are necessary. Following Quine’s terminology (1970)
they say that "simplicity is an immanent (defined relative to a system of basic kinds
or basic predicates) rather than transcendent (defined independently of the system
of basic kinds or basic predicates) notion" (Cohen and Callender 2009: 5)2. Cohen
and Callender argue that simplicity, strength and balance are immanent rather than
transcendent (Cohen and Callender 2009: 6). Consider simplicity, for instance. A
language that contains "grue" and "bleen" as simple predicates (Goodman 1954)
rather than "green" will count "All emeralds are green" as less simple than one that
contains "green" as a simple predicate (cf. Loewer 1996: 109).
Cohen and Callender first consider (and then reject) what they call "stipula-
tionism": when formulating the systems, scientists are allowed to a once-and-for-all
stipulation of acceptable terms, so that all future systems must be formulated in
terms of this "stipulated base". However, according to them,
a once-and-for-all stipulationism offends against the anti-apriorism that in-
spires this theory of laws. As we just witnessed, any particular choice of X
will preclude (what should be) live empirical possibilities. When we choose an
X as our stipulated kind, we thereby remove X from the normal back-and-forth
of scientific bartering (Cohen and Callender 2009: 18).
They offer an alternative view called "flexible stipulationism". The idea is that
science should not be exempt from revision and evaluation.
With respect to the problem of arbitrariness, the proponent of stipulative
[BSA] can treat her stipulated fixed background (of kinds, observable, etc.) as
a pro tanto, a posteriori, and defeasible assumption that is not insulated from
empirical inquiry. The thought would be that, while some or other stipulated
background is needed to carry out comparisons needed to fix [BSA’s] laws,
the background can itself be subject to rational revision on other occasions.
(Cohenn and Callender: 2009: 20)
So what they propose instead is a relativised BSA, where there is no "transcen-
dently best system (not fixed by nature, not stipulated once and for all by us)"
(Cohen and Callender 2009: 21). The best systems are axiomatised relative to a
specific choice of basic kinds K (to a specific choice of basic predicates PK). For
example, suppose there is a set E of economic predicates and a set B of biological
2This has been widely noticed by many authors such as (Lewis 1983: 366–368; 1986: 123–124;
Earman 1986; van Fraassen 1989: 41–43, 51–55; Taylor 1993: 82; Loewer 1996: 109).
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predicates. The general claims that represent laws of economics appear in the best
system formulated in terms of economic predicates. The general claims that rep-
resent laws of biology appear in the best system formulated in terms of biological
predicates.
The worry about immanent comparison is solved since systems can be compared
with each other provided they are formulated in the same language. So, for example,
systems formulated in terms of biological predicates can be compared with each
other with respect to simplicity, strength and balance. The worry about epistemic
accessibility is also settled as long as "the kinds in terms of which it is formulated
are epistemically accessible" (Cohen and Callender 2009: 21).
As BBSA is an account that relativises laws to kinds it is natural to expect some-
thing to be said about what natural kinds are. Cohen and Callender interestingly
suggest to adopt explosive realism:
The answer in question is a proposed middle way between naive relativism
and the idea that nature possesses a uniquely true carving up into kinds; on
this view, the world permits possibly infinitely many distinct carvings up into
kinds, each equally good from the perspective of nature itself, but differentially
congenial and significant to us given the kinds of creatures we are, perceptual
apparatus we have, and (potentially variable) matters we care about. Thus
some sets of objects, although perfectly objective and well-defined, are not
interesting to us, e.g., the set of the Eiffel tower, the two authors, and elm
trees, whereas others are, e.g., the set of living creatures (Cohen and Callender
2009: 22).
And they emphasise that combining explosive realism with BBSA allows us to
account for regularities in the special sciences. Notice that since on their view there
is no transcendently best system, systems axiomatised relative to different choices
of basic kinds (and so formulated in terms of different sets of predicates) cannot be
compared with each other. So - for instance - a system axiomatised relative to a
specific choice of basic kinds B (say, biological kinds) to a specific choice of biological
predicates cannot be compared with a system axiomatised relative to basic kinds E
formulated in terms of economic predicates. The pay-off is that this allows to count
special science generalisations as law statements, even if their predicates do not pick
out perfectly natural, fundamental properties3.
3This, however, is controversial. See Backmann & Reutlinger (2014). For a defence of the
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Lewis’ BSA has problems in counting special science generalisations as law state-
ments for two reasons. First, there is the requirement that systems need to be
formulated in terms of predicates that express fundamental and perfectly natural
properties, which is something that special science do not do. For example, imagine
we construct a system in botany; it is unlikely that the basic predicates of such a
system will pick out fundamental properties. Second, special science generalisations
are usually thought of as allowing exceptions, and so "the fact that they are gen-
erally incomplete descriptions of reality imply that candidate special science laws
will lose in terms of strength to candidate fundamental laws" (Cohen and Callender
2009: 23).
As one might expect, on such a view agents like us may be an exception to the
laws that cover everything else in the world. After all the laws of nature depend on
systems that are always constructed relative to a specific choice of basic kinds K
(to a specific choice of basic predicates PK). And it could be that these predicates
fail to pick out properties concerning agents like us. So BBSA-laws may very well
be limited in extent. On the other hand, it could be that some (physical, biological,
etc.) laws are deterministic whereas the laws that cover agents are not. That is,
laws may be permissive for agents while being impermissive for everything else.
There are many interesting aspects to consider, and the connection between the
BBSA, explosive realism and free will is rather unexplored. It seems to me however
that the BBSA will not have trouble with the claim that there is free will. My
goal was just to point out the importance of the distinction between extent and
permissiveness according to this view.
traditional BSA see Wheeler (2015).
Appendix B
Proofs of rules (α-M) and (β-M)
The following proof can be given on Lewis’ system, where the following holds:
(L) φ◇→ ψ ⊣⊢ ∼(φ ∼ψ)
B.1 α-M
We start proving (α-M):
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1 □φ
2 φ E□, 1
3 Can(s, a, t1) ∧ (Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼φ)
4 Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼φ ∧E, 3
5 Does(s, a, t1)
6 φ E□, 1
7 Does(s, a, t1) φ ⇒I, 5–6
8 Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼φ ∧E, 3
9 ∼(Does(s, a, t1) φ) L, 8
10 ⊥
11 ∼(Can(s, a, t1) ∧ (Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼L)) ¬I, 3–11
12 ∀x∼(Can(x, a, t1) ∧ (Does(x, a, t1)◇→ ∼φ)) ∀I, 11
13 ∀x∀α∼(Can(x, α, t1) ∧ (Does(x, α, t1)◇→ ∼φ)) ∀I, 12
14 ∀x∀α∀t∼(Can(x, α, t) ∧ (Does(x, α, t)◇→ ∼φ)) ∀I, 13
15 ∼∃x∃α∃t[Can(x, α, t) ∧ (Does(x, α, t)◇→ ∼φ)] DM, 10
16 φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α∃t[Can(x, α, t) ∧ (Does(x, α, t)◇→ ∼φ) ∧I, 2, 11
B.2 β-M
Now we prove (β-M):
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1 Nφ
2 N(φ→ ψ)
3 φ ∧ ∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼φ)] def, 1
4 φ→ ψ ∧ ∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ))] def, 1
5 ψ ⇒E, 1, 2
6 ∼(ψ ∧ ∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼ψ)]
7 ∼ψ ∨ ∼∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼ψ)] DM, 6
8 ∼∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼ψ) DS, 5, 7
9 ∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼ψ) ¬E, 8
10 Can(s, a, t1) ∧ (Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼ψ) ∃E, 9
11 ∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ))] ∧E, 4
12 ∼[Can(s, a, t1) ∧ (Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ))] ∀E, 11
13 ∼Can(s, a, t1) ∨ ∼(Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ)) DM
14 Can(s, a, t1) ∧E, 10
15 ∼(Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼(φ→ ψ)) DS, 13, 14
16 Does(s, a, t1) (φ→ ψ) L, 15
17 ∼[Can(s, a, t1) ∧ (Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼φ)] ∀E, 3
18 ∼(Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼φ) DS, 14, 17
19 Does(s, a, t1) φ L, 18
20 Does(s, a, t1)
21 φ , 19, 20
22 φ→ ψ , 16, 20
23 ψ ⇒E, 21, 22
24 Does(s, a, t1) ψ , 20–23
25 Does(s, a, t1)◇→ ∼ψ ∧E, 10
26 ∼(Does(s, a, t1) ψ) L, 25
27 ⊥
28 ψ ∧ ∼∃x∃α∃t′[Can(x, α, t′) ∧ (Does(x, α, t′)◇→ ∼ψ)]
29 Nψ
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